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December 11, 1992
Mr. Norman N. Strauss, Chairman
Accounting Standards Executive Committee
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Strauss:
We are writing to express our views and concerns 
related to the proposed . accounting changes for 
Employees Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) as embodied in 
the September 8, 1992, AICPA draft Statement of 
Position (SOP), "Employers Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans.” The proposed changes will 
have a dramatic adverse impact on employers, and 
consequently on employees, when the fair value of the 
stock held by the ESOP increases during the period 
between the stock purchase date and the stock release 
date. We agree that some of the more recent ESOP 
arrangements may not be addressed adequately in 
current accounting standards and that further guidance 
and clarification is needed. However, we strongly 
disagree with the provisions affecting ESOPs that 
provide only incremental compensation to employees and 
are not used to fund other employee benefit plans, 
such as 401(k) savings plans.
The Home Depot was founded in 1978 and will have grown 
to 214 stores by our fiscal year end in January, 1993. 
These stores will generate approximately seven billion 
dollars in revenues for fiscal 1992, with an employee 
base of approximately 40,000. The motivation of our 
employees has been the most important element in 
helping us to grow and succeed. As a result of our 
collective efforts, the value of our stock has also 
increased significantly during our short history. Our 
plan is to grow to over 500 stores with approximately
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90,000 employees by the end of fiscal 1995. Without 
the continued motivation of our employees, these goals 
will be difficult to attain.
After considering several alternatives, we decided to 
establish an ESOP in 1988. This decision was based on 
several factors, including the accounting treatment 
existing in SOP 76-3. This was the most viable 
vehicle to allow our employees to reap the benefits of 
their efforts and for The Home Depot to achieve its 
goal of encouraging employees to act like owners of 
the business. It has been our philosophy to share our 
success with our employees by virtue of our ESOP. 
Many of these people and their families have never had 
an equity interest in any other company. Our 
employees tell us that the benefits received from the 
ESOP are extremely important to their financial 
security and self worth, and an important factor in 
their desire to be a part of The Home Depot team.
The ESOP we established was intended to provide 
additional compensation to our employees, not to 
provide a portion of their current compensation. The 
ESOP purchases shares on the open market using funds 
borrowed from The Home Depot and releases the shares 
to the employees as the loan is repaid. This provided 
an additional benefit of approximately 8%-10% of our 
employees base compensation. Had the company not 
purchased the shares in prior years, the benefit would 
have been significantly less. The unreleased shares 
are considered legally outstanding. These shares 
remain the property of the Trust and connot revert to 
The Home Depot. The only circumstance under which The 
Home Depot can receive the benefit of the shares held 
in trust is in the unlikely event that the plan is 
terminated. Even then, employees participating in the 
plan receive the benefit of any excess of the market 
value of shares held in trust over the remaining 
principal balance of the ESOP debt. All risks and 
rewards revert to the employees at the time the shares 
are purchased. Therefore, we believe that the stock 
purchase date is the appropriate point to measure 
compensation expense.
The minority view expressed by three members of the 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) in 
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the September 8, 1992 draft SOP is consistent with our 
position. Previous drafts circulated to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission proposed no significant change to 
ESOPs used to provide additional compensation to 
employees. We understand that, based on reviews by 
the FASB and the SEC, the draft SOP has been revised 
to require employers to account for the release of 
shares at fair value at the release date for all 
ESOPs. The accounting for our ESOP was appropriately 
considered in SOP 76-3 and the subsequent consensus 
positions of the Emerging Issues Task Force. TO apply 
the same accounting to all forms of ESOP arrangements 
would dilute the efforts we have made to allow our 
employees to share in the success of The Home Depot. 
We will be forced to change our policy of buying 
shares before releasing them to the employees, and 
begin buying and releasing the shares simultaneously. 
While we will continue to provide benefits to our 
employees through the ESOP, the effective benefit to 
the employees will most likely be reduced to 
approximately 2% of their annual salary from the 
historical 8%-10%.
We have intentionally omitted extensive technical 
arguments against the proposed SOP. There has been 
sufficient discussion of the technical merits of the 
proposed changes. We feel that more consideration 
should be given to the impact that the proposed 
changes will have on employees. We believe the 
original AcSEC position that left substantially 
unchanged the accounting for existing ESOPs that 
provide additional compensation for employees is the 
most appropriate position. The current draft SOP that 
requires changes for all ESOPs will result in 
considerable measurable cost to our employees, as well 
a potential negative impact that may affect our future 
growth. This appears to us to be counter productive 
in an economy where businesses should be encouraged to 
grow and create new jobs. In our opinion, the 
benefits that will be provided by the accounting and 
other changes in the draft SOP will be greatly 
overshadowed by the overall potential cost to 
businesses and their employees.
We appreciate your consideration of our views 
presented in this letter, and would be pleased to 
discuss them with you at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
Ronald M. Brill
pc: Mr. Dennis R. Beresford, Chairman 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
401 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, CT 06856-5116
Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager-Accounting Standards 
AICPA 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
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Grow Group, Inc
 
Pan Am Building 
200 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 
10166
Telephone (212) 599-4400
TWX; 710-581-3686
Telecopier: 212-286-0940
January 13, 1993
Dianne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
AICPA, 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee
The following points constitute my comments on the Exposure Draft 
of an SOP on Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
1) I believe that the issue of accounting for ESOP’s is 
sufficiently broad in scope and inportant enough in inpact to be 
addressed by the only fully recognized standards setting body - the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. The AICPA (of which I am a 
member) and other accounting organizations have turned over the 
responsibility for setting accounting standards to the FASB and I 
object to the arbitrary establishment of standards by the AICPA.
Further, I believe that the adoption of a standard effective at the 
beginning of fiscal years ending after December 15, 1993 (years 
beginning after December 16, 1992) is unreasonable. No consideration 
is given to the needs of corporations to plan for the impact on 
budgets, forecasts, loan agreement covenants, etc. For example, if a 
calendar year corporation's ESOP acquired shares through a leveraged 
transaction on September 24, 1992, it would be required to account for 
the item under the Proposed SOP as early as January 1993 (Now!!). This 
could cause violations of loan covenants based on earnings tests with 
no opportunity to negotiate changes ultimately resulting in 
bankruptcy. With a little foresight (by the FASB!) the effective dates 
could be amended to provide some breathing room.
Insofar as the significant technical change which is to measure 
compensation by the Fair Market Value of shares committed to be 
released rather than based upon the original acquisition cost of these 
shares, I believe that this is another departure from the historical 
cost basis of financial statements and should be addressed only by the 
FASB as part of a conceptual framework project. This piecemeal
Dionne D. McNamee 
January 13, 1993 
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approach to Fair Market Value concepts results in confusing and 
inconsistent financial statements. There is no conceptual difference 
between measuring a charge for depreciation on an FMV basis and a 
charge for compensation on an FMV basis; yet we are asked to accept 
financial results that measure depreciation on a historical cost basis 
and certain forms of compensation on a FMV basis.
fe:ms
cc: N. Strauss, Partner E&Y
R. Banks
L. Frank
M. Wovsaniker, Partner E&Y
 Frank V. Esser, C.P.A. 
Treasurer & CFO
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From: Pauline Leung or Mr. Uri (phone no 415-982-2412 Fax no. 296- 
8616)
To: Dionne D. McNamee (Fax no. 202-638-4512)
Res Exposure Draft Proposed statement of Position-Employees' 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plan
I have two questions on the above exposure draft
1) paragraph 13: An employer should report the issuance of 
shares... to ESOP when it occurs and should report a corresponding 
charge to unearned compensation, a contra equity account. 
paragraph 25 : Employers that sponsor an ESOP with a direct loan 
should report the obligations of the ESOP to outsider lender as 
liabilities.
paragraph 61: ...because the shares transferred when the ESOP is 
established are not exchanged for a receipt of assets, services, or 
for a reduction of liabilities, total shareholders* equity should 
remain unchanged.(?????)
How the equity remain unchanged if a contra equity account 
(unearned compensation) is created? Should the liabilities 
mentioned in paragraph 25 be putted under equity section or 
liabilities section in the Balance Sheet
2) paragraph 49 ...Differences result when a) the fair value of
shares committed to be released differs from the cost of those 
shares to the ESOP ....Such differences should be reported in 
accordance with FASB 109 . The difference between FMV and cost
appears to be a permanent difference to me and FASB accounts for 
timing difference not permanent difference.
ESOP 
TM
The 
ESOP 
Association
The ESOP Association
1726 M Street. NW 
Suite 501
Washington, D.C. 20036 
202-293-2971
FAX 202-293-7568
President
J. Michael Keeling
Officers
Chair
Donald B. Williford 
Corporate Secretary 
Ruddick Corporation
Senior Vice Chair
Richard G. Biernacki 
President
Fastener Industries
Vice Chair  W. Gabrielsen 
ecutive Vice President
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Treasurer
Steven R. Koch
Vice President/Treasurer 
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Dan R. Bannister 
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Vit Eckersdorf 
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Bofors, Inc.
February 17, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 
AICPA 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is written in response to the December 21, 1992 Accounting Standards 
Executive Committee’s (AcSEC) request for comments on the proposed statement of 
position (SOP) entitled Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs).
The ESOP Association (TEA) is the only national business trade association 
representing corporations that sponsor ESOPs, and those firms and individuals that 
provide services to those entities with regard to ESOPs. Since its founding in 1979, 
TEA’S membership from corporate sponsors of ESOPs has grown to include 
approximately 1,000 American corporations and 600 service providers. The 
demographics of TEA’S corporate members is similar to that of American businesses as 
evidenced by the fact that TEA has members who are large, publicly-traded corporations 
with thousands and thousands of employees as well as small, closely-held corporations, 
with every size company in-between. Some corporate TEA members’ ESOP have 50% 
to 100% of the corporation’s stock in the ESOP, while others may have less than 5% of 
their stock in an ESOP.
TEA has a well-defined committee structure which provides its elected leaders 
analysis and recommendations on highly technical matters, such as the proposed SOP, 
which could affect ESOPs. This letter of comment was prepared with the assistance of 
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
February 17, 1993
Page 2
TEA’S Task Force on the Proposed ESOP Accounting Standards. In summation, TEA is the best 
qualified and most knowledgeable entity in America with regard to ESOPs, employee ownership and the 
public ramifications of actions that affect ESOPs.
Our comments are directed at the Need for a Change in Accounting and, as specifically requested, 
the issues of Recognition of Compensation Cost, Effective Date and Transition, and Disclosures.
Need for a Change in Accounting
In paragraphs 4 through 9 of the proposed SOP, the BACKGROUND discussion indicates that 
the utilization of ESOPs have grown significantly from 1976, when SOP 76-3 was issued, through the 
end of 1990, and from a structural standpoint, have grown more complex. Although we agree with these 
observations, we fail to see why these developments necessitate any change in the existing accounting 
pronouncements which govern the accounting for and reporting on ESOPs. Additionally, we fail to see 
why the LAW CHANGES, presented in APPENDIX B of the proposed SOP, offer any compelling 
reasons to prompt the current efforts of AcSEC to alter the accounting for ESOPs.
In fact, we believe that AcSEC’s citation of the many Acts of Congress illustrates the important 
public policy considerations involving ESOPs and employee ownership. While it is common to disregard 
the impact of accounting standards on corporate behavior, the fact is that accounting standards do 
influence corporate behavior. Accounting rules that ignore public policy as set forth in APPENDIX B 
do need to be reexamined to ensure that our desire for accounting accuracy is not overriding important 
public policy goals. In truth, accuracy in accounting, and widespread employee ownership are not 
mutually exclusive.
SOP 76-3 has stood the test of time! This accounting pronouncement has provided fundamental 
guidance for the accounting for and reporting on leveraged ESOPs. We have not heard any out-cry for 
change from TEA’S membership and are not aware of any other interested groups, other than AcSec, who 
sense or demand any further changes in ESOP accounting or reporting. The underlying economic 
substance of a leveraged ESOP is correctly reported under the existing guidelines provided by SOP 76-3.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
February 17, 1993
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ESOP trusts and sponsors, employee-shareholders, ESOP lenders, service providers and 
regulators are all familiar with the existing body of accounting literature on this important subject. 
Lacking evidence of concern on the part of any of these groups, which can only be gained by polling 
these constituents, we fail to see where the value is to be gained from making the significant accounting 
and disclosure changes suggested by the proposed SOP. TEA agrees with the MINORITY VIEW that 
it would be an error to tamper with the existing ESOP accounting framework, particularly in-light of the 
current Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) project on accounting for employee stock 
compensation.
Recognition of Compensation Cost
TEA strongly opposes the proposed position that ESOP compensation cost should be categorically 
measured based on the fair value of shares when they are released. We are of the opinion that the 
valuation of ESOP shares to employee-shareholders must be distinguished based on which party, the 
ESOP sponsor or the ESOP beneficiaries, bears the risks and rewards associated with changes in the value 
of ESOP shares to be allocated.
Our opinion on this critical issue of measuring ESOP compensation cost is based on our views, 
which differ from those offered by AcSEC, of the reasons presented on pages 21 and 22 of the proposed 
SOP which are provided to support the proposed categorical change to fair value expense measurement:
• As stated above, we see no need, nor are we aware of any developments which 
necessitate an immediate change to the existing body of accounting pronouncements 
which govern the accounting for and disclosure of ESOPs. We specifically disagree with 
AcSEC’s conclusion that ESOPs have undergone such significant fundamental changes 
since 1976 as to warrant the wholesale abandonment of the guidelines presented in SOP 
76-3 and the various applicable emerging issue Task Force issue statements.
The fair value of the ESOP shares committed to be released does not necessarily reflect 
the value of the employee-shareholders’ services received by the ESOP sponsor. The 
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value of the services to the ESOP sponsor is a function of the intent and operation of the 
ESOP and of which party stands to gain or lose as a result of changes in the value of the 
ESOP stock yet to be allocated. To the extent that ESOP shares are to be allocated in 
the future as a direct function of the payment of principal and/or interest payments on 
ESOP debt obligations, the value of the services provided by the employee-shareholders 
is equal to the cash expended to meet the ESOP debt service requirements. From the 
perspective of the ESOP sponsor with ESOP debt to be repaid under a level amortization 
schedule, the value of the compensation provided is constant. The economic reality of 
a leveraged ESOP is most appropriately measured by its cash consequences; interjecting 
opportunity cost measures such as fair value distorts, rather than enhances, the 
measurement of the ESOP sponsor’s operating performance. The value of this 
compensation is variable only to the employee-shareholders because only they benefit or 
lose as a result of any changes in fair value.
Although employers do have the ability to manage their employees* total compensation 
package, it is erroneous to assume, as AcSEC has done, that employers typically alter 
the values of the other components of their compensation package in direct response to 
the actual or potential changes in the fair value of ESOP shares. Additionally, it is not 
typical for ESOP sponsors to alter ESOP debt service payments to achieve certain 
compensation goals, given the typical requirements imposed within ESOP related debt 
instruments. Because the risks and rewards of holding employer equity securities 
typically rest solely with the employee-shareholders, employer compensation 
considerations are focused on issues such as inflation rates, levels of company 
profitability or the lack thereof, and competitive considerations. TEA’S members have 
not experienced any windfalls from lowering other cash and non-cash compensation plans 
as a direct result of higher valuations for their ESOP shares, nor have any increased the 
cost of their other compensation components in direct response to lower than anticipated 
fair values or the prospect of potentially lower future valuations of their ESOP shares. 
There is no evidence supporting AcSEC’s view in this regard.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
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• For the reasons stated earlier, TEA contends that ESOP compensation costs should be 
based on which party, the ESOP sponsor or the ESOP beneficiaries, bear the risks and 
rewards associated with changes in the fair value of ESOP shares to be allocated. 
Therefore, we do not agree with the current or proposed requirements to measure 
categorically ESOP compensation expense applicable to shares allocated by an ESOP 
created through a pension reversion or from a non-leveraged ESOP at fair value.
Although TEA finds a number of the proposed changes in ESOP accounting to be conceptually 
appealing, such as considering ESOP shares as outstanding only to the extent they have been allocated, 
we do not believe these positives adequately offset the confusion and distortions that would otherwise 
result from the adoption of the proposed SOP. Additionally, we find a number of the other proposed 
accounting changes within the proposed SOP to be conceptually flawed, such as the proposed accounting, 
as outlined in paragraph 50 of the proposed SOP, for the non-existent tax effect of the difference between 
book (fair value) expense and tax deductible (cost) expense of ESOP allocations.
Consistent with our views concerning which party benefits or suffers from changes in the fair 
value of ESOP shares to be allocated, TEA believes it is generally appropriate to measure ESOP 
compensation expense based on cost value. The only conceptually acceptable exception, which would 
imply the alternative use of fair value as a basis to measure expense, is where fair value is central to 
defining the number of ESOP shares which will be allocated to employee-shareholders. TEA’S position 
concerning this critical issue of recognition of compensation cost is thus in basic agreement with the 
MINORITY VIEW.
Effective Date and Transition, and Disclosures
TEA does support the transition approach outlined in paragraph 57 of the proposed SOP, except 
as it relates to the requirements which become operational if the decision to initially apply the provisions 
of the proposed SOP is delayed beyond December 31, 1994. However, TEA does not support AcSEC’s 
decision to establish September 23, 1992, as the date which dictates the adoption of the proposed 
accounting requirements for new ESOP shares acquired on or after this date. Lastly, and equally as 
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important, TEA does not support the proposed requirement expressed in paragraph 54 which will apply 
to ESOP sponsors who do not elect to apply the proposed accounting provisions to old (acquired on or 
prior to September 22, 1992) ESOP shares, a proposal which will be unfairly applicable solely to 
publicly-held corporations, and which will require them to provide pro forma income and earnings per 
share data as though the new accounting requirements had been adopted.
Although we appreciate the effort expended by the AICPA to provide TEA’S members with a 
copy of the exposure draft of the proposed SOP, TEA has great difficulty understanding why AcSEC has 
elected a cut-off date of September 22, 1992, for the acquisition ESOP shares which may be accounted 
for under the existing ESOP accounting framework. Given that a number of TEA’s members and other 
ESOP sponsors had no awareness of the developments which preceded the publication of the exposure 
draft or the September 23, 1992, cut-off date, we anticipate that a number of ESOP sponsors will find 
that the accounting rules which they thought would be available to account for their recently acquired 
ESOP shares are no longer valid. As indicated in paragraph 94 of the proposed SOP, ESOPs are 
typically long-term undertakings and the accounting treatment is generally an important consideration in 
ESOP establishment.
We believe adhering to any cut-off date prior to December 21, 1992, the date the exposure draft 
of the proposed SOP was issued, contradicts the spirit and process of soliciting comments on proposed 
accounting requirements. TEA recommends that AcSEC follow the normal procedure of establishing a 
proposed effective date which is applicable to fiscal years beginning after the conclusion of the comment 
period on the proposed new accounting provisions. We also believe it will be very time consuming and 
costly for public ESOP sponsors to calculate the pro forma disclosures which are proposed to be required 
and which also may create more confusion rather than contribute any clarity and comparability.
TEA appreciates having the opportunity to comment on this extremely important subject of 
accounting for ESOPs. We are hopeful that AcSEC will find our comments to be helpful in reaching an 
informed decision which will continue to facilitate and foster the utilization of ESOPs by corporate 
America to achieve the direct linkage between employee and shareholder interests, a linkage which we 
believe is essential to corporate America’s survival and success in a globally competitive environment.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
February 17, 1993
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We are available to meet with AcSEC and the ESOP Task Force to further explain our comments and 
concerns with the proposed SOP.
Sincerely.
J. Michael Keeling 
President
The ESOP Association
JMK:lr 
cc: Mr. Donald B. Williford, Chair
The ESOP Association
Mr. Alan J. Schneider, Chair
The ESOP Association’s Task Force on the Proposed ESOP Accounting Standards
Mr. Norman N. Strauss, Chairman
Accounting Standards Executive Committee
Mr. John F. Hudson, Vice President
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Mr. D. Gerald Searfoss, Chairman
ESOP Task Force
Mr. Dennis R. Beresford, Chairman
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Mr. Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant 
Securities and Exchange Commission
Donnelly Meiners Jordan Kline
A Professional Corporation
Certified Public Accountants/Management Consultants
4600 Madison • Suite 1100 • Kansas City, MO 64112 
816-753-3000 • FAX 816-753-3299
February 10, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Re: Exposure Draft on "Employers’ Accounting 
for Employee Stock Ownership Plans" 
dated December 21, 1992
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I strongly recommend the term "fair value" (defined on page 12 and used 
throughout the exposure draft) be changed to "fair market value." I would 
further recommend that the definition of "fair value" stated on page 12, "the 
amount the seller could reasonably expect to receive for it (an ESOP share) in 
a current sale between a willing buyer and a willing seller, that is, other 
than a forced or liquidation sale", be changed to the accepted definition of 
"fair market value." The accepted definition of "fair market value" in the 
business valuation profession is "the amount at which property (a business 
interest) would change hands between a willing seller and a willing buyer when 
neither is acting under compulsion and when both have reasonable knowledge of 
the relevant facts."
I believe the term "fair value" defined on page 12 of the exposure draft is 
attempting to define "fair market value" and contains the elements of the 
definition of "fair market value", except for not including the phrase "both 
(willing seller and willing buyer) have reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts." In the business valuation profession, "fair value" is a statutory 
standard of value, most often applied in cases of dissenting stockholders* 
appraisal rights. While there is no clearly recognized consensus on the 
definition of "fair value", precedents established in the various state courts 
have definitely not equated "fair value" to "fair market value."
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
February 10, 1993
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To summarize, I strongly recommend the term "fair value" be changed to "fair 
market value" and the definition of "fair value" on page 12 of the exposure 
draft be changed to the definition of "fair market value" stated above.
If I can answer any questions or if you wish to discuss either of the 
recommendations I have made, please call and I will be happy to discuss.
Very truly yours
DONNELLY MEINERS JORDAN KLINE
JPC:jsf
John P. Corbin, CPA
C-CUBED
CORPORTION
5252 CHEROKEE AVE., SUITE 400 
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22312-2000 (703) 658-9685
February 25, 1993
Ms. Dionne McNammee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Subj: Draft on accounting procedures for leveraged ESOPs
Ms. McNammee:
It is my understanding that the AICPA has released a draft which proposed that shares released from an ESOP 
suspense account (as a result of an acquisition loan pay off) would be charged to compensation at their fair 
market value when released, not their cost basis, as is now the case.
I am a CPA and the Chief Financial Officer of a government contracting firm in Alexandria, Virginia. We are 
in the process of implementing a leveraged majority-owned ESOP. I am writing this letter to express my 
strong opposition to the above change. The economic cost of the dollar paid, which causes the release of 
stock from the ESOP suspense account, is still one dollar. That economic cost has not changed because an 
estimate of the value of the stock (which is merely collateral) has changed. This is particularly true in the case 
of privately owned firms which rely solely on a single valuation rather than open market trading for a 
determination of value.
The true capital of the company (when used in determining financial health), for purposes of potential investors, 
banks and other users of financial statements, has been reduced solely by the dollar paid, not by the market 
value of the released stock (which is already owned by the ESOP Trust, not the company).
The ESOP Trust is the owner of the stock (regardless of whether the transaction has been leveraged or the stock 
has been used as collateral). Transfers, allocations or distributions from one stockholder to another have never 
been, and should never be, reflected on the financial statements of a company. A company’s performance or 
financial condition is unaffected by the value placed on the stock held by its owners. (However, the opposite is 
true , that is, the stock value is reliant upon the financial condition and prospects of the company .) If stock 
were shown at fair market value on the company’s financials, the results would be different. Presenting a 
company’s capital at its fair market value has never been, and most likely will never be, a realistic financial 
presentation. Accounting for leveraged ESOPs should not deviate from this standard presentation.
I will be available to discuss this further and appreciate your consideration of my opinion.
Sincerely
cc: National Center for Employee Ownership
ESOP Association
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, TEST/EVALUATION, DOCUMENTATION, TRAINING
Rhonda Lugar / 
Chief Financial Officer 
C-CUBED Corporation
PMF
Pearsall, Maben++ Frankenbach
Insurance & Financial Services
March 2, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
RE: ESOP'S MARKET VALUE COST RECOGNITION RULE
Dear Ms. McNamee:
As a company with an ESOP, contemplating a simple leveraged 
buyout of an owner's stock, we believe that the market value 
cost-recognition rule should not apply to ESOP's such as 
ours. It should only apply to leveraged ESOP's where the 
shares, being released from the suspense account, are being 
used to satisfy a specific liability of the company, such as 
the match on a 401 (K) . The fact that the ESOP might buy 
stock at a favorable price, either negotiated at less than 
the market value, or as compared to the stock value which 
may increase during the term of the loan repayment, the 
sponsoring company should not be penalized.
Thank you for your review of our thoughts in this matter.
Sincerely,
Theodore F. Frankenbach 
Chief Financial Officer
TFF:mfm
53 Cardinal Drive. Box 2037, Westfield, NJ 07091 
Telephone (908) 232-4700 Fax (908) 232-7139
480 Morris Avenue, Summit, New Jersey 07901 
Telephone (908) 273-1900
Nantabala Outdoor Center
Nantahala
Outdoor
Center
February 27, 1993
41 US Hwy 19 West
Bryson City, NC 28713 
(704)488 2175
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
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e I am the Treasurer of the Nantahala Outdoor Center, a privately owned, majority ESOP company based in the mountains of North Carolina, and I am writing to 
comment on the draft of the new Statement of 
Position on ESOP accounting rules. Since our 
leveraged transaction took place in 1990, we can 
(and almost certainly will) elect not to follow the 
new rules, but I believe that our situation can 
illustrate some of the problems caused by these 
proposals.
In the spring of 1990, the Trustees of the NOC ESOP 
negotiated to buy over 10% of the outstanding shares 
at a cost of $100 per share (appraised value at the 
time = $138). Today, the fair market value of this 
stock is over $220 per share. The compensation cost 
for 1992 that NOC recorded was about $40,000. Under 
the new rules, this amount would have been close to 
$90,000 and that change would result in a $30,000 
decrease to the bottom line. For a company with 
annual earnings of $300,000, this is a big hit. We 
are currently negotiating with the local bank for a 
loan to finance some major capital improvements and 
a drop in reported earnings of this magnitude is 
difficult to explain to those not familiar with the 
special issues of ESOP accounting.
The recognition of compensation cost at the market 
value of the stock would disadvantage our company 
simply because the ESOP got a good deal on its stock 
purchase and the company has done well in the 
interim. I understand that there was a some 
discussion about having different sets of rules for 
ESOPs in different situations. I strongly encourage 
you not to apply the market value cost-recognition 
rule uniformly to all ESOPs. Thanks for your 
consideration.
Sincerely,
Tom Blue
  DATA INSTRUMENTS  
March 7, 1993
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
ATTENTION: Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
RE: Exposure Draft: Proposed Statement of Position: Employers’ Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Data Instruments would like to express its sincere concern with respect to the subject 
proposed Statement of Position.
This Statement of Position undermines the treatment of ESOPs both from a business 
perspective and an accounting perspective. Data Instruments formed a leveraged 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan in 1989. The benefits the company has derived from 
its ESOP have been tremendous. Our productivity has increased by over 15%, our 
profitability has improved 100% and our employees are extremely motivated. As a 
result our stock value has risen over 80% from its issuance price. If an ESOP is 
implemented correctly, (as is Data Instruments’) it can have a profound affect on a 
company, and in some instances, mean the difference between survival and non­
existence. In addition to Data Instruments, there is an abundance of empirical evidence 
supporting the fact that leveraged ESOPs are a valuable source of employee 
empowerment and motivation in addition to being a source of much needed capital. If 
the AICPA instituted the proposed guidelines it is doubtful that Data Instruments 
would have implemented an ESOP. The statement of position would have required us 
to record an increase in the fair value of the shares released as additional compensation 
expense with no corresponding tax benefit. A significant factor we considered when 
the ESOP was established was that compensation expense would not increase as our 
ESOP loan was paid and shares were released. Undoubtedly, other companies 
considering implementing ESOP may forego the opportunity if this statement of 
position is implemented. Such an increase in compensation expense could make the 
difference between a company being able to go public or not. At a time when the 
United States economy is attempting to recover and compete in a global marketplace,
Data Instruments Inc., 100 Discovery Way, Acton, MA 01720-3600 USA • (508) 264-9550 • Fax (508) 263-0630 
the AICPA should not be promulgating rules which constrain U.S. companies from 
succeeding.
From an accounting perspective, this proposal is inconsistent with the matching 
concept and the lower of cost or market concept. Currently, the ESOP debt and the 
corresponding contra-equity (suspense account) are recorded at the fair value at the 
time the shares are purchased by the ESOP. The fact that the company makes a binding 
commitment for the purchase of the company shares at the fair market value at the time 
of the purchase should not be destroyed by this proposed statement, but it will be. The 
fact that the statement will increase the value of the shares released for recording 
compensation expense regardless of the purchase value (basis) of such shares is 
inconsistent with the traditional matching concept. In addition, the acquisition of 
company shares should not be accounted for any differently than any other investment. 
Accordingly, such shares should be accounted for at the lower of cost or market, 
consistent with FASB #12. Treating company shares any differently than other 
investments is not consistent with other accounting policies and not logical.
In conclusion, Data Instruments strongly opposes the implementation of the subject 
statement of position, particularly as it relates to the fair value of shares being released. 
If this statement is adopted it will produce an extraordinary obstacle for the creation of 
future Employee Stock Ownership plans and detrimentally affect an already ailing 
economy.
Respectfully yours,
Edward M. Colbert 
Chairman
Peter A. Hunter, CPA 
Vice President, Treasurer 
and Chief Financial Officer
cc: J. Michael Keeling, President, The ESOP Association
Corey Rosen, Executive Director, National Center for Employee Ownership
rutherfoord
INSURANCE AGENTS, BROKERS & CONSULTANTS
March 5, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I am writing regarding the proposed rules to change the accounting for ESOPs. Our 
firm disagrees with the market value cost-recognition rule and does not believe 
that it should apply to all ESOPs. We believe this rule should only apply to 
leveraged ESOPs where the shares being released from the suspense account are being 
used to satisfy a specific liability of the company, such as the match on a 401(K). 
We also believe that this new rule tends to penalize ESOP companies that bought the 
stock for a good price. In all likelihood, the ESOP stock would not be purchased 
if the trustees did not believe there was a great likelihood of the stock going up 
in value. Therefore, in most situations, you are going to penalize the company's 
earnings if you expense the market value of the stock distributed. In addition, 
our opinion is that the principal payment on the leveraged loan is a much better 
method of matching cost and benefit. Please consider these comments in your 
determination.
Sincerely,
Brad Buie, CPA 
Vice-President, Finance
BB/ko
Thomas Rutherfoord, Inc.
Corporate Office • One South Jefferson Street • P.O. Box 12748 • Roanoke, Virginia 24028 • (703)982-3511 • Fax (703) 342-9747
CBI Industries, Inc.
George L. Schueppert
Executive Vice President - Finance
800 Jorie Boulevard
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521-2268
708 572 7257
March 3, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I have had an opportunity to review, in its entirety, the proposed statement of position 
regarding ESOP’s which was issued by AcSEC in December, 1992, and have read the February 
1993 response to it from The ESOP Association (TEA).
We, as one of the largest publically-held ESOP companies, are totally in agreement with 
the position taken by TEA, and urge AcSEC to adopt all the recommendations made in TEA’S 
letter to you. CBI Industries, a NYSE company, is over 20% owned by our employees. As the 
chief financial officer of the company, a member of our Salary and Benefits Committee, and 
Chairman of the Trustees of our Pension Trust, I can assure you that all of the market risk in the 
value of our stock is carried by our employee-owners. No benefits are increased or decreased 
because of the price of our stock changes, and the number of shares allocated to our employees 
each year does not change in any way due to the price of our stock. We believe, quite strongly, 
that the majority’s view in this respect is misplaced, and are wholly-supportive of TEA’S arguments 
to the contrary.
In addition, we also agree with TEA’S view that no accounting changes are necessary. 
No constituency of ours - investors, bankers, accountants, analysts, etc. - has ever suggested 
there is a need for change. We hope the AICPA will reconsider its SOP and withdraw it There 
is no compelling argument in the market place in favor of its adoption.
Sincerely,
George L. Schueppert 
tp
cc: J.Michael Keating, TEA
Cooper Industries
P.O. Box 4446
Houston, Texas 77210
COOPER
March 9, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue
N.W. Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Sir,
This letter sets forth Cooper Industries, Inc. ("Cooper") comments with 
respect to the Proposed Statement of Position, Employers' Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Cooper generally supports the Proposed 
Statement of Position and would like to comment on the following specific 
issue.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
We strongly support a grandfathering provision. Cooper created an employee 
stock ownership plan in 1989. At that time, the accounting rules were 
closely reviewed to determine the financial statement impact of the ESOP. 
We feel it would be unjust to retroactively change the accounting rules 
upon which our decisions were based.
We recommend the proposed grandfathering date be the date upon which the 
Proposed Statement of Position is actually issued. We do not feel the 
September 23, 1992 date is fair since companies were not given proper 
notice that the accounting rules would definitely change as of that date.
We appreciate having an opportunity to provide our comment. If we can 
provide any additional information or input please let us know.
Yours truly,
/dr
1OO1 Fannin, Suite 4000 
Houston, Texas 77002
713 739-5400
Donald R. Sheley, Jr.  
Vice President & Controller
MOSS ADAMS
  3-12-93
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 1001 - 4th Avenue, Suite 2830
Seattle. Washington 98154-1199
March 8, 1993 Phone 206 223 1820
FA.X 206 622 9975
Offices in Principal Cities of
Ms. Dionne McNamee, Technical Mgr., Accounting Standards Division 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee: Subj: Comments on Exposure Draft “Employers
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans" - File 2500
Moss Adams agrees with the proposed SOP’s fundamental conclusion that an employer 
accounting for debt associated with an ESOP should be distinct and separate from accounting 
for compensation.
Because we agree with that basic concept, we believe the transition explained in 
paragraphs 55 through 57 is not appropriate and retroactive application with restatement for all 
prior periods presented is appropriate, and if not required, should at a minimum be allowed. 
We also believe that part of paragraph 57 requiring continuation of the shares allocated method 
in EITF #89-8 is inappropriate.
Alternatively, if the committee decides against retroactive application, we believe the 
cumulative effect method would be preferable because the cumulative amortization of unearned 
compensation will be consistent with the valuation measurements in the SOP.
The reasons for our opinions are explained in the following paragraphs.
Transition
We recognize that transition included in various statements on promulgated accounting 
standards since APB 20 vary; and seem to be arbitrary.
We believe it would be reasonable and logical to provide for transition consistent with 
the transition provisions of FAS 109.
We believe restatement should be allowed for the following reasons:
1. The SOP would fundamentally change compensation expense 
reported in the income statement. It (apparently) would not 
change total stockholders equity. Because the prime purpose of an 
income statement is to display earnings trends over some period of 
years, we believe it is inappropriate to include in historical 
earnings trends inconsistent accounting for a non cash expense.
MOSS ADAMS
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2. The measurement of compensation expense particular to an 
ESOP included in a series of income statements represents only the 
amortization of an original transaction (the issuance of shares to 
the ESOP). In order to understand the effect on the financial 
statements of continuing amortization of the original transaction, 
the basis for the amortization should be consistent through all 
periods until the unearned compensation has been totally 
amortized.
3. Under the proposed SOP, the continuing amortization of 
unearned compensation costs for shares purchased (but not 
released) before September 23, 1992 will result in an inconsistent 
carrying value of the company’s various equity accounts during the 
period between the original stock issuance and the eventual release 
of all shares. Thus, users of the financial statements will have to 
understand the effect of two fundamentally different methods of 
accounting over an extended period.
4. The pro forma presentation described in paragraph 95 is not an 
acceptable substitute for recording in the basic financial statements.
5. We also observed that if the fair value of shares were used to 
measure compensation for all periods from the time of share 
issuance to final allocation, assuming such values approximate the 
values used in preparation of the financial statements of the ESOP, 
there will be some consistency between the financial statements of 
the ESOP (net value of equity resulting from allocation of shares 
at fair value) and the amount of cumulative compensation expense 
recorded by the sponsor. This symmetry seems logical. The 
participants in the ESOP, who also are stockholders, might expect 
the accounting measure for the value of their shares to be 
consistent with the cumulative compensation expense recorded by 
the company.
Transition Paragraph 57 Relative to EITF 89-8
We believe the provisions of EITF 89-8 should be eliminated from transition 
requirements for the following reasons:
1. Because EITF 89-8 continued the requirement to use the cost of ESOP shares rather 
than those shares’ values, that method is inherently improper according to the proposed SOP. 
For that reason alone, the requirement to continue reporting prior periods based on the shares 
allocated method seems unreasonable.
Ms. Dionne McNamee 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
March 8, 1993
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2. If the Accounting Standards Executive Committee believes that employers accounting 
for debt and compensation are distinct and should be separated, there is no reason to continue 
the requirement to apply EITF 89-8. We further observe that EITF 89-8 did not constitute 
generally accepted accounting principles under Rule 203 at the time it was issued.
3. Footnote #8 is technically incorrect. EITF 89-8 did not allow employers to continue 
their current method; rather it required employers to continue their method if the cumulative 
expense exceeded the amounts computed under the shares allocated method. For reasons that 
must be totally arbitrary, EITF precluded a company from reducing cumulative compensation 
expense to an amount which the EITF agreed was a more proper measure.
Ambiguity of Transition Paragraphs 55-57
We believe the explanation of transition requirements should be improved. Our 
understanding of the transition requirements is written in the attachment to this letter which we 
believe is grammatically clearer than the exposure draft.
Notwithstanding the attachment, the description in the second bullet of par. 57 raises the 
following questions:
1. Whether the "expense” is compensation expense or total 
(including interest) expense.
2. Whether an adjustment is precluded if expense already 
recorded exceeds that under the shares allotted method.
Ota
Additional guidance should be added to paragraph 19 for circumstances where the cost 
of the ESOP shares is greater than the fair value and the company does not have any additional 
paid in capital. It seems reasonable in those circumstances to classify the excess (debit) as an 
additional component of unearned compensation.
Paragraph 50 provides guidance on the classification of the income tax effect of 
differences between deductible expense and financial statement expense. We believe the 
classification of the tax effect of such differences should be consistent with the classification of 
the differences between cost and fair values (paragraph 19).
Please direct any directions to the undersigned at (206) 223-1820.
Very truly yours,
George D. Funk 
For MOSS ADAMS
 MOSS ADAMS
 MOSS ADAMS
ATTACHMENT TO MOSS ADAMS COMMENTS ON
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS DIVISION, FILE REFERENCE 2500, RE TRANSITION
.55 As to shares acquired by ESOP’s after September 23, 1992, transition is as 
follows:
a. For fiscal years ending after December 15, 1993, the SOP 
should be applied prospectively to those shares that were not 
committed to be released as of the beginning of such fiscal year.
b. No adjustment should be made for shares committed to be 
released prior to the beginning of a fiscal year ending after 
December 15, 1993.
c. Restatement of any previously issued annual financial 
statements is not permitted.
d. Restatement of interim periods during the fiscal year of 
adoption is required.
.56 As to shares acquired by ESOP’s before September 24, 1992, application of this 
SOP to shares not committed to be released is elective for fiscal years ending 
before January 1, 1995.
a. The accounting required by such election depends on whether 
or not the shares allocated method described in EITF Issue No. 89- 
8 had been used.
b. If the shares allocated method was used to measure 
(compensation?) expense, the provisions of this SOP should be 
applied only to those shares not yet committed to be released as of 
the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption.
c. If the shares allocated method was not used to measure 
(compensation?) expense,
. Additional expense should be recognized if, and 
to the extent that the cumulative expense that would 
have been recognized prior to the period of 
adoption of this SOP under the shares allocated 
method ([Total shares committed to be released x 
cost of the shares to the ESOP] - cumulative 
dividends on ESOP shares) exceeds the cumulative 
expense already recognized.
MOSS ADAMS
  
Attachment to Moss Adams Comments
Page 2
. The additional expense, if any, should be 
reported as the cumulative effect of a change in 
accounting principle in accordance with APB 
Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, by including 
the cumulative effect of the change in income and 
crediting unearned compensation in the period the 
SOP is first applied.
. No adjustment is allowed if the cumulative 
expense already recognized exceeds the amount 
computed under EITF 89-8.
Ashland
ASHLAND OIL, INC. • POST OFFICE BOX 391 • ASHLAND, KENTUCKY 41114 • PHONE (606) 329-3333
KENNETH L. AULEN
Administrative Vice President and 
Controller
(606) 329-5454
March 1, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Ashland appreciates the opportunity to respond to the AICPA's Exposure Draft 
of the Proposed Statement of Position (SOP) entitled Employers’ Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans.
We concur with the decision to address accounting standards for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). The limited guidance provided in SOP 76-3, 
Accounting Practices for Certain Employee Stock Ownership Plans, is 
inadequate for many of the financial accounting and reporting issues related to 
ESOPs which have surfaced since the SOP was issued in 1976. Although we 
feel that the proposed SOP adequately addresses most of these issues, we 
strongly disagree with the AICPA's proposal in three respects as discussed 
below.
Recognition of Compensation Cost
The SOP requires employers to recognize compensation costs based on the 
fair value of the ESOP shares which are committed to be released. This 
handling is appropriate where employers are obligated to provide a specified or 
determinable benefit, such as contributions to a 401 (k) plan or formula profit- 
sharing plan. However, we do not feel it is appropriate for traditional leveraged 
ESOPs which involve only a future commitment to allocate a specified number 
of shares to employees, rather than any specified value. In our opinion, the four 
justifications given for this required handling are not convincing enough to 
require a change from current practice, as indicated in the following 
paragraphs.
First, your analogy to APB Opinion 25 is not valid with respect to a traditional 
leveraged ESOP. Although the number of shares which an individual 
employee is entitled to receive may not be known, the total shares to be 
allocated in the future are generally known or reasonably predictable at the time 
the ESOP indebtedness is finalized. When shares are ultimately allocated 
based on contractual debt payments, deferring the measurement date because 
the number of shares an individual will receive is unknown places form (i.e., an 
uncertainty as to who gets the shares) over substance (i.e., the total number of 
shares are reasonably predictable).
The second justification is that the required handling more accurately reflects 
the value of the services received by the employer. For a traditional leveraged 
ESOP, share allocations are reasonably constant over time. Accordingly, this 
justification implies that an employer will receive services worth twice as much if 
the value of the company’s stock doubles. I doubt that I need to go any further 
to illustrate the inherent weakness of this justification. Employee services 
received should be valued based on the company’s initial commitment (i.e., the 
cost of the ESOP shares) without regard to future changes in the value of those 
shares. Doing otherwise would place this SOP in direct conflict with the 
direction the FASB is heading with respect to accounting for stock options (i.e., 
the value of an option is determined at the date of grant and should not change 
with each movement in the company’s stock price).
The third justification is that employers will adjust other portions of employees’ 
compensation packages over time to reflect the market value of the shares 
allocated. The primary objective in establishing many ESOPs is to encourage 
employees to think and act like owners. The assumption that a company will 
make up for any deficiency in the expected value of the allocated shares, or 
conversely will confiscate any windfalls from share appreciation through 
reduced salary adjustments in the future, is incorrect and in conflict with the 
employer's primary objective in establishing the ESOP. Although some 
companies could follow a practice of adjusting employee compensation for 
abnormal ESOP performance, we believe that prevalent practices, rather than 
unusual situations, should drive general accounting requirements.
The fourth justification is that the accounting for leveraged and nonleveraged 
ESOPs will be conformed. The essence of this argument appears to be that 
unrelated transactions should be accounted for the same as related 
transactions if their outcomes are similar. The SOP tries to separate the 
accounting for the borrowing from the accounting for the shares, but it cannot 
ignore the fact that they are related transactions. For instance, the shares are 
security for the debt, debt service payments determine the number of shares 
committed to be released, and the interest rate on the indebtedness may be 
impacted by the fact that the loan was to an ESOP. The differences between a 
leveraged ESOP and an nonleveraged ESOP preceded by a borrowing to buy 
treasury stock are too numerous to list. The obvious difference, however, is the 
extent to which a company’s long-term commitment is demonstrated in 
establishing a leveraged ESOP. It has never been an objective of accounting to 
force conformity of dissimilar transactions simply because they could have a 
similar result.
Under SOP 76-3, compensation expense was based on the cost of the ESOP 
shares and this handling should be retained in many circumstances. Rather 
than permitting flexibility to fit the facts and circumstances, the AICPA is 
proposing the replacement of the one-size-fits-all method of SOP 76-3 (which 
was inappropriate for certain new types of ESOPs) with a new one-size-fits-all 
method (which is equally inappropriate for traditional ESOPs where risks and 
rewards of ownership are retained by participants). We strongly concur with the 
minority view expressed in the SOP that compensation costs should be based 
on the cost of the related shares for traditional ESOPs.
Effective Date and Transition
Although the selection of September 23, 1992 as a transition date has no 
impact on Ashland, we believe it could have a significant impact on many 
companies. Since these companies established ESOPs based on certain 
assumptions, including the existing accounting requirements, we believe it 
would be inappropriate to establish an arbitrary cut-off date for transition 
purposes which was prior to the date the SOP was first issued for comment.
Disclosures
The SOP requires public companies to make certain pro forma disclosures if 
they elect to retain their current accounting for shares acquired by ESOPs on or 
before September 23, 1992. Currently, pro forma disclosures are only required 
where a company's financial statements are noncomparable between years as 
a result of accounting changes or where its results may not be indicative of 
future results due to acquisitions. Requiring such disclosures with respect to 
ESOP accounting would add little other than complexity and confusion. But 
more importantly, requiring such disclosures for transactions which might be 
accounted for differently in the future if they were to recur establishes a new and 
disturbing precedent. The lack of comparability between companies caused by 
different accounting methods for ESOPs has to be insignificant compared to the 
lack of comparability caused by differences in other accounting methods (e.g., 
FIFO versus LIFO, accelerated versus straight-line depreciation, etc.) for which 
pro forma information is not and should not be required.
Sincerely,
Kenneth L. Aulen
  CLAYTON BROWN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
SPECIALISTS IN PUBLIC SECURITIES
March 9, 1993
Mrs. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1007
File 2500
Dear Mrs. McNamee:
Clayton Brown & Associates, Inc. is pleased to offer comments on the December 21, 1992 
Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of Position, Employers' Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans. To better understand our perspective, a description of our company 
and situation is appended.
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
The central theme/assumption underlying the proposed accounting treatment is that all of 
the stock transactions are with the "treasury" of the sponsoring company, or can be thought 
of as being so. We do not believe this to be a valid theme or assumption on which to base the 
accounting for all ESOP transactions.
All too often, ESOP transactions are done for the tax benefits available, and, because of 
limitations in the tax regulations, most likely would never be considered if the transactions had 
to be accomplished through exchanges of treasury stock. These are what the "Minority" refer 
to as "Type 1" transactions, and the guidance in SOP 76-3 seems to us to be adequate.
At the time of the transaction, management presumably considers all aspects in deciding to 
do the transaction, including the fact that the price of any purchase of stock would be fixed 
until all of those shares are allocated to participants. When an ESOP acquires stock from a 
shareholder under the provisions of IRC Section 1042, to preserve the tax aspects, the ESOP 
may not be allowed to sell such shares to the treasury (e.g., as in our case, where the 
purchase brought shareholdings of the ESOP to just over 50%). The flexibility inherent in your 
assumption is not available to us. Accordingly, we believe that, for these transactions, where 
the tax aspects are of primary concern, the cost of the shares to the ESOP should be used as 
the measure of compensation cost.
We recognize the compelling nature of the last argument in paragraph 69, that measuring 
compensation based on current fair value conforms the accounting for leveraged and 
non-leveraged ESOPs. Perhaps the way to delineate a difference in accounting is to proscribe 
cost-based accounting when IRS rules and regulations prohibit liquidating the transactions 
through treasury transactions, with some acknowledgement of de minimus levels of flexibility.
Should the Accounting Standards Executive Committee ("AcSEC") ultimately decide to use 
fair value, may we suggest that the fair value adjustment flow through income, as it is a 
measurement of the wisdom of management in fixing the initial purchase price of the stock in 
the tax-advantaged transaction. While this would violate the basic rule of not recognizing gain 
or loss on the sale of treasury stock, it would provide some expanded information to the reader
SUITE 3000 • 500 WEST MADISON STREET • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60661-2511 • 312/559-3000
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of the financial statements. Of course, this may just highlight the fallacy of applying the 
proposed treasury stock accounting to the "Type 1" transactions.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
We are unable to fathom the significance of the September 23, 1992 date, and 
accordingly, perhaps selfishly, we suggest consideration of December 21, 1992, the date of 
publication of the Exposure Draft.
Issue 3: Disclosures
The disclosures for non-adopting employers seem somewhat punitive and tantamount to 
forcing employers to adopt. Why not allow for a few years of non-disclosure such that many 
of the older transactions will be allowed to expire without the application of the new SOP?
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this important project. We would be pleased to 
discuss these comments with AcSEC or its representatives.
Sincerely,
G. Victor Johnson 
Senior Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer
March 9, 1993
CLAYTON BROWN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Mrs. Dionne D. McNamee
Addendum
Background Information
Formed in 1967, Clayton Brown & Associates, inc. (the Company) is a registered 
securities broker/dealer and investment banker participating in all major fixed-income securities 
markets, including municipal, corporate, U.S. Government, and government agency issues, 
with activities in institutional sales, trading, and underwriting. It is essential to the conduct of 
its business that the Company maintain adequate levels of both equity capital and regulatory 
net capital. While the Company is considered "closely-held," the capital has arisen primarily 
through the retention of earnings.
The Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Clayton Brown Holding Company (Holding). 
Until the closing of a leveraged ESOP transaction in November 1992, one individual held 
approximately 75% (either directly or indirectly through the ESOP) of the stock of Holding. It 
was this concentration of stockholdings, the need to maintain the adequate levels of capital in 
the Company, and the desire to have an orderly transfer of capital that caused us to consider a 
tax-advantaged ESOP transaction under IRC Section 1042.
After the November 1992, transaction, the ESOP holds approximately 51 % of the stock of 
Holding. Should employees leave with any significant amount of vested stock, management 
will have to face the prospect of losing at least one of the tax advantages of the transaction. 
At the present time, management really does not have any significant flexibility for the 
Company or Holding to buy into the treasury the leveraged shares held by the ESOP.
BGS&G 
44 Baltimore Street 
Cumberland, MD 21502 
Tel (301) 777-1500
Fax (301) 724-3953
BGS&G Consulting Services
Robert H. Gamer, CPA, CPC, clu 
Executive Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer March 9, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. MacNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. MacNamee:
As a member of The ESOP Association and an administrator of 
numerous ESOP plans, I strongly suggest that your proposed market 
value cost recognition rule should apply only to leveraged ESOP's 
where the shares being released from the suspense account are 
being used to satisfy a specific liability of the company such as 
a match on a 401(k) Plan.
Our company has a leveraged ESOP and the effect on our 
income statement is known and predictable. If your market value 
rules go into place, it could have unknown impact on our 
corporate financial statements. We do not feel that a plan 
sponsor should be penalized for having the ESOP buy the stock at 
a favorable price.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
BGS&G QUALIFIED PLANS
Robert H. Garnet, CLU, CPA, CPC
Executive Vice President
RHG:lam
Beall, Garner, Sorcon and Geare
Cumberland, Baltimore. Frostburg, Hagerstown, Oakland, MD • Hollidaysburg,Johnstown, PA • Keyser, WV • Washington, D.C.
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  Dionne D. McNamee. Technical Manager 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS DIVISION 
File 2500, AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Washington. DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Following are my comments regarding the current Exposure Draft for the proposed Statement 
of Position on Employers Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans.
Recognition of compensation cost
The requirement that expense recognition be based on market value of released shares is 
particularly troublesome for closely held companies with leveraged ESOPS. The reported 
earnings of the company will be artificially low as the stock price increases over time. This 
has the added effect of creating confusion in dealing with banks as to what the real financial 
condition of the company is. On an ongoing basis and in doing projections for banks on 
prospective ESOP loans the development of a credible forecast of earnings will be difficult at 
best. Complex footnote proformas will not enhance statement user understanding. The 
market value approach decreases financial statement predictability.
Fair value could be used in the case of KSOPS where the company contributes ESOP stock 
to match employee deferrals.
In most small companies ESOP trustees establish the plan as an Incentive for employees to 
share in the success of the company and to create a ready market for shareholders on the 
Idea that stock prices will rise over time. Under the proposed rule a successful ESOP plan 
will make earnings appear tower than they actually are. Future ESOPS will not grow by 
leveraging company stock. ESOP companies will in effect be penalized for their success.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Bradley D. Matulonis  
Chief Financial Officer 
(An ESOP Company)
BDM/eh 
cc: Warren L. Thompson, President
Insurance/Risk Management/Financial Services
102 South Winooski Avenue, P.O. Box 730, Burlington, Vermont 05402-0730.
Phone: 802-658-4600. In/Out of state: 1-800-735-1800. FAX: 802-658-6191. FAX: 802-862-2180.
SmithBell & 
Thompson
CONRAIL
DONALD W. MATTSON
VICE PRESIDENT - 
CONTROLLER
March 10, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) is pleased to 
respond to Accounting Standards Executive Committee's 
(AcSEC) proposed statement of position (SOP), "Employers' 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans" (ESOPs). 
Conrail participated in the discussions regarding ESOP 
accounting in 1989 when AcSEC first began to address this 
issue. We appreciate AcSEC’s efforts to formulate more 
definitive authoritative literature on ESOP accounting; 
however, we disagree with some of the changes suggested in 
the proposed SOP.
Our primary concern relates to the SOP’s proposal that would 
require employers to use the fair value of shares released 
to measure compensation cost. We believe that the 
employer’s cost of those shares should continue to be used 
as a measure of compensation expense as it reflects the 
"true economic cost" to the employer for the services of the 
ESOP participant for a given period of time. The fair value 
of the ESOP shares committed to be released does not 
necessarily reflect the value of the employee shareholders' 
services received by the ESOP sponsor. We believe that the 
"fair value" compensation proposal would create volatility 
in earnings without a demonstrated improvement in the 
reliability of ESOP cost measurement.
Our second concern involves the proposal that would allow an 
employer to charge to retained earnings only dividends 
related to allocated ESOP shares, rather than to dividends 
paid on all ESOP shares, as is the present practice. We 
believe that if the ESOP preferred stock is classified in
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION 2001 MARKET STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19101-1429 (215) 209-5588
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the stockholders' equity section of the balance sheet and is 
considered an equity instrument issued by the company, the 
only logical treatment of dividend payments would be to 
charge retained earnings for all dividends, which we believe 
is consistent with generally accepted accounting principles. 
To our knowledge, there is no authoritative accounting 
literature that would support categorizing a dividend 
payment and applying different accounting treatments to each 
dividend category (i.e. dividend payments on allocated vc. 
unallocated shares).
Our other areas of concern, as well as more detailed 
explanations for our above positions related to the SOP, are 
adequately expressed in the comment letter of February 17, 
1993 submitted by The ESOP Association (TEA).
We are in basic agreement with TEA'S position on the 
proposed SOP and are hopeful that those comments will be 
given careful and serious consideration in reaching any 
final accounting treatment regarding ESOPs.
We appreciate this opportunity to participate in the 
discussions regarding formulation of ESOP accounting. If 
you have any questions regarding our comments, we would be 
pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICES COMMITTEE 
1992-93 MEMBERS
Stanley A. Ratzlaff. Chairman 
Pacific Enterprises
Los Angeles, Caifomia
Martin Abrahams 
Coopers & Lybrand 
New York, New York
Philip D. Ameen
General Electric Company
Fairfield, Connecticut
Robert N. Anthony 
Harvard Business School 
Boston, Massachusetts
Diane M. Butterfield
Chemical Bank
New York, New York
Patricia P. Douglas 
University of Montana 
Missoula, Montana
William J. Ihlanfeldt
Shell Oil Company 
Houston. Texas
Kenneth J. Johnson 
Motorola, Inc.
Schaumberg. Illinois
Thomas H. Kelly 
Schering-Plough Corporation 
Madison, New Jersey
Alfred M. King
Valuation Research Corporation 
Princeton, New Jersey
Ronald L. Leach
Eaton Corporation 
Cleveland. Ohio
John J. Lordan
Johns Hopkins University 
Baltimore. Maryland
John C. Macaulay 
Dresser industries 
Dallas. Texas
Frank C. Minter 
Samford University 
Birmingham. Alabama
Fred J. Newton
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Alexandria. Virginia
John J. Perrell, Ill
American Express Company 
New York, New York
L. Hal Rogero, Jr.
Mead Corporation 
Dayton, Ohio
Fred S. Schulte 
Oshkosh Truck Corporation 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin
Joseph J. Smith
IBM Corporation
Armonk, New York
John E. Stewart
Arthur Andersen & Company 
Chicago, Illinois
Norman N. Strauss
Ernst & Young 
New York, New York
Edward W. Trott
KPMG Peat Marwick
New York, New York
Patrick M. Worsham 
The Coca Cola Company 
Atlanta, Georgia
Staff-
Management Accounting Practices
Louis Bisgay, Director
INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANTS 
10 PARAGON DRIVE 
MONTVALE, NEW JERSEY 07645-1760 
(201) 573-9000
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Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division,
File 2500
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Re: Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Management Accounting Practices (MAP) Committee 
of the Institute of Management Accountants is 
pleased to comment on the proposed Statement of 
Position (SOP), "Employers' Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans."
The MAP Committee agrees with AcSEC's minority view 
expressed on pages 27 and 28 of the proposed SOP 
for the reasons stated.
We note that the SOP makes for difficult reading. 
For example, paragraph 57 is very difficult to 
understand.
Our comments on the specific issues raised in the 
transmittal letter for the SOP are as follows:
Issue 1:
Issue 2:
Recognition of Compensation Cost — The 
MAP Committee agrees with the minority 
view of AcSEC.
Effective Date and Transition — We agree 
it is important that companies not be 
required to change their accounting for 
shares already held by ESOPs. Companies 
in good faith entered into significant 
transactions in part based on then- 
existing accounting literature. However, 
we believe the SOP should "grandfather" 
shares held by ESOPs as of the issuance 
date of the final SOP rather than 
September 23, 1992. As proposed, the SOP 
has a retroactive aspect.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
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We also believe the effective date should be delayed one year so 
calendar-year companies would be required to adopt the SOP in 1994 
rather than 1993 as proposed. As drafted, the SOP would be 
retroactive to the beginning of 1993.
Issue 3: Disclosures — We disagree with the disclosures calling
for pro forma income effects of retroactively adopting 
the SOP. The past should be grandfathered entirely. The 
costs of developing the pro forma information outweigh 
the benefits.
Very truly yours
Stanley A. Ratzlaff 
Chairman
Management Accounting 
Practices Committee
LB:ll
Institute of Mangaement Accountants • 10 Paragon Drive • Montvale. New Jersey 07645-1760 • (201) 573-9000
THE PARSONS CORPORATION
100 West Walnut Street • Pasadena. California 91124 • (818) 440-2000 • Fax: (818) 440-2630
March 9, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is written in response to the December 21, 1992 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee's (AcSEC) request 
for comments on the proposed statement of position (SOP) 
entit1ed Employer's Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs).
The Parsons Corporation ("Parsons") is one of the largest 
employee-owned corporations in the United States. Parsons 
became 100% ESOP-owned in January, 1985 following a tender­
offer made to public shareholders by the existing ESOP, 
which in 1984 owned approximately 29% of Parsons' 
outstanding shares. The tender offer was financed through 
loans to ESOP of funds borrowed by Parsons from a bank and 
Parsons' loans of internally-generated funds. As is 
customary in a leveraged ESOP, shares acquired by ESOP in 
the tender offer are held in a suspense fund and allocated 
to employee-shareholder accounts as debt is repaid.
Our comments are primarily directed at issues of Recognition 
of Compensation Cost.
We are firmly of the opinion that the proposed position that 
compensation cost should be categorically measured based on 
the fair value of shares when they are released ignores the 
fundamental difference between an unleveraged ESOP and a 
leveraged ESOP such as we have at The Parsons Corporation.
In a leveraged ESOP, where there is a debt amortization 
schedule, the value to the employer of services performed in 
a given year is the amount of the debt repayment for that 
year. Notionally, the debt incurred to leverage the ESOP is 
prepayment of the Company's ESOP obligation. The cost to 
the Company of this transaction does not change because of a 
subsequent swing, in either direction, in the value of the 
Trust * s assets.
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Debt repayment results in the release of a certain number of 
shares for allocation to employee-shareholder accounts. The 
release formula is mandated by the Internal Revenue Service 
("I.R.S.") and it cannot be manipulated by the employer.
The value of the shares released is at cost, but that cost 
was determined by market value at the point when control of 
the shares passed to the ESOP. The unallocated shares are 
held in trust and are not subject to Company control.
The fair value of the shares released and allocated depends 
upon many factors, including corporate performance and stock 
market performance. The risk of a diminished fair value or 
the reward of an enhanced fair value falls upon the 
employee-shareholder. It makes no sense to require the 
employer-sponsor to recognize the fair value of the shares 
as compensation cost because of the fundamental difference 
between the mechanical operation of this leveraged ESOP and 
a retirement or thrift plan funded through contributions of 
treasury stock.
In conclusion, should it be determined that the measure of 
ESOP compensation cost must be based on the fair value of 
shares when allocated, we firmly believe that such a 
determination should explicitly exclude from its scope trust 
shares released under a debt service amortization schedule. 
Compensation related to such shares should continue to be 
measured at cost which equates to market value at the point 
when control of the shares passed to the ESOP trust.
Very truly yours,
Curtis A. Bower
Senior Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer
CAB:ph
cc: The ESOP Association
Keck, Mahin & Cate
FILE NUMBER
DIRECT DIAL
1201 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3019 
(202)789-3400
FAX (202) 789-1158
March 12, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft of Proposed Statement of Position on 
Employer’s Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I am an attorney specializing in practice involving Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans. I have represented a variety of parties, 
including lenders, trustees, plan sponsors, investors, and liti­
gants in hundreds of ESOP-related transactions over the past dozen 
years. The views expressed here are solely my own, and do not 
represent those of Keck, Mahin & Cate or any other person.
I am a consumer of financial statements of ESOP companies, 
the person that the accounting profession should serve, by crea­
ting financial statements that present in summary form the eco­
nomic reality of the financial operation and condition of an ESOP 
company. I appreciate the efforts of the Accounting Standards 
Division to revise and update SOP 76-3, which is inadequate to 
treat the variety of ESOP transactions that has developed since 
its publication. However, the fundamental change in the premise 
of accounting for leveraged ESOP transactions contemplated by the 
Exposure Draft would result in the presentation of financial 
statements that do not accurately reflect the operations and 
condition of an ESOP sponsor, and which would therefore have to be 
re-constructed to provide the user with useful information.
Compensation costs: In a leveraged ESOP, every year the plan 
sponsor writes one or more checks to the plan trustee, in payment 
of its contributions to the ESOP for the year. That contribution 
is the actual, economic "cost” or "expense" to the company of 
having an ESOP. If I represent a lender, investor, employee, or 
trustee looking at an ESOP company’s financial statements, I want 
to know what that real cost is. The Exposure Draft, however, will
A Law Partnership Including Professional Corporations
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deny me this information. Instead, a "compensation cost” will be 
reported on the income and expense statement that bears no rela­
tion to the actual amount spent by the company. The cost will be 
based on the value of the stock allocated to the employees as a 
result of the payment, and not on the size of the payment itself.
This figure might be useful if I were looking at a financial 
statement of the employee. But I am not; I am looking at the 
statement of the company, and I am seeing a "cost" figure that in 
no sense of the word represents the "cost" to the company.
The difference in many cases will not be trivial. When a 
company does a major ESOP leveraged buyout, the value of the stock 
in the ESOP declines sharply the instant after the transaction, 
because the company has incurred a major new debt obligation. Ac­
cordingly, in the early years of debt repayment, this will result 
in a serious understatement of the actual compensation expense of 
payments to the ESOP. Such an understatement would be contrary to 
the accounting profession’s constraint of conservatism in the pre­
sentation of financial information. In particular, it would be 
misleading for creditors who rely on a company’s financial state­
ment, without the sophistication to realize that the "compensation 
cost" is a fiction that bears no relation to the actual payments 
made by the company, and probably understates the actual compen­
sation expense borne by the company.
In the later years of the loan, if all has gone according to 
plan, then the company stock may be worth much more than its ini­
tial cost, because the company has done extremely well. Yet, this 
strong performance will be partially concealed, because the "com­
pensation cost" will be an artificially high number that does not 
reflect what the company has spent, or what the company is obli­
gated to spend in the future. The victims of this illogic will be 
the employee-owners of the company, who will have the uphill bat­
tle of explaining to creditors, appraisers, investors, etc. that 
their earnings are really much better than they appear because one 
of the company’s major expense items is an accounting fiction.
Over the term of the ESOP loan, therefore, the aggregate 
"compensation cost" incurred by the company will not equal the 
amount actually spent by the company, except by coincidence. It 
might be much higher, or much lower, depending on the fluctuations 
in stock valuation. This would seem to violate the accounting 
profession’s guiding principle of reliance on historical cost 
rather than current value or replacement cost.
For example, suppose a company worth $3 million creates a 
leveraged ESOP, which borrows $2 million to buy 2/3 of the 
company’s stock from its owners. The loan has a term of ten 
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years, with $200,000 of principle payable each year. At the end 
of the first year, the company writes a check to the ESOP for 
$200,000, plus whatever interest is owed, that the ESOP uses to 
make its first payment on the loan. Because the company has gone 
heavily in debt, it is no longer worth $3 million; its independent 
appraiser says that it is only worth half that much.
The actual amount spent by the company in the first year is 
$200,000. The Exposure Draft, however, would only record a com­
pensation cost of $100,000, since that is the value of the stock 
allocated to the employees. The $100,000 difference would never 
be shown on the income statement, but would merely be an adjust­
ment to equity on the balance sheet. However, in the later years 
of loan payment, if the company’s total value has doubled to $6 
million, then the $200,000 payment made in the later year will 
result in a compensation cost of $400,000. Neither the early year 
$100,000 nor the later year $400,000 figure reflects economic 
reality for anyone interested in how well the company is actually 
performing in a particular accounting period. Moreover, the sum 
of the expenses over the loan period, which should equal the $2 
million actually spent, will only do so by chance.
The idea that unrealized appreciation or depreciation in 
defined contribution plan assets should be included on the em­
ployer’s statement of operations could have far-reaching ramifi­
cations. Hundreds of billions of dollars are invested in profit 
sharing and §401(k) plans. If the value of an employee’s profit 
sharing account increases because its underlying asset values 
appreciate, and not because of any employer contribution, should 
there be an additional ’’compensation cost” charged to the employ­
er? It would seem illogical, and cause tremendous disruption, to 
do so. Yet that is exactly what it being proposed for leveraged 
ESOPs: that the employer's compensation cost be based not on what 
the employer spends, but on what the employee receives. If ESOP 
sponsors are required to do this, then all defined contribution 
plan sponsors should be required to do this also.
Earnings per share: The Exposure Draft also provides that 
the unallocated shares in the ESOP loan suspense account be 
excluded from the computation of earnings per share. While this 
may make some companies happy by inflating their reported EPS, it 
unfortunately does not reflect the economic reality of the company 
for its current and prospective investors.
Unallocated shares vote. Unallocated shares receive divi­
dends. Unallocated shares are entitled to proceeds on a liqui­
dation. Unallocated shares would be sold for value equivalent to 
any other shares to a person who sought to acquire 100% of the 
stock of a company. Unallocated shares, in fact, have every legal 
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and economic right that other shares have to share in the equity 
of the company. To pretend that they do not is extremely unfair 
to investors who are not sophisticated enough to realize that 
reported earnings "per share" in a company with a leveraged ESOP 
are really earnings per "some, but not all, of the shares".
In general. The basic premise of the Exposure Draft, that 
the value of the released shares should form the basis for recor­
ding compensation cost, carries through to many other specific 
items in the draft. Disagreement with that basic premise means 
disagreement with all of the other specific points that flow from 
it, so I will not recite here all of the other disagreements I 
have with these specific points.
The apparent origin of this concept is the desire on the part 
of some to treat ESOP stock in a manner similar to the treatment 
of stock options. While doing so may seem orderly and symmetrical 
on the surface, it does not withstand careful scrutiny. Sometimes 
the greatest distortions are created by treating different things 
as though they were the same. Stock options are not like ESOP 
stock. They do not vote. They do not share in dividends. They 
do not share in liquidation proceeds. They do not, most impor­
tantly, result in an actual measurable cash outlay on the part of 
the company, as leveraged ESOPs do. Therefore, it is quite appro­
priate not to treat stock options as outstanding, but to record a 
compensation cost to reflect the diminished shareholder value re­
sulting from the dilution that will occur on their exercise. It 
is not appropriate, though, to carry that treatment over to the 
completely different leveraged ESOP arrangement.
Therefore, I respectfully urge the Accounting Standards 
Division to reject the Exposure Draft, and to start over on a new 
draft that will more accurately reflect the economic reality of 
ESOP transactions.
Sincerely
Luis Granados
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Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the exposure draft "Employers’ Accounting For Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans". We believe this is an important issue as the present guidance for such accounting is limited.
National City Corporation (NCC) is a $29 billion diversified financial services company headquartered in 
Cleveland, Ohio. NCC operates banks and other financial service subsidiaries principally in Ohio, Kentucky 
and Indiana. NCC has an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) that is used to fund our matching 
contribution to our employees’ 401(K) savings plan. The ESOP holds in the combined form of allocated and 
unallocated shares approximately two percent of NCC’s issued and outstanding voting common stock.
NCC agrees with AcSEC that ESOP’s are complex and the facts of each may require different accounting 
treatment. However, we have a few overriding concerns with the present proposal that we would like to bring 
to your attention.
Our first concern is the view that the accounting for an employee benefit plan should not differ whether an 
ESOP is present or not. While our view is directed towards an ESOP established in tandem with an employee 
savings plan, we believe it also holds true for other forms of employee benefit or compensation plans. In 
essence, the ESOP is a funding mechanism to provide funds for a specific employee benefit. This is quite 
similar to the establishment of a trust or VEBA for employee pensions or other benefit plans, which often hold 
shares of the sponsor’s common stock as a plan asset. The accounting for such plans by both the employer 
and the trust is well-defined in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard Nos. 35, 36, and 87. Inherent in 
that accounting are provisions that adjust the employer’s expense for the earnings and changes in market value 
on the assets held by the trust. The current proposal related to ESOP’s does not accept the trust as a funding 
vehicle and essentially moves the market value accounting that is performed by the trust to the sponsoring 
company’s financial statements. We believe that this is inconsistent (and in violation of current generally 
accepted accounting principles) with present accounting for other benefit plans.
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Our second concern arises from the market value concept that would be used to value the shares as allocated. 
The proposed accounting would record the difference between the fair value of the shares when allocated and 
their original cost to the ESOP as an adjustment to paid in capital. This accounting suggests that the economic 
event that results in a capital transaction is the employer’s matching 401(K) contribution (driven by employee’s 
optional decision to participate in the plan) rather than the issuance (or purchase) of shares to the Trust to fund 
this employee benefit. We do not agree with this position as the shares held by the Trust are legally issued 
and are accounted for as such in the common stock and paid in capital accounts at the time of issuance. 
Further, we do not believe that the employee’s decision to participate in the plan represents an economic event 
that would adjust the sponsor’s capital structure when assets have been legally set aside to meet this obligation. 
It is important to focus on the fact that the employee’s compensation and core benefits are the value ascribed 
to the employee’s service. The 401(K) is an employee elective benefit that we believe does not change the 
value of the work performed.
Our third concern is an extension of the point just discussed. The proposed accounting does not recognize 
the ESOP trust as a legal stockholder of the Company. The trust does in fact have all of the legal rights as 
any other stockholder, including the rights to vote, receive dividends, and a "claim" to a pro-rata share of 
annual earnings. The accounting proposed, which culminates in the exclusion of the unallocated ESOP shares 
from the earnings per share computation, does not consider the rights of the ESOP legal entity. The proposal 
also does not recognize that as soon as the shares are allocated they carry a right to the cumulative earnings 
of the Company without liquidating the same value that any other share previously had. The proposal’s 
argument that the sponsor company controls the ultimate use of the funds paid into the ESOP does not consider 
the fact that the ESOP could not exist without the financial means to acquire ESOP assets. The cost of 
obtaining said "means" is in part paid for by the income earned from the assets. As such, the sponsor does 
not have discretionary use of the Trust income. It must use such income to pay for the Trust’s expenses and 
cost of funds. Accordingly, we believe the ESOP should be viewed as a legal entity that holds the sponsor’s 
common stock (Plan assets) to be used to fund employee benefits and the stock should be viewed as outstanding 
for earnings per share computation purposes.
For all of the reasons stated, we believe AcSEC should further review its proposed accounting for ESOPs. 
We agree that various accounting treatments may be necessary to reflect the different uses of ESOPs, but also 
believe that any changes should be consistent with other promulgated generally accepted accounting principles. 
As such, we encourage AcSEC to accept ESOP trusts as a funding vehicle for employee benefit plans. We 
would be pleased to discuss our view with you further if so desired.
Respectfully,
Robert G. Siefers 
Executive Vice President & 
Chief Financial Officer
THOITS INSURANCE
EMPLOYEE OWNED
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Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Re: AICPA Exposure Draft - Proposed Statement of Position on ESOP Accounting
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I have struggled through the draft. I have not yet discussed it with any of our professional advisers 
although our CPA firm also has a copy of it. It seems to me there is some rather arcane reasoning in 
it, particularly with respect to the traditional leveraged ESOP:
1. It seems we still are stuck with the instant hit to our balance sheet for the full amount of 
any ESOP leveraging done in the traditional "mirror loan" format;
2. I fail to understand why an "indirect loan", to use the AICPA term, which I take to be 
what we have been calling a "mirror loan" or "back-to-back" loan, should be 
distinguished from what the AICPA terms a "direct loan" coupled with an employer 
guarantee. To my understanding, there is no difference in economic substance at all;
3. To my mind, the treatment given in section 49 simply generates "another set of books" 
to no significant purpose and may tend to mislead non-accounting professionals looking 
at sponsoring employer's financial statements;
4. On the positive side, we applaud the AICPA's distribution of the report to ESOP 
members, the grandfathering provisions (very important), and the partial exemption 
with respect to non-public companies such as ourselves;
5. Clearly, in a typical leveraged ESOP, all shares should be treated as outstanding and no 
problem is created with respect to loan payments by dividends on unallocated shares or 
funding of other benefit plans [e.g., 401 (k)] from the ESOP as the sponsor does not 
engage in such activities. The timing of the releasing of shares is irrelevant to our Plan. 
Allocated and unallocated shares are indistinguishable, as they should be, and are valued 
at issue or purchase. Dividends are passed through. Contributions are employee benefit 
(compensation), not (just) loan repayment. The Plan retains substantial cash, not just 
(leveraged) stock, as AICPA's arguments imply. The economic reality of our Plan is 
what happens to the cash. Opportunity cost calculations (the market value accounting 
concept) distort the reporting of performance and would confuse most readers of our 
statements. The Plan beneficiaries, not the sponsoring employer, bear the market risk;
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6. It seems to me that the opinions expressed in the "minority view" represent a much 
better understanding of what a traditional ESOP in a non-public company is all about. 
In what the minority view identifies as a "Type I" ESOP, their statement clearly reflects 
the understanding that we have, our employee owners have, our mirror loan lender has, 
and everyone else I’ve ever talked to about ESOP has with regard to the timing issues on 
the valuation of shares and of presentation of ESOP driven transactions in the sponsor 
employer’s financial statements. The issue raised by the minority view concerning the 
extra time and expense that will be incurred by small non-public companies to attempt 
compliance with new presentation rules that frankly don’t make much sense to us 
appears compelling. If it were not for the fact that, as with virtually any leveraged 
ESOP, we have to provide financial statements to outside parties (lenders) and those 
lenders want statements in accordance with AICPA guidelines, most non-public 
companies simply could ignore all this as being technical gobbledegook of interest only 
to financial wizards who might otherwise be tempted to play games with their public 
reports.
In our case, we simply want our financial reports to be acceptable in the general business community 
while fairly and in a straightforward way representing what we and everyone with whom we've ever 
discussed our ESOP understand to be its economic reality.
Sincerely,
Donald A. Way 
Chairman
DAW/jg
L:3-367.way
714-524-5520
3101 EAST ENTERPRISE • BREA. CALIFORNIA 92621
March 17, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We wish to comment on the exposure draft of the proposed statement 
of position, employers* accounting for employee stock ownership 
plans.
We take exception to the use of fair values of committed to be 
released shares to measure compensation costs of a leveraged ESOP.
To adopt this position would require an assumption that the 
sponsoring Company entered into a compensation agreement with its 
employees to give them shares of Company stock. This is not the 
case. The commitment of the sponsoring Company is to contribute a 
percentage of the employees compensation to a unique type of 
defined contribution plan. The compensation commitment made to 
employees is clearly measurable as a percentage of the employees' 
wages.
The contributions to the ESOP plan are made on the employees behalf 
and are then invested in non cash assets which may consist 
exclusively of Company stock. The periodic fluctuations in the 
Company stock value will affect the Company’s repurchase liability 
but these fluctuations clearly have no effect on the Company’s 
compensation commitment to its employees. Particularly for 
privately held companies the fair values of the stock can fluctuate 
widely based on factors which have little if anything to do with 
the value of services rendered by the employees.
In summary the use of fair values of committed to be released 
shares to measure compensation cost does not reflect the substance 
of the compensation arrangement entered into at the time a leverage 
ESOP is adopted and is not an improvement upon methods currently 
used to measure compensation. This portion of the proposed SOP 
should not be adopted.
Very truly yours,
Marlin Summers, CPA
Vice President Administration
COLUMBIA GAS
System
Richard E. Lowe March 15, 1993
Vice President and Controller
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500, AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Columbia Gas System, Inc. is pleased to submit its comments with respect to the 
Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of Position. Employers' Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans. The Columbia Gas System is one of the nation’s largest natural gas 
systems. Subsidiary companies are engaged in the exploration, production, storage, 
transmission and distribution of natural gas and other energy operations such as 
cogeneration. Columbia’s transmission and distribution facilities serve, directly or indirectly, 
over eight million customers in 15 states and the District of Columbia.
On July 31, 1991, The Columbia Gas System, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation filed separate petitions seeking protection under 
Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Both the Columbia Gas System, Inc. and 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation have been granted debtor-in-possession status 
under the Bankruptcy Code, allowing them to continue the normal operations of their 
businesses subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.
During 1990, Columbia established a Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(LESOP) to pre-fund a portion of the matching obligation under the terms of the System’s 
Thrift Plan (essentially a 401(k) savings plan). Since that time, Columbia has followed the 
accounting guidance provided in the AICPA’s SOP 76-3, Accounting Practices for Certain 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and EITF Issue No. 89-8, Expense Recognition for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Although Columbia’s LESOP was established prior to 
the September 23, 1992 cut-off date for required application of the SOP, disclosure of the 
items listed in Paragraph 54 is still required. In addition, Columbia anticipates termination 
of its LESOP as part of the plan of reorganization in connection with Chapter 11 
proceedings.
Consequently, we would like to address certain concerns resulting from the 
applicability of the proposed SOP to Columbia. However, prior to addressing these 
concerns, Columbia would like to express its agreement with the accounting treatment 
provided for terminations. Columbia believes that the charge associated with the remaining 
unearned compensation account at termination of a LESOP should be classified as a capital 
transaction, rather than a charge to income.
Columbia Gas System Service Corporation, 20 Montchanin Road, P.O. Box 4020 
Wilmington, Delaware 19807-0020
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Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
Paragraphs 14 through 17 of the proposed SOP establish the use of the fair value 
of shares committed to be released as the measurement basis of compensation cost. 
Although Columbia appreciates the efforts of the AICPA in its movement towards "fair 
value accounting”, we must express certain objections that we have had with other fair value 
based measurements in various FASB exposure drafts. The tone of these objections are 
based primarily on the unique regulatory environment Columbia faces in the utility industry.
Since the time that a consensus was reached on EITF Issue No. 89-8, entities with 
leveraged ESOPs have been following the "shares allocated" expense recognition procedures 
included in that Issue. The concepts underlying the accounting in the proposed SOP are 
significantly different than those included in Issue No. 89-8. The concepts underlying Issue 
No. 89-8 essentially represent a systematic and rational allocation of costs over the term of 
the debt issued in connection with the ESOP. The concepts underlying the proposed SOP 
are essentially fair value based.
To propose such a radical change does not appear to give much credence to the prior 
work done by the EITF on this issue. Although their conclusions were not without 
controversy and significant debate, they did have substantial conceptual merit. In essence, 
the expense recognized under Issue No. 89-8 represents the total amount of cash to be paid 
over the term of a leveraged ESOP, excluding any top-up effects and dividends on ESOP 
shares. Since all transactions should ultimately reflect the flow of cash, this method has 
tremendous conceptual appeal. The proposed SOP’S reliance on fair values makes it subject 
to more volatility and brings into question the very theory that advocates the use of fair 
values.
Paragraph 69 discusses the recognition and measurement of the committed to be 
released shares. The tone of the fair value measurement arguments are such that the use 
of fair value more accurately reflects the value of services received by the employer. While 
this may appear conceptually sound, further thought challenges such logic. Consider that 
most 401(k) plans cover substantially all employees, many of whom are employed in 
positions that have little effect on the day-to-day value of their employer’s stock. If, during 
period 1, the stock price is $x, under the proposed SOP, the employer’s matching expense 
would be based on the $x price. However, assume that in period 2, the price changes to $x 
plus or minus $5. The matching expense is now based on the $x plus or minus $5 price. 
Assuming that the majority of the employees performed at essentially the same level of 
quality as in period 1, is it truly conceptually appealing to value the same service at a 
different amount each period? By taking the argument to this level of detail, fair value 
seems to lose some of its original appeal.
Paragraph 69 also mentions that the risks and rewards of the ESOP shares rests with 
the employer until the shares are committed to be released. Under existing accounting 
guidance, such risks and rewards are properly and equally reflected. While allocated shares 
-3-
are released and expensed at cost, the rise and/or fall in stock price is reflected by the 
amount of top-up required to meet 401(k) matching obligations. The magnitude of stock 
price changes are equal for both increases and decreases in terms of required top-up shares 
and expense. The proposed SOP does not follow the same logical pattern because 
compensation expense is always recorded at the fair value of the 401(k) matching obligation, 
regardless of the value of the underlying stock price. As such, the proposed SOP does not 
reflect the risks and rewards of utilizing ESOP shares because the change in stock price, as 
measured by the amount of top-up, is not reflected in expense.
Also consider that under a going concern assumption, another important motive for 
a leveraged ESOP used to fund 401(k) obligations is the financing aspect of the transaction. 
The logic being that, assuming a significant drop in stock price does not occur, the employer 
would not have to pay any more for its matching obligation than it would have without the 
leveraged ESOP. In fact, if superior stock performance is achieved, real savings are 
realized. These are often viewed as "bonus" attributes of such a plan.
In connection with the objections raised above with respect to fair value based cost 
measurement, several of Columbia’s subsidiaries are under the jurisdiction of regulatory 
commissions that establish their revenues. Rates are generally established to recover certain 
costs of service in addition to a fair and reasonable return. Quite often, the rates are 
developed based upon both actual and projected data with respect to costs, among other 
items.
In recent years, employee benefits have received significant attention, and any 
attempt to recover costs based on fair value, or any amount other than true cost, is met with 
unfavorable reaction. As is normally the case when amounts recovered do not equal 
amounts expensed, the creation of a regulatory asset for such difference results. The 
realizability of such an asset under the circumstances surrounding ESOPs should not be 
addressed in this forum, and accordingly will not be. Nonetheless, we feel that is necessary 
to object to any new accounting guidance that extends the growing gap between regulatory 
accounting principles and GAAP. This is especially true when such accounting represents 
a further departure from the underlying flow of cash which financial statements are 
ultimately supposed to represent.
For the most part, our opinions run contrary to the underlying concepts envisioned 
in the proposed SOP. Accordingly, we feel that fair value based measurements are not 
appropriate in most situations, specifically in the regulated utility environment in which 
Columbia operates.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
The proposed SOP would be effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 
1993, as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which the SOP is adopted. This appears to 
be an unrealistic timetable and transition period considering the fact that the comment 
deadline is not until March 19, 1993 and the final issuance may not occur until some time 
later in 1993. In effect, any calendar year entity would find it difficult to effectively adopt 
the proposed SOP in its first interim period. As such, paragraph 55 requires restatement 
of previous interim periods if the SOP is adopted in other than the first interim period of 
an entity’s fiscal year. It is dearly unappealing to enter any particular fiscal year knowing 
that a restatement will be required, yet be unable to complete an accurate calculation until 
the issuance of a final statement that may not be available until a significant portion of the 
fiscal year has expired.
As a more reasonable alternative, we suggest that the proposed SOP be effective for 
fiscal years beginning after 1993. For calendar year companies, the effective date would be 
January 1, 1994 which should provide ample time for the analysis of comments and the 
consideration of revisions while at the same time preclude any long delays in application.
Issue 3: Disclosures
While Columbia has always been in support of full disclosure and our current LESOP 
reporting meets most, if not all, of the requirements of paragraph 54, we must object to the 
disclosure of the pro forma effects as if Columbia had adopted the provisions of the 
proposed SOP. Such disclosure amounts to "de-facto” adoption since public companies must 
compute all the necessary calculations and journal entries in order to satisfy the pro forma 
requirements. For those companies that elect to retain their current accounting for ESOPs, 
such disclosure would appear cumbersome in their financial statements and possibly 
discredit the continued application of currently existing accounting. As such, most 
companies would have no incentive to retain their current accounting except as a form of 
objection to the proposed SOP. If this situation were to occur, it would certainly discredit 
and undermine the efforts of the AcSEC.
It is likely that most companies that object to the topics raised in Issue 1, will also 
object to the disclosure of pro forma effects of the SOP. Columbia is included in this group 
for the reasons stated in Issue 1 and those discussed above. In the interest of harmony, it 
would seem more appropriate to allow entities that acquired their ESOP shares on or before 
September 23, 1992 to retain their current accounting and not require pro forma disclosures 
provided the other items listed in paragraph 54 are adequately addressed. Such treatment 
would be more equitable since the accounting treatment existing at the time of establishing 
an ESOP was normally an important consideration.
-4-
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Columbia appreciates the opportunity to provide input and contribute to the 
standard-setting process and hopes our comments will be considered by the AcSEC in its 
discussion of these important issues. Should you have any questions or if you would like to 
discuss any of our views, please feel free to contact us at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
3M General Offices
3M Center
St. Paul, MN 55144-1000
612/733 1110
March 12, 1993
3M
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
3M appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
exposure draft of the proposed Statement of Position 
(SOP) "Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans.” In addition to addressing the 
specific issues identified in the exposure draft, we 
believe it is important to consider the proposal from 
a broad business perspective. Both aspects will be 
covered in this letter.
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost:
The proposed SOP's use of fair value of shares when 
committed to be released rather than the cost of the 
shares to the ESOP to measure compensation cost 
represents another piecemeal move toward a fair value 
accounting model. We believe that development of a 
comprehensive fair value accounting model is 
preferable to developing this and other individual 
applications of fair value. Use of the cost of the 
shares accurately reflects the transaction approved by 
management.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
We do not agree with the proposed effective date of 
fiscal years ending after December 15, 1993. 
Implementing this standard late in 1993 would require 
calendar year corporations to restate financial 
results from the earlier quarters of the year. This 
would seem a source of unnecessary expense to the 
companies and confusion to the readers of the 
financial statements. Our objection to the proposed
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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transition is consistent with our November 9, 1989 
comment on the EITF Working Group on ESOP Accounting’s 
Consensus No. 89-8 where we stated, "We do not believe 
it is prudent to change accounting rules having such 
significant impact without an adequate transition 
time." We believe that the effective date should be 
prospective, not retroactive.
We endorse the provision for grandfathering ESOP 
shares acquired before September 23, 1992. 3M’s ESOP 
was structured to be optimal under the then prevailing 
regulations. To compete successfully, businesses need 
to be able to make sound long-term business decisions 
with the confidence that rules will not be changed in 
such a way that good business decisions look bad. 
This position is also consistent with our 1989 
comments on EITF Consensus No. 89-8 where we stated, 
"We do not believe companies should be required to 
comply with provisions of an accounting ruling which 
were developed after their ESOPs were established." 
Accordingly, we would strongly oppose any SOP that did 
not contain provisions to protect existing plans.
Issue 3: Disclosures
We doubt that the proposal to show pro forma data will 
improve readers' understanding of our ESOP. In what 
appears to be an effort to produce comparability with 
other companies, this disclosure would more likely 
confuse readers and would violate the grandfathering 
protection of existing plans that we strongly 
supported in the previous paragraph. We recommend a 
simple disclosure that, "Transactions related to this 
ESOP are accounted for under the rules of SOP 76-3."
If, however, there is a necessary trade-off between 
accounting and disclosure, we think that 
grandfathering existing plans is most important. 
Disclosure should then be as simple as possible and in 
summary form.
General Business Considerations
3M's leveraged ESOP was established to enable the 
company to provide benefits to employees beyond what 
it would otherwise be able to afford and to insure 
that the benefits will be available in the future.
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Increasing the company match in our 401(k) plan, part 
of it in the form of a profit-sharing match, and 
offering a PAESOP not only increased the overall 
benefits provided, but put more 3M stock in employees' 
hands, thereby increasing their identification with 
the company's goals and results. Providing such 
benefits will contribute to our efforts to attract and 
retain the talented people who will be dedicated to 
continuing 3M's competitive success.
The treatment proposed in the exposure draft could 
give rise to unintended consequences. To the extent 
that net operating income is lowered, other forms of 
compensation which make employees stakeholders, such 
as profit sharing, would be negatively impacted. 
Also, fixed charge ratios would be adversely affected.
We have had no indication from users of 3M*s financial 
statements that they are not receiving an adequate 
picture of our ESOP transaction, and we question that 
the proposed rules would give investors a better 
understanding.
In summary, many corporations established leveraged 
ESOPs to ensure that their employees will continue to 
receive certain benefits that align their interests 
with those of corporate shareholders. We believe that 
this is a desirable objective from a business 
perspective. We further believe that current 
accounting standards provide a sufficiently clear 
understanding of ESOP transactions. If, indeed, 
compelling reasons for change can be demonstrated, 
existing ESOPs should be allowed to continue to 
operate and report according to the rules under which 
they were established. Changing the reporting rules 
for completed transactions is very disconcerting!
Sincerely,
Dwight A. Peterson
Vice President, Treasurer 
DAP/gp
 
POLAROID CORPORATION
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
RALPH M. NORWOOD
VICE PRESIDENT AND CONTROLLER
March 16, 1993
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division File 2500 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the proposed Statement Of Position (SOP) 
"Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans". We support the concept 
that ESOPs which release shares to settle or fund other employee benefits should be 
reported as outlined in the SOP. However, not all ESOPs fit into this category. For 
example, our ESOP is a "pay-exchange ESOP" which directly compensates employees. 
We believe the cost basis of shares at the time of the exchange with the trust should be the 
basis for measuring our compensation expense. In addition to this distinction, we offer the 
following additional comments regarding specific issues raised in the SOP cover letter:
Issue I: Recognition of Compensation Cost
When Polaroid’s ESOP was established in 1988, a predetermined amount of employee pay 
and benefits was exchanged to fund the ESOP and shares are released to directly 
compensate employees (i.e., a Type I ESOP as described in the minority views section of 
the SOP.) Although the related service is performed in future periods, the basis for the 
transaction was determined at the time of the exchange with the trust We do not see the 
logic for valuing this transaction at a date other than die date of the exchange. On the other 
hand, we agree that compensation cost for ESOPs which settie or fund employee benefits 
should be measured at fair market value on the date such shares are released.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition  
The effective date of fiscal years ending after December 15, 1993, presents a practical 
problem. For existing ESOPs, applying the SOP in 1993 would require either adopting the 
SOP before it is formally issued or later restating quarterly results for 1993. Our 
recommendation would be for the new SOP to be effective for fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 1993, especially since most large companies will be addressing adoption and 
implementation issues relative to FASB Statements No. 106 and 109 in 1993.
American Institute of
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Issue 3: Disclosures
We believe that for accounting standards which are not adopted, sufficient information 
relative to new methods of accounting can and should be provided to users of financial 
statements to assist them in making appropriate value judgments. However, we do not 
believe companies should be required to incur the cost of developing and maintaining the 
required information to provide full accounting information on an "as-if-adopted" basis. In 
isolation, this requirement may appear to be a somewhat straightforward task but, added to 
the large number of new and existing accounting and disclosure requirements, it would add 
to the already heavy reporting workload that companies face today. Disclosure of the 
periodic number of shares released and allocated along with the related average annual 
share prices should be sufficient for those so inclined to perform the calculations required 
by the SOP.
Numerous thoughtful and constructive efforts have been made over the years by various 
sponsoring groups to make ESOPs an economically viable means to encourage employee 
ownership of U.S. companies and thereby provide a valuable tool to improve worldwide 
competitiveness. At Polaroid, we find this ownership interest provides a very good 
incentive that motivates employees to improve quality, productivity and earnings for the 
benefit of all shareholders. If the new SOP were to be implemented as proposed, U.S. 
Companies may be much more reluctant to establish direct compensation ESOPs. We urge 
you to reconsider and revise the proposed SOP to recognize the differences between benefit 
replacement (i.e., Type II) and direct compensation (e.i., Type I) ESOPs.
Thank you for providing us the opportunity to express our opinion on this important issue.
Sincerely,
The Peoria Journal Star, Inc
1 NEWS PLAZA • PEORIA, ILLINOIS 61643
March 17, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Re: Proposed Statement of Postion 
Employers Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft, "Employers 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans" (ESOP SOP) as prepared by the 
Task Force on Accounting for ESOPs of The Accounting Standards Executive 
Committee (AcSEC). We do not agree with Exposure Draft’s position with regards 
to the recognition of compensation expense based on shares committed to be 
released. The following description of The Peoria Journal Star (the Company) 
and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (PJS ESOP) will provide the background for 
the example we have prepared to demonstrate the effect of the Exposure Draft’s 
provisions on our Company’s financial statements which we believe to be a 
representative leveraged ESOP.
The Peoria Journal Star, Inc. is a privately owned company which owns and 
operates daily newspapers in Peoria, Illinois and Galesburg, Illinois. The 
PJS ESOP was implemented in 1983 and since its inception has acquired 699,660 
or 83.3% of the outstanding common stock of the Company, principally through 
the use of loans to the PJS ESOP which are guaranteed by the Company. The ESOP 
is party to a put and call agreement which will allow the ESOP to acquire the 
remaining shares of Company stock which it currently does not own. 
Additionally, the PJS ESOP incurs debt annually to acquire shares from former 
PJS ESOP participants upon their termination of employment with the Company. 
The ultimate goal of the PJS ESOP is to achieve 100% ownership of the Company, 
and in order to do that we estimate that it will be necessary for the PJS ESOP 
to maintain approximately a 30% to 40% leverage factor for the forseeable 
future. In other words, approximately 30% to 40% of the shares owned by the 
PJS ESOP will be unallocated and used to collateralize PJS ESOP debt.
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The PJS ESOP was established with many purposes in mind, however the most 
important objective was to transfer Company ownership from the family 
shareholders to the employee group. With this in mind, we believe that 
dividends paid on company shares held by an ESOP, both allocated and unallocated 
shares, represent a return on equity for the ESOP participant, and as such 
represent an equity transaction which should not be recorded as an operating 
expense of the Company. We do not consider dividends on unallocated PJS ESOP 
shares to be compensation to our employees nor was any element of the PJS ESOP 
established as a compensation plan. Exclusive of the ownership benefits of 
the PJS ESOP, our Company still pays a competitive salary to attract qualified 
employees as salary surveys for our community and industry would support.
We don’t believe that recording compensation expense for dividend payments 
would enhance the understandability and relevance of ESOP accounting, which 
was an objective of AcSEC in reconsidering SOP no. 76-3. In fact, we believe 
that it would confuse the reader of the financial statements. For example, 
reported earnings would be negatively impacted when dividends are increased 
as a result of improved cash flow, resulting in increased compensation expense. 
Making the logical assumption that improved operating cash flow would result 
in an increase in the value of the stock, the negative impact on a company’s 
earnings would be compounded further by the rising value of shares committed 
to be released. Under the provisions of the ESOP Exposure Draft, our Company’s 
operating results and statistics would no longer be comparable with other 
companies in the newspaper industry, and would most likely cause our Company’s 
results to appear to be below average when in fact just the opposite has been 
true. Although adoption of this SOP would have no impact on actual operating 
cash flow, the most important measurement of our Company’s financial 
performance, our audited cash flow and income statement would reflect a 
significantly different operating result. We view this as pushing what would 
otherwise be income to the shareholders of the Company down to compensation 
expense. In fact, our appraiser would adjust out the compensation expense 
recorded under the ESOP SOP when determining the true earnings of the Company 
for appraisal purposes.
The attached schedules document the projected effects of the ESOP SOP on 
the Company’s income statement for each of the next five years. Schedule 
II projects the anticipated ESOP borrowings for each year and documents the 
estimated charge to compensation expense on an annual basis. The assumptions 
made in preparing the example are found at the bottom of each schedule. It 
should be noted that by the fifth year of the example, profit margin before 
recording the effect of the ESOP SOP is nearly 22% and drops to 14% after 
recording the ESOP SOP. We believe that this example demonstrates the 
significant impact that the ESOP SOP would have on a leveraged ESOP company 
and how it distorts a company’s income statement for paying dividends and 
servicing the debt of its ESOP.
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For the reasons stated above, we believe that the ESOP SOP should not be 
adopted and that the current accounting for ESOPs continues to be relevant. 
If, however, the ESOP SOP is adopted, we believe that a distinction should 
be made between ESOPs with controlling ownership and those with less than a 
controlling ownership. ESOPs which have a controlling interest in their company 
represent a true transfer of ownership to its employees and dividends paid on 
those shares of stock are a return on equity transaction for the 
employee/participant rather than compensation expense. We have included a copy 
of our 1992 Annual Report in order to provide further background information 
on our Company.
Sincerely
Fred L. Bergia  
Vice President/Treasurer
Ken Mauser
Business Manager/Controller
KM:jc
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SCHEDULE I
THE PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, INC.
PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS
1993 - 1997
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
REVENUE $48,482,000 $50,421,000 $52,438,000 $54,536,000 $56,717,000
EXPENSES:
0PERATIN6 COSTS 27,630,000 28,735,000 29,884,000 31,079,000 32,322,000
SELLIN6 6ENERAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE 7,426,000 7,723,000 8,032,000 8,353,000 8,687,000
DEPRECIAITON 2,027,000 2,108,000 2,192,000 2,280,000 2,371,000
AMORTIZATION 946,000 951,000 956,000 961,000 966,000
INCOME FROM OPERATIONS BEFORE
EFFECT OF ESOP SOP 10,453,000 10,904,000 11,374,000 11,863,000 12,371,000
PROFIT MARGIN BEFORE EFFECT OF ESOP SOP 21.6% 21.6% 21.7% 21.8% 21.8%
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION EXPENSE PER
PROVISIONS OF ESOP SOP (SCHEDULE ID 1,232,000 2,029,000 2,854,000 3,715,000 4,571,000
INCOME FROM OPERATIONS AFTER
EFFECT OF ESOP SOP 9,221,000 8,875,000 8,520,000 8,148,000 7,800,000
PROFIT MARGIN AFTER EFFECT OF ESOP SOP 19.0% 17.6% 16.2% 14.9% 13.8%
NONOPERATING ITEMS:
INTEREST INCOME 310,000 322,000 335,000 348,000 362,000
INTEREST EXPENSE (2,322,000) (2,415,000) (2,512,000) (2,612,000) (2,716,000)
INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES 7,209,000 6,782,000 6,343,000 5,884,000 5,446,000
INCOME TAXES (883,000) (881,000) (920,000) (960,000) (1,002,000)
NET INCOME $6,326,000 $5,901,000 $5,423,000 $4,924,000 $4,444,000
Assumptions:
1) Revenues and expenses increase 5% annually.
2) The Company retains at the alternative minimum tax level and dividends used by the 
ESOP to reduce debt are tax deductible to the Company.
SCHEDULE II
THE PEORIA JOURNAL STAR INC.
PROJECTED ESOP DEBT ACTIVITY
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
ANNUAL ESOP LOAN $12,000,000 $8,000,000 $8,400,000 $8,820,000 $9,261,000
SHARE MARKET VALUE @ JANUARY 1st $148 $155 $163 $171 $180
NUMBER OF SHARES PURCHASED ANNUALLY 81,081 51,480 51,480 51,480 51,479
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SHARES PURCHASED (A) 81,081 132,561 184,041 235,521 287,000
ALLOCATED SHARES IN ESOP TRUST (B) 0 8,108 21,364 39,768 63,320
UNALLOCATED SHARES IN ESOP TRUST 81,081 124,453 162,677 195,753 223,680
DIVIDEND RATE/SHARE (C) $9.30 $9.80 $10.30 $10.80 $11.30
LOAN PAYMENT ANALYSIS:
DIVIDENDS ON SHARES ACQUIRED WITH '93-'97 LOANS
(A x C) $754,053 $1,299,098 $1,895,622 $2,543,627 $3,243,100
PORTION OF MINIMUM INSTALLMENT PAID 
WITH DIVIDENDS ON SHARES ACQUIRED 
WITH PRE AUGUST ’89 ESOP LOANS $445,947 $700,902 $944,378 $1,178,373 $1,405,000
CUMULATIVE MINIMUM ANNUAL INSTALLMENT $1,200,000 $2,000,000 $2,840,000 $3,722,000 $4,648,100
SHARES RELEASED FOR COMPENSATION PER
PROVISION OF ESOP SOP (D) 8,108 12,756 17,087 21,111 24,843
AVERAGE SHARE MARKET VALUE (E) $152 $159 $167 $176 $184
DIVIDENDS CHARGED TO RETAINED EARNINGS (B x C) $0 $79,460 $220,040 $429,500 $715,510
CHAR6E TO COMPENSATION EXPENSE BASED ON AVERAGE
MARKET VALUE OF SHARES RELEASED FOR COMPENSATION
PER PROVISION OF ESOP SOP (D x E) $1,232,000 $2,029,000 $2,854,000 $3,715,000 $4,571,000
NOTE: THIS SCHEDULE ONLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT FUTURE ESOP LOANS AND DOES 
NOT ADDRESS ESOP LOANS CURRENTLY ON THE BOOKS.
March 17, 1993
geico plaza
Washington, D.C.
20076
Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
GEICO Corporation is a publicly traded, property casualty insurance holding 
company with consolidated assets of $4.4 billion, shareholders' equity of $1.3 
billion, and revenue of $2.4 billion. Maintaining a disciplined balance sheet 
is one of our company's five operating principles and we firmly believe in 
conservative accounting and recording the economic substance of transactions. 
Unfortunately I have several concerns regarding the AICPA's "Proposed Statement 
of Position on Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans". I 
believe that the Proposed SOP is flawed theoretically and would require us to 
adopt accounting for our leveraged ESOP which is incongruous with the economics 
of the entire transaction.
GEICO Corporation has a leveraged ESOP which was established in 1983 and covers 
substantially all employees. The ESOP borrows money and uses the proceeds to buy 
shares of GEICO Corporation's common stock. GEICO Corporation guarantees the 
loans and makes annual contributions sufficient to enable the ESOP to repay the 
loans including interest. The obligations of the ESOP are included in GEICO 
Corporation's long-term debt and an amount representing the obligations of the 
ESOP, which have not yet been charged to compensation expense, is deducted from 
shareholders' equity. ESOP expense for the year consists of principal and 
interest payments for the plan year reduced by dividends used for debt service 
plus any additional accrued compensation based on the number of shares allocated 
to participants as required by EITF 89-8.
GEICO Corporation's ESOP debt is $50 million consisting of numerous loans which 
generally have a ten year life with level principal payments. As principal 
payments are made each year, the ESOP has traditionally borrowed an additional 
amount to increase total debt back to $50 million and purchased additional 
shares. Accordingly the ESOP has usually maintained $50 million of debt under 
a series of loans and the shares held in suspense relative to each loan are 
allocated to participants as the principal and interest on the debt is paid. The 
market value of the shares at the time of allocation has usually been 
approximately twice the cost of the shares. ESOP expense has approximated $8 
million annually based on $6 million of debt principal plus $4 million of 
interest less $2 million of dividends used to service debt.
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Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
I believe that Statement of Position 76—3 "Accounting Practices for Certain 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans" provides for the appropriate accounting for GEICO 
Corporation's leveraged ESOP. GEICO Corporation's expense from an economic point 
of view is the amount contributed or committed to be contributed to the ESOP for 
a given plan year. GEICO Corporation's expense is related to the debt incurred 
to purchase the shares and the interest which is paid until the shares are 
allocated. The additional cost of a leveraged ESOP compared to an unleveraged 
ESOP is the interest expense used to service the debt after the shares have been 
bought. Any changes in the market price of the stock prior to or after 
allocation to the participants has no economic consequence to the Corporation. 
Changes in the market value of these shares should be reflected on the ESOP's 
financial statements, not the financial statements of the Corporation.
The Proposed SOP supports using fair value to measure compensation because "fair 
value more accurately reflects the value of services received by the employer." 
The value of employee services does not change with subsequent market price 
fluctuations of the Corporation's stock. The only meaningful measure of 
compensation is what the services actually cost the Corporation. To suggest that 
compensation should be adjusted with an offsetting entry to paid-in-capital due 
to subsequent fluctuations in the market price of the stock which changes the 
perceived value of the service and makes it different from the cost of that 
service is inappropriate. These ESOP transactions have no effect on the 
Corporation's paid in capital.
If there is any ongoing adjustment to compensation expense based on the ultimate 
value received, there should also be an offsetting entry in the income statement 
to reflect the results of leveraging the transaction from a financing point of 
view. The conclusion that the accounting for the ESOP's debt (financing element) 
should be separated from the accounting for an ESOP's shares (contribution 
element) ignores the substance of the transaction and economic reality. The 
compensation and financing elements are inseparably linked because the whole 
purpose of a leveraged ESOP is to borrow funds to buy stock at current prices 
which will be allocated to participants over time as the loan is repaid 
regardless of future changes in the price of the shares. It is inconsistent to 
charge unearned compensation against shareholders' equity and credit debt at the 
time a loan is made and then pretend that the financing and compensation are 
separate. If one wishes to engage in such mental gymnastics, one could also 
argue that unearned compensation should also reflect the ultimate "fair value" 
of what will be charged to compensation. Since the debt is used to finance this 
ultimate "fair value" of compensation, one could conclude that there should also 
be a financial gain or loss on the extinguishment of debt in the income statement 
for the difference between the cost of the shares acquired by the ESOP using the 
debt and the ultimate "fair value" of the shares allocated when the debt is paid. 
To try to separate "financing" from "compensation" and then charge only the 
"compensation" element to the income statement truly distorts the substance of 
the transaction.
I think it is more appropriate to view our ESOP as a supplement to our retirement 
benefit package for our associates. A leveraged ESOP is similar to a defined 
contribution plan and the only contribution required is an amount to fund the 
debt service. If one suggests that the compensation expense of a defined 
contribution plan should be based on the "fair value" of the benefit as 
"defined" by the market price of the stock when it is allocated to the par­
ticipant's account, it should also follow that the expense related to the benefit 
"defined" at that time should also be adjusted to reflect the ESOP's favorable 
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or adverse investment experience on the employer's stock so that the expense to 
the company ultimately reflects the cash contribution required to be made to the 
plan. For a defined benefit pension plan, pension expense is based on the 
required contribution to provide the defined benefit to associates in the future. 
If the pension plan's investment results vary significantly from the assumed rate 
of return, future expense is increased or decreased to ensure that there are 
sufficient funds to pay the defined benefit. Accordingly, even if one tries to 
mentally convert a defined contribution ESOP to some kind of defined benefit 
plan, compensation expense should still reflect only the net contribution made 
by the Corporation to service the ESOP's debt obligation. The Corporation's ESOP 
expense should mirror the contribution income which is reflected on the ESOP's 
own financial statements.
I agree with the minority view expressed by three dissenting AcSEC members who 
believe that the fair value of shares released should not be used to measure 
compensation cost of Type I ESOP's which are used to compensate employees 
directly. I would recommend that Statement of Position 76-3 be maintained for 
recognizing the compensation cost of Type I ESOPs, which I view as fundamentally 
different from Type II ESOPs where the fair value of the liability determines how 
many shares must be released. However, if fair value were to be used to measure 
compensation for any type of ESOP, the fair value should be the value of the 
shares at the date the shares are allocated to the participant, not the average 
price during the year.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
The Proposed SOP in its current form should not be adopted. However, if adopted, 
the effective date should be January 1, 1994 for loans made after that date only. 
The Proposed SOP would require calendar year companies to adopt the new standard 
at December 31, 1993 retroactive to January 1, 1993 for loans made after 
September 23, 1992. The transition is very awkward and requires restating 
previously recorded ESOP expense in interim periods for loans that originated a 
decade ago.
Issue 3: Disclosures
It is not appropriate to require proforma income and earnings per share amounts 
for ESOP loans from prior periods. I do not believe the benefit of such 
disclosures justifies the cost.
I strongly urge you to reconsider the Proposed SOP's accounting for Type I ESOPs. 
GEICO Corporation's ESOP has been in operation for over ten years and has been 
a terrific benefit for the Corporation and its associates. As someone who has 
been actively involved with both the accounting and financing of our ESOP, I feel 
obliged to respond that I believe that the Proposed SOP would require us to 
account for the Corporation's ESOP in an erroneous manner that does not properly 
reflect the economic substance of the transaction. I would be pleased to meet 
with you to further discuss our comments regarding the Proposed SOP. Please call 
me at 301-986-3433 if I can be of assistance.
Very truly yours,
Thomas M. Wells 
Group Vice President
and Controller 
/mrn/TMW#1
612-376-4500
Fax 376-4850
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 LARSON
 ALLEN
 WEISHAIR& CO.
Suite 1000 
220 South Sixth Street 
Minneapolis, MN 55402-4505
March 9, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N. W.
Washington, DC 20004-10007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter serves as my comments to the Exposure Draft on Employers’ Accounting for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans issued December 21, 1992. I understand that one of our employee benefits 
partners is furnishing you a separate letter as to our firm and its thoughts as a group.
My personal thoughts are based on a desire to keep GAAP understandable and practicable for small 
business clients. I currently serve six clients with ESOP’s in place, with sales ranging from $4 million 
to $50 million annually. Four clients are leveraged ESOP’s.
On the positive side, the exposure draft attempts to clarify some areas that currently are without 
technical guidance and/or improve the accounting currently in practice (e.g., EPS, internally leveraged 
ESOP’s).
On the negative side, the exposure draft is attempting to replace historical cost accounting with fair 
value accounting for shares committed. I feel that accounting for the shares at cost is easier and 
produces a result that is more consistent between companies. You might guess that I have also been 
against the recent AICPA movement to value stock options at their fair values. Furthermore, I think 
we, as accountants, should resist the temptation to mix historical cost accounting with fair value 
accounting and potentially end up with less-understood information. SFAS #53 (Changing Prices) to 
me was an example of experimenting with basic accounting concepts, and it took us seven years (1979 
to 1986) to rescind the standard (or make compliance voluntary).
In closing, I applaud the efforts made to clear up differences currently existing in practice for ESOP’s; 
but am strongly against fair value accounting as part of the solution.
Ms. Dianne D. McNance
March 9, 1993
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Thank you for the opportunity to give input.
“Brian H. Schmidt, CPA 
Partner
612/376-4514
BHS:mp
f:BHSAICPA.LTR
SERVICES
INCORPORATED
March 16, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500 AICPA 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee,
I am writing to comment on the proposed Statement of Position for the Financial Reporting 
for ESOP Sponsors.
ESOP Services has been involved with more than 200 ESOPs and we have been installing these 
plans for 10 years. During that time, we have participated in the closing of dozens of leveraged ESOP 
transactions.
After carefully reviewing your exposure draft and considering the matter at length, we 
conclude that the expense recognition based on market value irrespective of the way the plan is being 
used, would be very bad for ESOPs. We urge you to reconsider the idea of having a different rule 
for plan sponsors who are using the release of shares to satisfy an existing liability of the corporation, 
such as a 401(k) match.
The "market value" rule is at odds with the fiduciary considerations of ESOPs and with the 
practical aspects of using these plans. The trustees of an ESOP are obligated to bargain on behalf of 
their participants and seek the best price possible for the ESOPs acquisition of stock. Fair market 
value represents the most that an ESOP can pay. Furthermore, most of our clients have become 
interested in ESOPs as a result of the Section 1042 "tax-free" rollover which is often available to 
selling shareholders of closely-held companies. When the trustees of the ESOP know that the selling 
shareholder may be saving 30% to 40% of the amount of the sale in taxes, they are even more inclined 
to negotiate a price which is less than fair market value. Finally, many departing owners like to give 
the employees a break, rather than push the transaction to the limit and burden them with maximum 
debt. In fact, as many as one-third of the transactions we have seen involve the ESOP paying less 
than fair market value as determined by an independent appraiser. In these cases, the AICPA would 
be dictating from the word go that the expense recognition of the financials of the plan’s sponsor will 
be higher than the actual expense associated with repaying the loan. Ironically, "good ESOP deals" 
in the eyes of the Department of Labor will cause overstated plan expense.
ESOP Professional Building • Post Office Box 400 • Scottsville, VA 24590 
804-286-3130 FAX 804-286-3815 Telex 430889 ESOPS
Affiliated Offices Internationally
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
March 16, 1993
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For years, we have had to explain the financial reporting of ESOP transactions to potential 
lenders. The contra-equity account and the expense recognition of ESOPs have been an ongoing 
challenge to explain to banks. We are convinced that the proposed SOP will make it much harder still 
to explain the true effect on the sponsor’s profit and loss statement of the ESOP.
Since the vast majority of our clients are closely-held, we have reviewed and commented on 
hundreds of appraisals. From experience, we are aware of a significant variance among valuation 
firms in what they determine to be the fair market value of the stock in a given company. I have 
regularly seen two different ESOP valuation firms deliver opinions of value which are more than 20% 
apart. Your new approach would inject a significant variability and uncertainty to the expense 
recognition process which, up until this point, has been very nicely defined by the payment of 
principal and interest on a known ESOP debt.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Peter H. Briggs
Director of Financial Services
PHB:be
Arthur
Arthur Andersen & Co, SC
Arthur Andersen & Co.
March 12, 1993
69 West Washington Street 
Chicago IL 60602-3002
312 580 0069
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Attached is our response to the AICPA Proposed Statement of Position, 
Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans.
Very truly yours,
PM
Attachment
Benjamin S. Neuhausen
March 12, 1993
ArthurAndersen
Arthur Andersen &Co, SC
Arthur Andersen & Co.
69 West Washington Street 
Chicago IL 60602-3002
312 580 0069
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are pleased to submit our comments on the AICPA Proposed Statement of Posi­
tion, Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans.
OVERALL COMMENTS
We are pleased that AcSEC undertook this project to update and overhaul em­
ployers’ accounting for ESOPs. Statement of Position 76-3 clearly did not 
contemplate many of the changes in ESOPs that have occurred in recent years 
and the new uses of ESOPs that have arisen since its issuance. The consen­
suses of the Emerging Issues Task Force alleviated the most pressing practice 
problems, but created some inconsistencies and anomalies in employers’ 
accounting for ESOPs. This project to create a complete and internally 
consistent model to account for ESOP transactions is timely, and we encourage 
AcSEC to issue a final Statement of Position promptly.
In our experience, leveraged ESOPs are difficult to understand. Further, 
those involved hold widely differing views about the economic substance of 
leveraged ESOPs and the nature of the employer’s involvement. Those differing 
views lead naturally to differing views about the employer’s accounting. We 
believe that the analysis of a leveraged ESOP in paragraphs 59, 60, and 63 of 
the Proposed Statement is the best and most appropriate analysis of the sub­
stance of a leveraged ESOP—that a leveraged ESOP consists of a borrowing and 
an exchange of shares for employee services over the term of the borrowing. 
All the accounting conclusions in the Proposed Statement flow logically from 
that analysis, providing an understandable and internally consistent model for 
employers’ accounting—something that does not exist today. Because we agree
Arthur
Andersen
Arthur Andersen & Co. SC
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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with the analysis in the Proposed Statement, we also agree with the proposed 
accounting. This provides the context for our comments on the three specific 
issues on which AcSEC requested comment.
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
We believe that an employer should measure compensation cost based on the cur­
rent fair value of the shares committed to be released. That measurement is 
most consistent with our view of the substance of a leveraged ESOP described 
in the preceding paragraph. In addition, we agree with the reasons stated in 
paragraph 69 of the Proposed Statement,
We believe that all leveraged ESOPs are fundamentally alike in substance, even 
though they or their shares may be used for different purposes, and accord­
ingly believe that the proposed measurement is appropriate. Under the 
proposed SOP, if an employer exchanges 10,000 shares for employees' services 
in a year, the amount of compensation cost will be the same regardless of 
whether the shares are issued by a leveraged ESOP as a 401(k) plan match, 
issued by a leveraged ESOP as direct compensation, issued by a nonleveraged 
ESOP, or issued directly by the employer. To us, this consistency is the most 
logical and understandable result. We do not believe that the minority view 
provides any persuasive reason why compensation cost should be measured 
differently if the 10,000 shares are issued by a leveraged ESOP as direct 
compensation. Further, we believe the minority’s reference to the FASB 
project on stock compensation is a red herring. ESOPs involve shares of 
stock, not options. To date, there is no indication that the FASB’s project 
on stock compensation will change either the date compensation is measured or 
the method of measuring compensation for plans that grant shares to employees.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
We believe the proposed transition requirements are the most appropriate. We 
also agree with the comment in paragraph 93 that transition is, for the most 
part, a practical matter. In this case, AcSEC must balance the costs and ben­
efits of improved reporting by employers of ESOPs. As stated in paragraph 94, 
the existing accounting was a significant factor in the decision to set up 
many existing leveraged ESOPs and such ESOPs cannot be undone easily; thus, we 
believe it is appropriate to permit employers to account for "old" shares ac­
cording to the existing accounting guidance. However, we suggest that AcSEC 
describe in the final Statement the source of the September 23, 1992 cutoff 
date for "old" shares.
Arthur
Andersen
Arthur Andersen & Co, SC
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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Based on AcSEC's schedule and the procedures necessary to issue a final 
Statement, the document will not be issued before late 1993. The proposed 
effective date would require calendar year companies with "new" ESOP shares to 
restate the first three quarters of 1993. We do not believe that effort is 
justified. Based on the current timetable, we suggest that the effective date 
should be fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993, so that restatements 
aren’t necessary.
Issue 3: Disclosures
We understand AcSEC's reasons for proposing the pro forma disclosures at the 
end of paragraph 54. However, such pro forma disclosures have not been re­
quired in other situations involving long-lived transactions and prospective 
accounting changes. For example, companies with intangible assets acquired 
before the effective date of APB Opinion No. 17 do not disclose the amor­
tization that would be required if the assets had been acquired after the 
effective date. Similarly, companies that sold and leased back real estate 
before the effective date of FASB Statement No. 98 and followed sale/leaseback 
accounting for transactions that would have been treated as financings under 
Statement 98 do not disclose the earnings effect of financing treatment. The 
situation with "old" ESOP shares does not seem sufficiently different to war­
rant the pro forma disclosures.
Other Comments
Appendices. The Appendices, particularly A (Illustrations) and C (Impact of 
Proposed SOP on Current Guidance), are useful to readers and should be re­
tained in the final Statement.
Issues Related to Accounting for Income Taxes. We believe the discussion in 
paragraphs 49 through 52 is helpful. The attached Exhibit suggests some 
changes to clarify those paragraphs. In addition, the Exhibit suggests a 
different way of presenting the income tax computations in the Illustrations 
that we believe would be clearer. Finally, we suggest that the Illustrations 
be expanded to include the journal entries to record income taxes, to help 
readers better understand the computations.
Disclosures. Paragraph 54.e. does not explain whether the amount of unearned 
compensation at the balance sheet date to be disclosed is measured at the cost 
of the shares to the ESOP or the fair value of the shares at the balance sheet
Arthur Andersen & Co. SC
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
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date. The fair value of the shares at the balance sheet date would be more 
relevant under the accounting model in the Proposed Statement. In addition, 
the unearned compensation disclosed on the face of the balance sheet presum­
ably would be measured at the cost of the shares to the ESOP; disclosure of 
the same amount in the notes would be redundant.
In addition, we suggest that the Illustrations include model disclosures for 
the factual situations presented.
EITF Abstracts. The Abstract for EITF Issue 93-2 should be added to Appen­
dix C in the final Statement.
We would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have about our 
response.
Very truly yours,
Attachment
Exhibit
32 con
Proposed Wording Changes for the 
Income Tax Section of the Proposed Statement
1. Insert at end of paragraph 49:
Similar differences arise from employee stock options. Para­
graph 36.e. of Statement 109 requires that the tax effects of 
expenses for employee stock options recognized differently 
for financial reporting and tax purposes be charged or 
credited directly to the related component of shareholders* 
equity.
2. Insert as the opening phrase to the first sentence in paragraph 50:
In accordance with paragraph 36.e. of Statement 109, ...
3. Proposed replacement for paragraph 51:
51. Differences between the periods in which compensation is 
recognized for financial reporting and tax purposes do not 
create temporary differences as defined in Statement 109 
because unearned compensation is a reduction of equity (tem­
porary differences are caused by book/tax basis differences 
related to assets and liabilities, but not equity). However, 
consistent with the requirements of Statement 109 for similar 
differences that arise related to employee stock options, 
interperiod tax allocation is required for those differences.
4. Proposed revision of tax computation in Illustration 1:
Deferred provision:
Reduction in unearned com­
pensation for financial 
reporting
Related tax deduction
Difference
Tax rate
Deferred tax expense/(benefit)
Year 1 Year 2
$200,000 $200,000
163,800 180,200
36,200 19,800
40% 40%
$(14,480) $ (7,920)
CP&L
Carolina Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 1551 • Raleigh, N.C. 27602 
(919) 546-6794
Charles D. Barham, Jr. 
Executive Vice President March 15, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submits its comments in response to the 
exposure draft of a proposed statement of position (SOP) "Employers’ Accounting 
for Employee Stock Ownership Plans." CP&L has a $300 million leveraged ESOP and, 
therefore, we are very interested in any proposed changes in accounting for 
ESOP's.
In general, CP&L believes the SOP represents an improvement in accounting for 
ESOP's. As noted in the SOP, current standards for ESOP accounting have 
developed on a somewhat ad hoc basis over the past several years. These standards 
are not totally consistent with each other, nor do they always reflect the 
underlying economic substance of ESOP transactions. We believe the SOP 
substantially remedies those deficiencies in ESOP accounting.
There are two aspects of the SOP that CP&L believes should be reconsidered.
Measure of Compensation
The SOP proposes that fair value of shares be used as the measure of 
compensation cost in all instances. We believe that the proper 
measure of compensation cost should be determined by reference to the 
terms and conditions by which shares are allocated to employees. If 
employees bear the risk and reward of changes in the price of 
unallocated shares, the cost of the shares is the appropriate measure 
of compensation. If the ESOP sponsor bears the risk and reward, fair 
value is the appropriate measure of compensation.
One additional point related to the use of fair value is the position 
stated in the SOP that "in some situations an employer has the 
ability to change other parts of an employee's compensation package 
in reaction to changes in the value of the shares being released." 
This position was used as partial justification for the use of fair
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
March 15, 1993 
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value as the measure of compensation cost. It seems this 
justification is based on what could occur, rather than what will 
occur. Assuming the change is made to measurement based on cost in 
the circumstance recommended above, the SOP could contain a statement 
that if compensation levels are adjusted in response to share price 
changes, the appropriate measure of compensation cost is fair value. 
This approach is somewhat analogous to using the "substantive plan" 
versus the "extant written plan" as the basis for accounting for 
post-retirement benefits other than pensions [reference Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, paragraph 23].
Transition Date
CP&L believes that the transition date provided in the SOP should be 
the effective date of the SOP, rather than September 23, 1992. Until 
the SOP is issued, employers cannot know what the new accounting 
requirements will be and assess those requirements along with other 
considerations regarding establishing an ESOP.
CP&L appreciates the opportunity to comment on the SOP. We would be pleased to 
provide any clarification or additional information needed.
Yours very truly,
Charles D. Barham, Jr.
CDBjr/JAB/ps
BARESOP.WPF
An Employee Owned Corporation 
ComSonics,® INC.
1350 Port Republic Road
P.O. Box 1106 Harrisonburg, VA 22801
SALES: 800-336-9681 703-434-5965 FAX: 703-434-9847
March 18, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007  
RE: EXPOSURE DRAFT OF PROPOSED SOP FOR EMPLOYERS’ 
ACCOUNTING FOR ESOPs
Dear Ms. McNamee:
My name is Bill McIntyre. I am the Director of Finance for ComSonics, Inc., 
a 100% ESOP-owned manufacturing company located in the Shenandoah 
Valley in Virginia. I am writing to provide you with some feedback on the 
Task Force on Accounting for ESOPs Exposure Draft of the Proposed 
Statement of Position of "Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans."
Some background re our Company: ComSonics, Inc. was founded in 1972; 
the ESOP was created in 1975; and the ESOP purchased 100% of the 
Company in 1985. We are a leveraged ESOP and will be paying off our 
ESOP Note until the year 2000. Currently, our annual sales revenue is 
about $9,000,000, and we employ 145 people. Our purchase price for 
Company stock in 1985 was $7.50/share. Currently, our stock is valued at 
$12.75/share. Historically, we have not paid any dividends, and we have 
no plans to do so.
I recognize that the Proposed SOP does not apply to ComSonics (other than 
footnote disclosure) as our ESOP acquired its shares prior to September 23, 
1992; however, I also recognize that it is likely that we will at some time 
in the future engage in some kind of transaction which will cause us to be 
impacted by the Proposed SOP.
Serving the World of Telecommunications Since 1972
Diomne D. McNamee
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My comments on the Proposed SOP are:
(1) Valuation of Shares Released at Market Value to Fund Other 
Employee Benefits, such as an Employers' 401(k) Matching 
Contribution or a Formula Profit-Sharing Plan.
I have no problem with using market value for valuing shares released to 
fund other employee benefits.
(2) Valuation of Shares Released at Market Value to Compensate 
Employees Directly.
I am against using market value for the Company’s valuing of ESOP shares 
released and directly allocated into ESOP Participants’ ESOP Accounts. I 
can understand your rationale for wanting to use market value; i.e. the 
situations which are corrected by my (1) above. To apply market value 
indiscriminately, though, is a huge mistake.
Using market value for released ESOP shares creates the totally nonsensical 
situation which penalizes an ESOP company which has performed well and 
has seen an increase in its stock value as that company will be forced to 
report lower profitability. Correspondingly, an ESOP company which has 
performed poorly and has seen a decrease in its stock value will be 
rewarded as it will be able to report higher profitability. Neither situation 
accurately portrays the true financial condition of the company, a clear 
violation of one of the basic tenets of GAAP. The change in the stock price 
is simply irrelevant to the profitability of the ESOP company.
Privately-held ESOPs such as ours are typically smaller, less sophisticated 
companies which typically deal with smaller banks and less sophisticated 
bankers. To those bankers, ’’lower profitability” is ’’lower profitability." 
They would not understand that, in reality, the ESOP company is reporting 
lower profits because it is doing well!! In our case, specifically, if we had 
applied the Proposed SOP for our latest fiscal year, the reduction in profits 
would have caused us to violate a loan covenant. I can assure you that 
with today’s banking environment, we would not have been able to renew 
our line of credit.
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The "Law of Unintended Consequences" is applicable here, too. The 
unintended consequence is that privately-held ESOPs will have greater 
difficulty obtaining financing. In a sense, then, your Proposed SOP will act 
as a deterrent to ESOPs. Since our ESOP is successful and I believe ESOPs 
are good for people, for business and for this country, I hope that your SOP 
is at worst "neutral" to ESOPs and, preferably, would be "favorable" to 
them.
To conclude the market value issue, I use the analogy of an ESOP 
purchasing Company stock with the Company buying a building with a 
mortgage loan. Following the Task Force's logic, if the value of the building 
rises after the Company’s purchase of it, the Company should increase its 
mortgage payments for the building. Nonsense!! If the Company got a 
good deal in its purchase of the building, it should be able to report 
increased profits from the building. Similarly, if the ESOP got a good deal 
in its purchase of the Company, it should be able to report increased 
profits without being penalized for making a good deal in the first place.
(3) Shares Outstanding.
Treating nonreleased shares as not being outstanding is a good idea. It 
clarifies several issues for us: (1) who votes nonreleased shares in a 
normal vote?; (2) who votes nonreleased shares in a vote on a "major" 
issue?; (3) who receives the dividends on nonreleased shares?; and (4) who 
receives the value for the nonreleased shares if the company should be 
sold or the ESOP terminated?.
(4) Earnings Per Share Calculation.
I have no problem with the proposed Earnings Per Share calculation. As a 
privately-held ESOP, EPS is of limited use for us. Public companies may 
have more significant input.
Dionne D. McNamee
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(5) Effective Date.
I have no problem with the Proposed SOP becoming effective for fiscal 
years ending after December 15, 1993.
(6) Transition.
I am pleased that the September 23, 1992, date chosen for the cutoff date 
in the Proposed SOP means that our Company is not affected by the 
Proposed SOP since our ESOP purchased its shares prior to that date and 
because I do NOT like the Proposed SOP in its current version. However, IF 
the finalized SOP is a good idea, then it should apply across the board, and 
there should be no need for a cutoff date.
(7) Disclosure.
In general, the disclosure requirements are fine; however, the requirement 
to disclose ’’repurchase obligation” is remarkably naive. Most ESOPs, ours 
included, structure their repurchase obligation so that it is paid on a 
deferred basis with installment payments being made over a period of 
time. I would suggest that if you are going to require disclosure of the 
repurchase obligation, then the following elements should be included:
• repurchase obligations already committed (by year for the next 5
years, with a lump sum reported for years 6+) -- this refers to 
amounts owed to people who have already left the company and 
are being paid per a payment schedule;
• repurchase obligations which are due but not yet committed -- this
refers to amounts owed to people who have already left the 
company but who are still in the deferral period and have not yet 
begun to receive their ESOP distribution; and
• repurchase obligations for vested ESOP account balances of current
employees — these amounts are not currently due and have no 
schedule for payment.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide input and hope that my thoughts 
have been of some assistance to you as you are finalizing the SOP. If you 
have any questions or would like more information, please do not hesitate 
to contact me.
Dionne D. McNamee
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Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
G. William McIntyre 
Director of Finance
xc: B. Corea - ESOP Administrator
J. Dickie - ESOP Administrative Committee, Chairman 
D. Zimmerman - President and CEO
ROSAUERS
EMPLOYEE OWNED SUPERMARKETS
March 18, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We would like to comment on the proposed statement of position "employers' 
accounting for employee stock ownership plans." First, we have a "Type I" 
ESOP and feel this proposal is not relevant and would only make our 
statements more complicated and confusing. Second, we had hoped the task 
force would address the contra-equity account, "unearned compensation," 
because it causes a lot of confusion and problems for a company with a 
majority ESOP.
We are a corporation owned 100% by the employees, 83% by the ESOP 
(leveraged ESOP) and 15% by the management. All of the employees, union 
and non-union, have agreed to a wage reduction for the duration of the 
acquisition loan.  The contra-equity account creates a negative 
stockholders' equity on the company balance sheet. The temporary wage 
reduction, a real asset to the corporation, is not recorded on the balance 
sheet.
We continually have difficulties with creditors, lending institutions, 
state and federal agencies and stockholders when trying to explain the 
negative stockholders’ equity. The corporation has over $150 million a 
year in sales, has been in business for 44 years, employs 1300, and is 
making a healthy profit (before ESOP contribution). The current and 
proposed accounting treatments preclude the corporation from being able to 
secure bonding, letters of credit and self insurance status for state 
workers' compensation.
The employee temporary wage reduction is worth in excess of $2 million per 
year and is recognized by the independent appraisal firm in their annual 
stock valuation. However, the current and proposed accounting treatment 
give the corporation no recognition for this very real contribution toward 
the future "unearned compensation".
Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc.  
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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We have talked to other ESOP companies, some who have a wage reduction and 
some who do not, and all are experiencing the same problems with the 
negative stockholders’ equity situation. We feel this accounting 
treatment needs to be addressed. Healthy companies who are majority owned 
by an ESOP have balance sheets that are almost impossible to interpret by 
any outside party, including CPA’s, and cause confusion rather than 
providing useful information to the reader.
Thank you for your consideration of this issue.
Sincerely,
C. J. McELDERRY 
Vice President - Chief Financial Officer
CJM/eh
ROSAUERS
701 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20004-2696
Telephone 202-508-5527
EDISON ELECTRIC 
INSTITUTE
David K. Owens
Senior Vice President 
Finance, Regulation, and 
Power Supply Policy
March 19, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is pleased to respond to the AICPA 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee’s exposure draft of a 
proposed statement of position (SOP) "Employers’ Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans".
EEI is the association of electric companies. Its members serve 99 
percent of all customers served by the investor-owned segment of the 
industry. They generate approximately 78 percent of all the electricity in 
the country and service 76 percent of all ultimate customers in the 
nation.
Recognition of Compensation Expense
EEI disagrees with the proposed position, from paragraph 14, that "...the 
amount of the charge should..." always "...be based on fair values of 
committed to be released shares". EEI believes that the amount of the 
charge should be determined by reference to the terms and conditions 
by which ESOP shares are allocated. More specifically, EEI believes that 
the key element is which party, the ESOP sponsor or the employee, has 
the risk and rewards associated with changes in share prices. If the 
employee has the risk and reward, cost is the appropriate measure. If 
the ESOP sponsor has the risk and reward, fair value is the appropriate 
measure.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
March 19, 1993
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The following two cases illustrate the position described above:
Case 1: An ESOP sponsor establishes an ESOP with no relationship
to other benefits. The plan is designed so that a certain 
number of shares will be released and allocated to 
employees each year.
In this case, employees will receive a certain number of 
shares regardless of the value of the shares being 
allocated. The employees clearly have the risk and reward 
of share price changes, and the ESOP sponsor's 
compensation expense should be measured based on the 
cost of the shares.
Case 2: An ESOP sponsor establishes an ESOP and the ESOP 
shares will be used to meet the sponsor’s obligation under 
a 401(k) plan to match 50 percent of employee 
contributions. The number of shares needed for the 401 (k) 
match is determined by the fair market value of the shares.
In this case, the employee has no risk and reward related 
to changes in share prices relative to unallocated shares. 
The employee will receive an allocation of shares such that 
the total fair value of those shares is equal to the sponsor’s 
50 percent matching obligation. On the other hand, the 
sponsor has the risk and reward of changes in the share 
price of the unallocated stock. If, for example, shares are 
worth $10 now, but were $20 when the ESOP was 
established, the sponsor will bear that difference.
In this case, the appropriate measure of compensation is 
the sponsor’s promise to the employee, which is the 
amount of the 50 percent match (equivalent to the ESOP 
shares used times the current fair value). The difference 
between the cost of the shares and the fair value should be 
charged or credited to paid-in capital at the time they are 
committed to be released.
With respect to plans similar to the one described in Case 1, we believe 
the exposure draft overstates the ability and desire of sponsors to adjust
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
March 19, 1993
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their employee compensation packages based on the value of the ESOP 
allocations. We suggest that many EEI member companies which have 
established ESOPs view the employee-shareholder as holding the risks 
and rewards associated with the performance of the ESOP shares. 
Therefore, these EEI member companies do not focus their 
compensation policies on the value of the shares but instead on the cost
In summary, we believe the proposal to utilize fair value in measuring 
compensation expense in all cases is flawed because it fails to 
adequately consider the effect of plan design in assigning the risks and 
rewards associated with changes in the fair value of unallocated stock. 
We believe the manner in which the ESOP program assigns the risks and 
rewards associated with the value of the unallocated stock is the key 
determinate and must be considered in deciding the appropriate measure 
of compensation.
Effective Date and Transition
EEI disagrees with the transition requirement that shares acquired by 
ESOPs after September 23, 1992 be accounted for under the proposed 
SOP. Application of the September date unfairly imposes requirements 
in advance of the effective date of the statement. Companies have 
acquired shares assuming existing accounting would be applied. The 
shares acquired transition date should be the same as the effective date 
of the SOP but certainly no earlier than the date the exposure draft was 
issued.
EEI appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed SOP. We 
hope our comments are useful in your consideration of employers’ 
accounting for ESOPs.
Sincerely,
David K. Owens
DO:dsk
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TEXAS UTILITIES COMPANY
2001 BRYAN TOWER • DALLAS, TEXAS 75201
H. Dan Farell
Controller
March 18, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division - File 2500 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Gentlemen:
Texas Utilities Company respectfully submits the following comments in response to the Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee’s proposed Statement of Position, "Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans".
Texas Utilities Company is a public utility holding company whose principal subsidiary, TU Electric, 
provides electric service to over two million customers in the north central, eastern and western parts of the State 
of Texas.
Our comments on various aspects of the proposed Statement are discussed below.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
We support the transition alternative provided for in the exposure draft. We agree that requiring 
employers with existing ESOPs to change their accounting would be unfair since the accounting requirements 
existing at the establishment of the ESOP was a significant factor in the decision process.
We believe the most appropriate effective date for the new Statement is for fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 1993. The currently proposed effective date is for the 1993 reporting year for calendar year end 
companies. The exposure draft includes provisions that require entities who adopt the Statement in a period 
other than the first quarter to restate previous interim quarters. As currently written, the exposure draft will 
require all calendar year end companies to restate reported earnings for the year’s prior interim periods. The 
implementation burden imposed by the new Statement would be considerably lessened if its requirements could 
be applied beginning in 1994.
DISCLOSURES
The disclosures required by the proposed statement expand the amount of information currently 
disclosed by employers who sponsor ESOPs. Such detailed disclosures, in our opinion, do not provide an 
incrementally enhanced benefit to the users of the financial statements. ESOPs are established as part of the 
employer’s employee compensation package and generally do not represent a significant portion of the 
employer’s compensation costs. Disclosure of the existence of an ESOP, the number of shares held by the 
ESOP, the amount of unearned compensation recorded at the balance sheet date and the amount of any ESOP 
debt (and its terms) recorded on the employer’s balance sheet is sufficient to adequately inform the financial 
statement user about the entity’s ESOP.
Mr. McNamee 
March 18, 1993 
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The pro forma earnings and earnings per share disclosures proposed for public companies are 
particularly onerous. Our evaluation of the exposure draft’s requirements revealed that application of the 
Statement to 1992 would not have had a material effect on reported results of operations or the company’s 
financial position. Since application of the Statement will likely have an immaterial affect on public companies’ 
annual earnings, AcSEC’s noncomparability concern is unfounded. We strongly encourage the AcSEC to delete 
the exposure draft’s disclosure requirements concerning pro forma earnings and earnings per share information. 
At the very least, the final Statement should allow a statement to the effect that pro forma earnings assuming 
the provisions of the SOP had been applied would not be materially different than reported results.
We appreciate the opportunity to express our concerns and comments on the proposed requirement.
Sincerely,
JSA:dkm 
cc: David Stringfellow - EEI
WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION
March 18, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) is pleased to respond 
to the AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee's exposure 
draft of a proposed statement of position (SOP) "Employers' 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans".
WPSC is an electric and gas utility serving northeast Wisconsin. 
WPSC has sponsored an ESOP since the mid-1970's and has sponsored 
a leveraged ESOP since 1988.
Recognition of Compensation Expense
WPSC strongly disagrees with the proposed position that 
compensation expense should be measured based on the fair value 
of the ESOP shares released in all cases. WPSC subscribes to the 
minority view expressed on page 27 of the exposure draft that 
where the risks and rewards associated with the value of the 
stock have been transferred to employees, the current statement 
of position yields the appropriate result. WPSC's ESOP is 
structured consistently with the Type 1 ESOPs described on page 
27.
Utilization of the current value (an opportunity cost) in 
measuring compensation expense in WPSC's situation suggests that 
it has more ability to control the release and allocation of 
shares than actually exists. In fact, unallocated shares held by 
the WPSC ESOP are not treasury shares and are not under the 
company's total control. Our plan is subject to a multitude of 
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA restrictions which require the 
allocation of shares and define the manner and the timeframe in 
which shares will be allocated. WPSC's ESOP holds common shares 
which are no different than other common stock with respect to 
their voting and other rights. While it is true that the WPSC 
ESOP loan arrangements contain some provisions designed to give 
the company some control over the year in which loan payments are 
made and shares released, these provisions are dealing with the 
periphery of the current year allocation not with the core (i.e., 
these provisions only allow fine-tuning). In fact, tax law
700 North Adams • P.O. Box 19001 • Green Bay, Wl 54307-9001
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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requirements and the external lenders who made the loans prevent 
excess fine-tuning.
With respect to Type 1 ESOPs, we believe the ED overstates the 
ability and desire of sponsors to adjust their employee 
compensation packages based on the value of the ESOP allocations. 
With respect to WPSC's program, we view the employee-shareholder 
as holding the risks and rewards associated with the performance 
of the ESOP shares. Therefore, we do not focus our compensation 
policies on the. value of the shares but instead on the cost.
In summary, we believe the proposal to utilize fair value in 
measuring compensation expense in all cases is flawed because it 
fails to adequately consider the effect of plan design in 
assigning the risks and rewards associated with changes in the 
fair value of unallocated stock. We believe the manner in which 
the ESOP program assigns the risks and rewards associated with 
the value of the unallocated stock is the key determinate and 
must be considered in deciding the appropriate measure of 
compensation.
Effective Date and Transition
WPSC disagrees with the transition requirement that shares 
acquired by ESOPs after September 23, 1992 be accounted for under 
the proposed SOP. Application of the September date unfairly 
imposes requirements in advance of the effective date of the 
Standard. Companies have acquired shares assuming existing 
accounting would be applied. The shares acquired transition date 
should be the same as the effective date of the SOP but certainly 
no earlier than the date the exposure draft was issued.
WPSC appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed SOP. 
We hope our comments are beneficial in your consideration of the 
accounting for ESOPs.
Sincerely,
Blduley-dehnson 
Director - Corporate Tax
CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.
JOHN L. BALTES, JR. 
Controller March 15, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Subject: Proposed Statement of Position: Employers' Accounting 
for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Central Louisiana Electric Company (company) is an investor owned 
electric utility with common stock listed on the New York and 
Pacific Stock Exchanges.
In April 1992, the company initiated an externally leveraged, 
convertible preferred $30,000,000 ESOP in connection with a 
401(k) Employee Savings and Investment Plan. Most of CLECO’s 
1,332 employees are eligible to contribute to the Plan. The $30 
million ESOP represents 4.1% of total capitalization.
The Accounting Standards Executive Committee has invited comments 
on the proposed SOP as a whole, and on all matters in the 
proposed SOP, and particularly on three specific issues. The 
company’s comments accompany this letter.
Sincerely,
John L. Baltes, Jr.
2030 Donahue Ferry Road, P.O. Box 5000, Pineville, LA 71361-5000, Telephone 318-484-7400
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
SOP: Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
The provisions of the proposed SOP would require an employer to 
measure compensation cost based on the fair value of the shares 
committed to be released.
The shares "committed" method represents a departure from the 
current requirement of the shares "allocated" method. The 
company concurs with this change to recognize 
compensation/benefit expense when earned rather than when funded.
Should the compensation cost be measured based on the fair value 
of shares when committed to be released or the cost of shares to 
ESOPs?
Compensation cost should be measured by the cost of shares to the 
ESOP. Under APB Opinion No. 25, compensation cost is based on 
"quoted market price" at "measurement date" (APB-25, paragraph 
10) . The company believes that the date of adoption of an ESOP 
is the appropriate date for the measurement of unearned (in 
effect prepaid) compensation and that future service is the means 
of systematic and rational allocation of that cost as shares are 
committed to be released.
Paragraph 70 of the SOP states that:
"AcSEC believes the employer's cost and liability 
for employee benefits that are funded with ESOP 
shares should be measured and recognized in the 
same way as if some other means of funding were 
used."
Paragraphs 17 and 70 contradict the "fair value" requirement of 
paragraphs 14 and 20. Any allocation of shares is inherently 
based on wages and is a matching form of compensation whether it 
is a stand-alone plan or related to any other employee benefit.
Paragraph 63 of the SOP states that:
"AcSEC's objective is that the accounting reflect 
the terms of the exchange transactions that take 
place between an employer that provides 
compensation and the employees who render services 
in exchange for that compensation."
The company believes that recognition of the "fair value" of 
shares when committed to be released may not reflect the terms of 
the employer/employee "exchange transactions" as explained below.
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Prior to the adoption of an ESOP, the company’s employer matching 
cash contribution under its 401(k) was one-half of the first six 
percent of employee contributions. Upon adoption of the ESOP, 
the match was increased to two-thirds of the first six percent of 
contributions. The reasons for this increase were compensation 
for the employee’s inability to direct investment of the company 
contributions and recognition that funding based on market value 
could decrease the number of shares earned by employees on 
equivalent amounts of eligible compensation in different periods. 
Under the terms of this ’’exchange transaction”, the fair value of 
the two-thirds match of ESOP shares could be based on the 
one-half match of cash contributions.
The company based its compensation policy on the cost of ESOP 
shares not on projections of estimated future market value. 
Changes in market value value affect the timing of the commitment 
to release shares but not the total shares to be released. 
Therefore, the sponsor’s compensation/benefit cost of an ESOP 
should be measured by the cost to the ESOP (proceeds to the 
sponsor) of the shares committed to be released to employees.
Should the SOP specify circumstances under which the fair value 
of shares should be used and other circumstances under which the 
cost of shares should be used?
If cost is not to be the measure of compensation expense for all 
ESOPs, then sponsors whose ESOPs are designed so that a certain 
number of shares are committed to be released periodically 
without regard to the market value should be permitted to 
recognize compensation expense based on cost of the ESOP shares.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
The proposed SOP would be effective for fiscal years ending after 
December 15, 1993, as of the beginning of the fiscal year in 
which the SOP is adopted. Application of the accounting is 
optional for shares acquired by ESOPs prior to September 23, 1992 
but mandatory for acquisitions after September 23, 1992.
Do [we] support this transition or is there another effective 
date or method of transition that is more appropriate?
The company supports a transition date of December 21, 1992, 
rather than September 23, 1992.
Issue 3: Disclosures
Public companies that elect not to adopt the accounting 
provisions of the proposed SOP would be required to disclose 
proforma income before extraordinary items, net income, and 
earnings per share computed as if the employer had adopted the 
provisions of this proposed SOP.
Do [we] believe that such disclosures are appropriate?
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No. In paragraph 93, AcSEC's stated objective was to "minimize 
implementation costs and to mitigate disruption”. Further, in 
paragraph 94, AcSEC's decision to grandfather ESOPs was 
influenced by the perception that "it would be unfair to 
employers with existing ESOPs to change their accounting for 
ESOPs in place.” And, again, in paragraph 94, "...the accounting 
treatment, which was covered in SOP 76-3, was an important 
consideration in establishing ... ESOPs.”
The company is unable to determine how disclosure of alternate 
income and per share amounts minimizes costs, mitigates 
disruption or grandfathers ESOPs under SOP 76-3.
Paragraph 16.
This paragraph requires that average fair value be used to 
determine the amount of compensation cost recognized in each 
reporting period. The amount of cost should not be adjusted for 
subsequent changes in the fair value of shares.
The company strongly objects to the lack of adjustment to actual 
results for interim or annual periods. In a preferred stock 
ESOP, the number of shares actually committed to be released 
depends on the fair value at specific points in time. The 
company is unaware of any justification for not adjusting 
estimated accruals to the actual results in subsequent periods 
whether it is for income tax accruals, contingent liabilities or 
ESOPs.
Paragraph 30. Common Stock Equivalents,
"Although the unique characteristics of convertible 
preferred stock held by an ESOP are not 
specifically addressed in APB Opinion 15, AcSEC 
believes that the shares are common stock 
equivalents, because the condition precedent to the 
issuance of common stock for shares that have been 
committed to be released is merely the passage of 
time until employees retire or otherwise become 
eligible to withdraw their account balances.” 
(Paragraph 80)
The issue of "mere passage of time” is discussed in APB Opinion 
15, as follows:
"Conversion or exercise options that are not 
effective until after ten or more years may be 
expected to be of limited significance because (a) 
investors are not likely to be influenced 
substantially by events beyond ten years, and (b) 
it is questionable whether they are relevant to 
current operating results.” (APB-15, paragraph 58)
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The average company employee has more than 17 years of future 
service remaining, giving effect to historical rates of employee 
turnover and of early retirement. On average, a considerable 
number of years elapse before shares committed to be released are 
converted. Thus the treatment of the company's ESOP convertible 
preferred stock as a common stock equivalent is of questionable 
relevance to the results of operations for the current period.
Convertible preferred shares held by ESOPs do remain outstanding 
indefinitely since an employee, aged 21, hired by the company in 
the year 2010 could still receive preferred stock that might not 
convert until the year 2059.
Common stock equivalents are securities with the "ability to 
participate in the economic benefits resulting from the 
underlying earnings and earnings potential of the common stock." 
(APB-15, paragraph 74.) It is precisely because the "ESOP 
participants cannot withdraw their shares from the plan" until 
retirement, death or termination that inhibits the employee from 
participating in the earnings potential of the common stock 
during the course of employment.
Paragraph 31. Number of Shares Outstanding,
For reasons stated above, the company believes that convertible 
preferred stock held by the ESOP is not a common stock 
equivalent. Therefore, shares committed to be released should be 
excluded from the if-converted computations for both primary and 
fully diluted earnings per share.
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United States Sugar Corporation______________
Post Office Drawer 1207 Clewiston, Florida 33440
Telephone: (813)983-8121 Telex: 510-952-7753
March 18, 1993
Task Force on Accounting for ESOP’s 
c/o Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Gentlemen:
Our company is a non-public entity over 42% owned by a 
leveraged employee stock option plan with approximately 2,500 
participants. Our ESOP was established 10/1/83 with benefits 
payable upon retirement. Our company also provides its employees 
with a defined benefit retirement income plan (RIP). However, 
benefits payable by the RIP are offset by 75% of the participants 
future value of ESOP shares at retirement. We acknowledge this 
interaction between an ESOP and a RIP is unique. Our outside 
ESOP counsel estimates probably less than a dozen ESOPs within 
the country have this type of relationship with a defined benefit 
plan.
Paragraph 17 of the 12/21/92 SOP exposure draft states "some 
employers agree to provide a specified or determinable benefit, 
such as a contribution to a 401 (K) plan or to a formula profit 
sharing plan, to employees and use the ESOP to partially or fully 
fund the benefit." We are not clear as to whether "a specified 
or determinable benefit to employees" should include a defined 
benefit pension plan with an ESOP offset such as ours. The exam­
ples in paragraph 17 center around defined contribution plans. 
Paragraph 17 further states "for ESOP shares committed to be 
released to settle liabilities for such benefits, employers 
should report satisfaction of the liabilities when the shares are 
committed to be released to settle the liability."
To determine our RIP liability annually, we offset 75% of 
the participant’s current value of ESOP shares against the par­
ticipant’s future RIP defined benefit. We do not have a RIP 
liability on current participants due to large percentage alloca­
tions and significant increases in market value since inception 
of the plan. In the future we believe a RIP liability will start 
occurring. Future ESOP allocations from leveraged retiree buy 
backs will not be sufficient to offset the RIP liability on new 
participants.
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We interpret paragraph 17 as potentially requiring us to 
determine the portion of the ESOP allocation applicable to our 
RIP offset and charge it to our RIP liability. Since our 75% RIP 
offset is determined on an employee by employee basis we see no 
way to compute compensation expense as incurred throughout the 
year other than perform expensive actuarial valuations to deter­
mine the offset portion by individual participant. Compensation 
expense under our circumstance will fluctuate by individual 
participant from 25% to 100% of the participant’s allocation.
We do not believe the task force contemplated an ESOP inte­
grated as an offset with a defined benefit plan when the SOP was 
drafted. We believe the accounting ramifications involved when 
ESOPs are used as offsets to actuarially computed liabilities are 
too complex to be decided without significant further study. We, 
therefore, request the task force to exempt an ESOP integrated as 
an offset with a defined benefit plan from the provisions of 
paragraph 17 in the SOP.
A second area of the SOP upon which we would like to comment 
is paragraph 47 and the proposed treatment concerning shares paid 
for by reversion proceeds and not yet committed to be released 
due to IRS limitations. The SOP states those shares should be 
treated like leveraged suspense shares and correspondingly sub­
tracted from outstanding shares in computing corporate earnings 
per share. We believe unallocated reversion shares should not 
be assumed the equivalent of treasury stock and subtracted from 
outstanding shares. If our ESOP plan is terminated any unallo­
cated reversion shares would not revert to the company but would 
remain with the terminated plan. We base our position upon the 
company having no creditor rights upon the reversion shares.
We appreciate your consideration of these arguments. Should 
you desire to discuss these matters further please feel free to 
correspond or call.
Gregory C. Ford CPA, CMA 
Director of Internal Audit 
United States Sugar Corporation
GF/mab
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Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
I am writing in regards to the proposed Statement of Position, "Employers’ Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans". Said SOP would require the use of fair value of the shares 
committed to be released to measure compensation cost. I am strongly opposed to this 
treatment for a leveraged ESOP. I believe that the cost of the shares at the time of purchase 
should be used.
For example, we have two leveraged ESOP companies as clients whose stock price has moved 
in opposite directions since the ESOP’s inception. The first company has experienced a 25% 
decrease in sales since 1988 and has operating losses also. It’s stock price has declined since 
1988. Compensation cost is being measured at the 1988 stock price which equals the long term 
debt. If fair value was used compensation cost would decrease over 50%. Operating results 
would improve dramatically because of this change in accounting principle. Management would 
be rewarded for driving the stock price down. There would be a strong disincentive to increase 
the stock price. Is this your intended result?
In contrast, the other ESOP company’s stock price has increased since the ESOP’s inception 
even though significant long term debt was incurred for the ESOP trust to purchase a majority 
of the outstanding shares. Compensation cost is being measured by the cost of the shares. To 
use fair value would fly in the face of common sense. Amortization of historical cost of assets 
is a decades old accounting principle. Why change now? This company and the employees 
would be penalized with worse operating results under this SOP. They have worked hard to 
increase the stock price even with the large debt load. This company’s management and 
employees will be punished by the AICPA for tremendous operating results. They did not pay 
the current fair value of the stock to purchase it.
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A corollary negative effect of this SOP is that it will tend to depress stock appraisal values for 
leveraged ESOP companies whose stock price is rising each year. With worse operating results 
appraisers will value the stock price lower because of the fair value compensation cost. This is 
a terrible result for private, closely held ESOP companies who rely on annual appraisals to 
determine stock prices rather than an actively traded market. Distributions to ESOP retiring 
participants will be smaller due to this SOP. Does the AICPA really want to penalize these 
participants?
I know there is significant pressure from the SEC, IRS, DOL and congressional staffers to always 
use fair value for pension assets. However it's myopic to apply fair value to the compensation 
cost of the released shares of a leveraged ESOP. It appears the AICPA is capitulating to undue 
pressure from these government agencies. To veer from historical cost of the shares will skew 
operating results and hurt the participants in a leveraged ESOP.
In contrast, the SOP should delineate that fair value of shares should be used for a non-leveraged 
ESOP. Typically these shares are being contributed to the ESOP in the current year so that fair 
value of the shares measures the cost to the company.
I am thankful for the transition date of September 23, 1992 so my existing ESOP clients will be 
grandfathered from these onerous rules if they are imposed. However, I have another private, 
closely held client implementing a leveraged ESOP and they will not be grandfathered. If this 
SOP is implemented I will seriously consider recommending they don’t comply with this new 
accounting treatment. The audit report would have to be qualified, but an informed banker would 
rather see an income statement based on economic reality rather than "fair value".
For public companies to be required to disclose pro forma results even though they elect to 
retain the current accounting for shares is inappropriate for leveraged ESOP companies. Again 
the operating results are skewed by the use of fair value. The disclosures will not be meaningful.
My clients, my partners and I are opposed to this SOP and its imposition of fair value of shares 
on a leveraged ESOP. We hope the AICPA will have the courage to change this SOP and retain 
the cost of the shares for the measure of compensation cost.
Sincerely,
Harry Beeson, C.P.A.
Mobil Corporation
March 19, 1993
3225 GALLOWS ROAD 
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22037-0001
ROBERT C. MUSSER
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20004-1007
PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POSITION 
EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are pleased to comment on the Proposed Statement of Position 
(SOP) entitled "Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans." In our view, appropriate accounting for the ESOPs cannot 
be determined without first addressing the underlying definitions 
and characteristics of liabilities and equity that are embodied in 
the conceptual framework.
We have the same concerns with the proposed SOP as we have 
expressed to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) with 
respect to its preliminary views on the accounting for stock 
options. The FASB extracted this issue from its liability/equity 
project in order to achieve a limited objective, which, in our 
opinion, is being influenced by political expediency and is 
inconsistent with the conceptual framework. AcSEC should avoid a 
similar approach. Our opinions on the specific issues raised in 
the proposed SOP are based on this perspective.
RECOGNITION OF COMPENSATION COST
Fair Value -
We agree with the minority view that type I ESOPs should not be 
included in this SOP. In our opinion, the allocations of shares 
are equity transactions and charging compensation expense for 
fluctuations in their fair value is inconsistent with the 
principles underlying the conceptual framework. The issues 
surrounding type II ESOPs are somewhat more complicated. While we 
understand why the dissenting AcSEC members would agree with the 
majority view for these ESOPs, we offer an alternative opinion.
CONTROLLER
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The premise for recording compensation expense for type II ESOPs 
is that a liability arises for the defined monetary contribution 
that the employer agrees to pay, such as a contribution to a 
401(k) plan. We do not disagree that this obligation clearly 
results in a liability and compensation expense. However, 
leveraged ESOPs effectively manage this cost by fixing the 
liability to equal the debt service. Presumably, the cash 
received on the sale of the shares will be invested (e.g., 
purchase of treasury stock, pay down debt, etc.) and over time 
will generate sufficient funds to redeem shares. The fair value 
of share redemptions should be accounted for as equity trans­
actions and not charged partially to compensation expense and 
partially to equity in different periods. The cash cost of the 
debt service (recognized on a shares allocated method) reflects 
the underlying economics of a leveraged ESOP and is the most 
appropriate measurement of the liability under the conceptual 
framework.
AcSEC’s fundamental conclusion that the accounting for an ESOP’s 
debt should be separated from the accounting for an ESOP’s shares 
is inconsistent with the concept of hedge accounting found else­
where in the accounting literature. An example is the accounting 
for a foreign currency hedge of a firm commitment. Under FAS 52, 
a forward contract that hedges a foreign currency commitment back 
into the functional currency is accounted for as a functional 
currency commitment measured at the forward rate, not the spot 
rate on the date the commitment is paid. A leveraged ESOP has the 
same effect as a foreign currency commitment and should be 
accounted for similarly. The leveraging fixes the future cost of 
the defined contributions (i.e., commitments to employees). 
Hence, the employees are receiving the current fair value of the 
shares, while the cost to the employer has been locked in by the 
leveraging.
Dividends -
Our view that the issuance of ESOP debt and ESOP shares is an 
integrated transaction is consistent with the conceptual 
framework. We believe it also supports charging all dividends to 
retained earnings, because it considers all shares issued and 
outstanding when the ESOP is established and the debt is issued. 
While we recognize that one could reasonably argue, under this 
integrated transaction concept, that only dividends paid on 
allocated shares should be charged to retained earnings, we do not 
understand how AcSEC’s position of separate debt/equity ESOP 
transactions can support a similar conclusion.
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In order to be consistent with AcSEC's view, the service of the 
debt should also be separate from the payment of dividends. This 
means that dividends on all shares should be charged to retained 
earnings and the use of the dividend funds by the ESOP should be 
irrelevant to the employer. It is simply illogical for AcSEC to 
require that compensation be measured at the fair value of the 
shares on the basis of ignoring the economics of the debt and then 
disallow dividends to be charged to retained earnings because the 
employer has control over directing those dividends to service the 
debt.
These are not mutually exclusive issues. If AcSEC believes that 
ESOP accounting should change to a fair value concept, it must 
not limit the charge to retained earnings to only dividends on 
allocated shares. It seems to us that AcSEC's position will 
result in a SOP that will have a large negative impact on the 
employer corporation but is not the most theoretically supported 
by accounting principles.
TRANSITION AND DISCLOSURES
We agree that employers with current ESOPs should be exempt from 
the new accounting requirements. However, we strongly object to 
some of the disclosure requirements. Mobil is a capital inten­
sive company, yet about 25% of our financial statement footnotes 
are devoted to employee related information (i.e., FAS 87, FAS 
106, ESOP, stock options). We do not believe that an expansion of 
the ESOP disclosures will be beneficial to investors. Information 
such as the classification of shares held by the ESOP and a 
complicated explanation of how the plan works is simply not useful 
to investors in Mobil.
However, our greatest criticism is directed towards the unreason­
able pro forma disclosures for grandfathered companies. In order 
to make these disclosures as understandable as possible, they will 
require lengthy technical explanations, which will add further 
unnecessary complexity to an already confusing subject. Pro forma 
disclosures should not be used to compare accounting policies 
among different companies. Requiring these disclosures would be 
tantamount to requiring pro forma successful efforts disclosures 
by companies using the less preferable, but SEC allowable, full 
cost accounting method.
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SUMMARY
We believe that the current accounting standards for ESOPs are in 
conformity with the conceptual framework. These standards should 
not be changed unless the definitions and characteristics of 
liabilities and equities are changed. This would require a 
complete re-engineering of the conceptual framework, which we do 
not support. In our opinion, the current accounting model has 
served U.S. investors and businesses well and we see no compelling 
reason to change it.
Very truly,
Robert C. Musser
McFARLAND & ALTON PS. 
Certified Public Accountants
March 17, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
AICPA
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is in response to the proposed statement of position "employers accounting for 
employee stock ownership plans." We have three comments related to the proposed 
"SOP" and they are as follows:
1. We support the three dissenting ACSEC members in their position that fair value of 
shares released should not be used to measure compensation costs of certain ESOPs. 
We concur with the position that in "Type I" ESOPs, in which shares are released to 
compensate employees directly (and not used to fund other employee benefits) that 
the fair market value of the shares at the time of release is not a factor.
We do not believe the additional costs to implement these charges are justified. 
Additionally, these changes will make the financial reporting even more confusing 
and complicated than it currently is.
Our experience has been that explaining the contra-equity account, "unearned 
compensation" to third party users is complicated enough and that many "reasonably 
prudent readers" have a difficult time comprehending the concept. Clearly the 
proposed treatment of compensation, at fair value, will do nothing to simplify the 
financial reporting for ESOPs.
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2 We generally found the verbage used in the SOP to be unclear. An example being the 
last sentence of paragraph 19. In this sentence, the phrase "fair value of shares as of 
the dates specified by the employers, which is usually specified in the ESOP 
documents," is used. Is the "fair value" referred to the same as the value used for debt 
service in conjunction with the share release formula specified in the ESOP 
documents? If so, is the term "fair value" different than the definition used in 
paragraph 20?  
3. Our last comment refers to the transition date selected of September 23, 1992. We 
recommend that the date selected by in conjunction with corporations normal fiscal or 
calendar year-ends. The current date makes us wonder which lobby acquired their 
ESOP shares on September 22, 1992.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. If you have any questions or 
require any additional clarification on our comments, please do not hesitate to call.
Sincerely
McFarland & alton, p.s.
Hubert S. Langenhorst, CPA
csbj
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Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is written in response to the December 21, 1992 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee’s (AcSEC) request for 
comments on the proposed Statement of Position (SOP) entitled 
"Employers’ Accounting For Employee Stock Ownership Plans."
The J. M. Smucker Company is a manufacturer of jams, jellies, 
preserves, and other fruit-related products. Our business 
was founded in 1897 in Orrville, Ohio as a small manufacturer 
of apple cider. We have subsequently grown to about $500 
million in sales, and we now have 13 manufacturing and 
processing facilities located throughout the United States 
and in England and Australia. Our Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan was established in 1981 and currently has 900 
participants.
The value of our stock was growing rapidly during the 1980s 
and we recognized that by leveraging our ESOP, we could 
provide this additional retirement benefit while promoting the 
continued motivation of our employees in an organized, 
cost-effective manner.
THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY • STRAWBERRY LANE, ORRVILLE, OHIO 44667-0280 • TELEPHONE (216) 682-3000 • FAX. (216) 684-3062
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Since its inception, we have placed 1,270,000 Smucker 
shares into the ESOP, of which about 30% have thus far 
been allocated to the separate accounts of the participants. 
Our intent has been to put significant amounts of additional 
shares into the ESOP when circumstances and our financial 
capabilities warranted. We view this goal as evidence of a 
responsible, long-term commitment on our part to provide 
additional retirement benefits to those employees whose efforts
  help us grow and prosper.
We also have an unrelated Section 401(k) Employee Savings Plan 
which is funded entirely by employee payroll contributions and 
matching employer cash contributions. It has never been our 
intention to combine this Plan with our ESOP in any manner, or 
to take any other actions that were not anticipated and approved 
under SOP 76-3.
It is our belief that the proposed change requiring that the 
recognition of compensation costs by employers be measured 
based on the fair value of the shares when committed to be 
released, will cause a significant, adverse, long-term impact 
on our ability to continue to provide our historical level of 
ESOP benefit to our employees.
For example, we considered using shares we have recently 
purchased from the estate of a deceased shareholder to rebuild 
the inventory of unallocated shares in our ESOP, but have now 
concluded that under the proposed change, that will simply not 
be possible. If the value of our stock continues to appreciate 
by 10% per year, such a move would cause us to expense for book 
purposes an additional $38 million over a 23 year allocation 
period. At 15%, the additional expense would be $90 million. 
Furthermore, we have been advised that there may be little or 
no related income tax benefit, since the charge would never be 
deductible for tax purposes.
We believe that Type I ESOPs should be excluded from the 
Proposed SOP because historical accounting requirements under 
SOP 76-3 are still relevant. The measurement date for 
compensation from Type I ESOPs should be the date the shares 
are acquired by the ESOP since that is the date when the risks 
and rewards associated with the value of the ESOP shares are 
transferred from the employer to the employees.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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If the accounting community has a general perception of abuse 
in regard to certain ESOP activities, it should direct its 
energies at correcting the abuses without adversely impacting 
Plans and employees generally. We fully agree with the AcSEC 
minority that there is no need to implement changes that would 
harm ESOPs that only release shares to employees directly.
We appreciate your consideration of the views we have 
presented in this letter, and we would be pleased to discuss 
them with you in greater detail at your convenience.
Richard K. Smucker 
President
RKS:sl
cc: Mr. Norman N. Strauss, Chairman
Accounting Standards Executive Committee 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Mr. Dennis R. Beresford, Chairman
Financial Accounting Standards Board
401 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, CT 06856-5116
March 10, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Accounting Standards Committee of the Maryland 
Association of CPAs reviewed the proposed Statement of 
Position entitled "Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans.” Our conclusions follow.
First, we support the SOP’s use of fair value as the 
measurement of compensation expense (Issue 1). We believe 
it provides a more realistic portrayal of resources 
sacrificed by the entity than does historical cost. 
However, we are aware of the current FASB project on stock 
compensation, and that it may eventually lead to further 
disclosures of stock compensation plans rather than the 
actual introduction of stock compensation expense into 
income realization. The fair value issues in this proposed 
SOP are somewhat related, and we advise the Task Force to be 
aware of any pending inconsistencies with the FASB project. 
Even if the two projects provide divergent standards, we 
believe that the accounting in the SOP is defensible.
Second, we do not favor disclosures that allow for pro 
forma earnings and earnings per share figures in the 
footnotes (Issue 3). We feel it could be potentially 
confusing to readers and erode the credibility of the 
financial statements as well as the credibility of the 
accounting standards embodied in them.
Finally, we find no fault with the effective date 
(Issue 2), but we do favor a prospective transition method 
that encompasses more company-to-company comparability 
directly in the financial statements. This is in line with 
our concerns about Issue 3.
I hope this is helpful. Thank you for the opportunity 
to respond.
Sincerely,
Gary F. Bulmash 
Chairman
PJ Lynch
Vice President 
and 
Comptroller
Texaco Inc 2000 Westchester Avenue 
White Plains NY 10650
March 17, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File Reference 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Texaco appreciates the opportunity to offer its comments on the Exposure Draft (ED) of a proposed 
AICPA Statement of Position, Employer’s Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans.
As a sponsor of two leveraged ESOPs, Texaco takes exception to many of the conclusions reached in the 
ED. Of major concern is the requirement to disclose pro forma earnings and earnings per share data for 
existing ESOPs that are grandfathered as if the requirements of the proposed Statement of Position had 
been adopted. In our opinion, such a disclosure would only serve to undermine the credibility of the 
primary financial statements. This type of disclosure is tantamount to mandating reconciliations between 
two acceptable methods of accounting and has no place in financial reporting. The ESOP program of a 
company might have been designed significantly different if the proposed new rules had then been in 
effect. Because of this, the AcSEC recognized that it would be inappropriate to mandate accounting 
changes on existing plans and, accordingly, grandfathered existing leveraged ESOPs. Pro forma disclosure 
as to what would have been the results under a different accounting principle would likewise be 
inappropriate.
The conceptual basis underlying the proposed accounting for a leveraged ESOP is that the ESOP is 
extension of the employer and has no independent substance. Under this rationale, the AcSEC has argued 
that an ESOP’s direct debt is actually debt of the employer. Carrying this reasoning further, we would 
then have to describe a leveraged ESOP’s purchase of shares from an employer as an employer’s 
borrowing of cash to purchase treasury shares from itself. This does not seem logical; an employer does 
not sell stock to itself. Furthermore, the interest expense on the ESOP debt is deemed to be interest 
expense of the employer. This ignores the question of the ESOP as the legal obligor for such interest
Texaco also objects to the use of fair value in the measurement of compensation expense. One of the 
considerations leading to the establishment of our ESOPs was the fact that long-term compensation would 
be fixed at the date the plans were established by effectively pre-funding the plans with shares of the 
company’s stock. Future stock price changes do not change the fact that the shares held by the ESOP will 
eventually be allocated to employees. Stock price increases merely extend the allocation period at no 
additional cost to the company. Furthermore, the use of fair values to measure compensation costs 
effectively penalizes the earnings of companies who have seen their stock prices appreciate in value, at 
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least in part, as a result of compensation plans that have served to motivate employees and to result in the 
realization of operating efficiencies.
The ED proposes that only dividends on allocated shares be reported and accounted for as dividends. At 
the same time, the balance sheet will show as outstanding all shares issued to the ESOP, and the issuing 
company’s board of directors will periodically declare that dividends be paid on those shares. With 
respect to dividends paid on ESOP shares, the payee is the ESOP trust, a separate entity from the 
sponsoring employer, which enjoys the same rights and risks and rewards as other shareholders. The fact 
that the ESOP uses dividend receipts to service its debt does not change the nature of the dividend 
payment by the sponsor from a distribution to owners to a payment of expenses. All dividends should 
be reported and accounted for as dividends.
By the proposal’s use of fair value as the basis for compensation expense, unallocated ESOP shares are 
being viewed as de facto treasury shares of the employer, although not accounted for in that manner on 
the balance sheet. Future compensation expense would be measured on the same basis as would occur 
in the case of future fixed awards of restricted stock from treasury. Likewise, the exclusion of dividends 
on unallocated shares from accounting as dividends also represents the treatment of unallocated ESOP 
shares as de facto treasury shares of the employer. This is an obvious inconsistency within the conceptual 
theory of this proposal. Unallocated shares are not treasury shares of the employer.
Texaco believes the proposed effective date for the final SOP of fiscal years ending after December 15, 
1993, as of the beginning of the year adopted should be changed to fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 1993. This change would permit calendar year companies wishing to adopt the proposed 
accounting rules to avoid the necessity of restating interim 1993 financial statements.
The opportunity to comment is appreciated.
Very truly yours,
PP&L
 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101-1179 • 215/770-5151
Ronald E. Hill
V/ce President and Comptroller
215 / 770-5646
March 22, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Comments on Proposed Statement of Position 
Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (PP&L) is an operating 
electric utility serving approximately 1.2 million customers in central eastern 
Pennsylvania. Revenues for 1992 were $2.7 billion, assets at December 31, 
1992 were $8.2 billion and the net income for 1992 was $347 million.
PP&L submits the following comments on the Exposure Draft of the 
Proposed Statement of Financial Position entitled "Employers' Accounting For 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans".
PP&L has a non-leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(ESOP) that allocates shares to eligible employees as of the end of the ESOP's 
fiscal year, but subsequently distributes shares after the end of the year. The 
allocation procedure is in compliance with Treasury Department Regulation 
1.46-8, which states "securities are allocated as of the last day of the plan year." 
Allocations to individual accounts are based, in part, on each participant's 
annual compensation.
PP&L believes it is impractical to allocate shares by the end of the 
year, because year-end compensation amounts are required to determine the 
individual allocations. PP&L also believes it is inappropriate to establish 
accounting rules that conflict with the existing Treasury Department regulations 
that established ESOPs. PP&L believes that changing the wording in paragraph 
40 of the proposed SOP from "by the end" to "as of the end" would resolve this 
conflict and would better reflect the intent of the proposed SOP.
Very truly yours,
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM
BARTLESVILLE, OKLAHOMA 74004
COMPANY
918 661-6600
CONTROLLERS
March 23, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
A.I.C.P.A.
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed statement of position (SOP), 
Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans. As our company sponsors an 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), the accounting for the plan is important to us.
No Demonstrated Need for Accounting Change
We do not believe there is a demonstrated need for an accounting change. As a plan 
sponsor, we are unaware of significant issues that question the usefulness of the current 
accounting for ESOPs. It is true that there has been a significant increase in the numbers 
of ESOPs and that many are complex. However, this does not provide any evidence that 
the underlying accounting concepts in SOP 76-3 do not provide useful information to 
financial statement users. Also, it is not demonstrated in the proposed SOP that the 
accounting will be more useful to financial statement users.
When we considered sponsoring an ESOP, all the issues connected with such a plan were 
examined, including the accounting treatment by the sponsor. Our ESOP is a long-term 
undertaking, and it was important that the accounting treatment be understood at the outset. 
We believe that this accounting should not be changed, unless it is flawed or the plan 
changes significantly.
Compensation Cost
We believe the proposed SOP is seriously flawed in that it requires compensation costs be 
measured based on the fair value of shares released. We strongly disagree with this 
position. The economic substance of the transaction is the sale of shares to the ESOP. The 
price of those shares has been established by the sale. The employee-shareholder has the 
risk/reward opportunity on the shares purchased by the ESOP, not the ESOP sponsor.
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The net cash outlay over the life of the ESOP is the important cost consideration to the 
ESOP sponsor. The cost to the plan sponsor is a more important and reliable measure of 
compensation costs than a value that is reflected in the stock price. Stock prices may 
fluctuate significantly in one year and have little relation to the value of services performed 
by the ESOP participants. Therefore, the cash required of the employer to support the 
ESOP is a much better measure of the true compensation costs than the stock price.
Company compensation policies are normally based on issues other than stock prices. It 
would be misleading to require entities to include in compensation costs fair values on 
ESOP shares, when in fact the employer does not base compensation policies on those share 
values. We know of no situation wherein an employer has changed or modified 
compensation policies because of changes in the value of ESOP shares.
Dividends on ESOP Shares
We do not agree with the proposed SOP concerning dividends on unallocated shares held 
by the ESOP. We consider these shares to be outstanding. We believe the dividends paid 
on these unallocated shares should continue to be charged to retained earnings. Also, only 
in the most unusual circumstances do the shares ever return to the ESOP sponsor. In this 
regard, we believe the proposed SOP places undue emphasis on the ESOP sponsor 
controlling the unallocated shares.
Disclosures
We do not support the proposed disclosure requirements for ESOP sponsors who elect to 
continue accounting for ESOP shares acquired on or before September 22, 1992 under SOP 
76-3. We believe the requirement to provide pro forma income before extraordinary items, 
net income and earnings per share information as if the proposed SOP had been adopted 
is punitive. This provision will apply an unnecessary recordkeeping and reporting burden 
on those public company sponsors who elect to continue their present accounting. In 
addition, we believe these disclosures will not be beneficial in helping the reader assess 
future cash flows of the ESOP sponsor.
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Effective Date
We believe the transition provisions of this proposed SOP are unnecessarily complicated. 
If adopted (which we oppose), we believe the effective date should be for fiscal years ending 
after December 15, 1994, with application at the beginning of the fiscal year in which it is 
adopted. The SOP should be applied prospectively with the new requirements applicable 
to new ESOP shares acquired in the year of adoption.
Conclusion
We disagree with the major thrust of the proposed SOP and urge the Accounting Standards 
Executive Committee to reconsider its conclusion. As an ESOP sponsor, we do not see a 
need for the proposed changes; do not agree with using stock values to calculate 
compensation expense; and believe the disclosure requirements for public companies who 
do not elect to adopt the SOP serves no useful purpose.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on a topic very important to our company 
and to ESOP sponsors in general.
Very truly yours,
L. F. Francis
Controller & General Tax Officer
 Ernst & Young ■ 277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10172
March 22, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Proposed Statement of Position,
“Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans”
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are pleased to submit our comments on the proposed Statement of Position, “Employers’ 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans” (the “Exposure Draft”).
Consistent with AcSEC’s minority view, we do not support the Exposure Draft because, for 
shares purchased after the effective date, its provisions would apply to too broad a range of 
ESOPs. Specifically, we do not believe that the fair value of shares released by ESOPs to 
compensate employees directly (“Type I ESOPs”) should be used to measure compensation 
expense. However, if the scope were revised, we would support a number of the significant 
changes proposed by the Exposure Draft, including that it would require compensation cost to be 
measured based on the fair value of shares committed to be released by ESOPs used to settle or 
fund liabilities for other employee benefits, such as an employer’s match of contributions to a 
401(k) plan (“Type II ESOPs”).
We believe that the existing guidance for Type I ESOPs is still relevant and reliable. For these 
plans, the costs of changing from the long standing and well understood practices established by 
SOP 76-3, “Accounting Practices for Certain Employee Stock Ownership Plans,” which 
effectively has been modified by several EITF consensuses directed towards the most 
troublesome practice problems that have arisen, clearly outweigh any benefits.
In our view, compensation cost for Type I ESOP shares should continue to be measured based on 
the cost of the shares to the ESOP. We believe that changes in the value of the stock subsequent 
to acquisition by the ESOP are not relevant because the risks and rewards associated with the 
value of the shares are substantively transferred from the employer to the employees upon 
acquisition. That is because under the tax laws applicable to these plans, the fair value of the 
shares at the time of release does not impact the number of shares released to directly 
compensate employees. Any control or risks and rewards the employer might retain are indirect
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and limited-clearly different from the facts of a Type II-ESOP. Subsequent changes in the value 
of the shares after acquisition by the ESOP reflect the effects of holding an equity instrument, not 
compensation expense. It would be inconsistent with the FASB’s conceptual framework, which 
concludes that only changes in the value of a liability, not an equity instrument, are to be 
recognized in income.
We recognize that present ESOP accounting is viewed by some as inconsistent with the stock 
compensation accounting of APB 25. Under APB 25, stock-based compensation must be granted 
to specific individuals in order to meet the fixed number of shares element of its definition of 
“measurement date.” However, it is important to remember that SOP 76-3 was issued after APB 
25. We believe it is appropriate to continue to consider that the tax laws require that all of the 
ESOP shares be allocated to the group of eligible employees as the debt is repaid. ESOP 
accounting under SOP 76-3 has been generally accepted for 17 years without significant concern 
over this inconsistency because ESOPs were considered to be different.
Our views on ESOPs that release shares to settle or fund liabilities for other employee benefits 
are different for two reasons. First, the substance of these Type II plans is different. The shares 
contributed to them are used to settle liabilities, and under the tax laws that is accomplished using 
the current market value of the shares. Second, if this type of plan existed in 1976, we do not 
believe it was considered by the AICPA when the existing guidance was issued. We understand 
that the FASB did not support this view during the clearance process and rejected a proposal that 
contained accounting guidance for Type I ESOPs that retained using the historical cost of shares 
acquired. Accordingly, from a practical point of view, we support leaving SOP 76-3 in place and 
amending it in a second SOP that only would apply to Type II ESOPs.
We believe that two accounting models can coexist. For Type I ESOPs, the shares are deemed 
outstanding from date of acquisition for EPS and dividend purposes and these practices, as 
modified by the several EITF consensuses, would simply continue. For Type II ESOPs, the new 
accounting model would consistently handle expense, EPS, and dividends, and provide relevant 
information for these types of plans. By AcSEC issuing an SOP with a narrower scope than is 
presently proposed, it is possible that the FASB would approve an SOP that addresses the real 
problem of Type II ESOPs.
We strongly support the prospective aspect of the implementation proposed by the SOP. 
Permitting continuation of present accounting for certain previously issued shares is entirely 
appropriate. As discussed in paragraph 94 of the Exposure Draft, to do otherwise would be 
unfair to employers who already have ESOPs in place, given the long-term nature and cost of 
ESOPs, and the difficulty of undoing them. However, we believe that certain of the effective 
date and transition provisions of the Exposure Draft are at least inconsistent with that prospective 
treatment, and thus recommend the following changes.
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We believe that the effective date should be deferred by one year to “fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1993.” Earlier in the project, the presently proposed 
effective date (1993 for calendar year companies) might have seemed appropriate, 
but delays have occurred such that a 1993 effective date is now clearly 
unreasonable.
We recommend that the artificial September 23, 1992 cutoff date for grandfathering 
be deleted in favor of a later date that is more consistent with the effective date.
We strongly object to the pro forma disclosures that would be required for public 
companies that elect not to apply its guidance to shares acquired by ESOPs on or 
before September 23, 1992. We believe that pro forma “what if" earnings would be 
confusing to users and cast doubt as to which is the “real” GAAP net income. 
Transition decisions always involve a trade-off and in this case prospective 
treatment for newly acquired shares is reasonable. These companies should not 
have to present pro forma net income any more so than should companies which, 
for example, implement FAS 106 on postretirement benefits by the prospective 
rather than the immediate recognition method. Furthermore, those pro forma 
disclosures required would significantly increase the cost of implementation, and 
they would be required as long as the ESOP has unallocated shares acquired on or 
before September 23, 1992, a potentially long period of time. We believe that the 
cost of providing those disclosures for an extended period of time for comparative 
purposes outweighs the benefits, and that the disclosures should be eliminated in the 
final Statement.
*****
We appreciate the opportunity to present our views on the Exposure Draft and would be pleased 
to discuss any aspect of our letter with AcSEC or its staff at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
 Houston 
 Industries
 Incorporated
March 24, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager, Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
AICPA, 1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is in response to the December 21, 1992 Accounting Standards Executive 
Committee’s (AcSEC) request for comments on the proposed Statement of Position (SOP) 
entitled Employer’s Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).
Houston Industries is a holding company operating principally in two business segments, 
the electric utility business and the cable television business. The Company has approximately 
11,600 employees and has annual operating revenues in excess of $3.8 billion. As of 
December 31, 1992 approximately 7% of the Company’s 129 million shares of common stock 
are in an ESOP trust.
The Company believes that SOP 76-3 currently accounts for the proper economic 
substance of the ESOP transactions based upon the historical cost concept. We do not see that 
additional value is gained from the accounting methods and disclosures required by the proposed 
SOP.
Financial Disclosure
Houston Industries does not support the required pro-forma disclosure expressed in 
paragraph 54 which applies to ESOP sponsors who do not elect to apply the proposed accounting 
provisions to transition ESOP shares (those purchased prior to September 22, 1992). The pro­
forma requirement appears to serve no logical purpose if the SOP has not been adopted and there 
is no financial impact to the corporate entity.
This type of disclosure is normally only required in financial reporting for accounting 
principle changes in which prior periods are reflected, in order to achieve improved comparative 
reporting. Therefore, we do not see a need for continuous pro-forma statements when no change 
to existing ESOP accounting methods has occurred.
Recognition of Cost
The Company also does not support the market value pricing for shares allocated as 
proposed. It is the Company’s position that the value of the services provided by employees is 
a function of the cash used to meet ESOP debt service requirements and therefore, the benefit
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cost should be measured in terms of the historical cash cost to the employer. Only the 
shareholder or employee should benefit or lose as result of the market fluctuations. The market 
should not dictate financial performance of the employer as a result of ownership of unallocated 
shares.
Effective Date and Transition
The Company disagrees with the transition requirement that shares acquired by ESOPs 
after September 23, 1992 be accounted for under the proposed SOP. Application of the 
September date unfairly imposes requirements in advance of the effective date of the Standard. 
The shares acquired transition date should be the same as the effective date of the SOP but 
certainly no earlier than the date the exposure draft was issued.
Houston Industries appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important topic of 
accounting for ESOPs. We hope that AcSEC will find our comments useful in reaching a 
conclusion that will balance employee, shareholder and corporate interests.
Sincerely,
Tom J. Farrell 
Administrator - 
Corporate Accounting
/yf
PPG Industries, Inc.
One PPG Place Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272 USA Telephone: (412) 434-2076
Raymond W. LeBoeuf
Vice President 
Finance
March 22, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File Reference 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), is pleased to submit this response to 
the December 21, 1992 Accounting Standards Executive Committee’s 
(AcSEC) request for comments on the proposed statement of position 
(SOP) entitled Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs).
PPG is a Fortune 100 company and is among the world’s leading 
manufacturers of glass, coatings, and chemical products and employs 
over 32,000 employees worldwide. PPG sponsors an ESOP which 
includes both pre-tax (401K) and after-tax employee contributions, 
as well as percentage contributions from the Company. The ESOP 
currently holds approximately 14% of PPG’s outstanding common 
shares. If the proposed ESOP SOP had been implemented in 1992, 
PPG’s earnings per share ($3.01) would have been increased by $ .06 
per share. This does not include the reduction of over $ .08 per 
share for the cumulative effect of the accounting change.
Our comments are directed at the Process and Necessity for the SOP 
and, as specifically requested, the issues of Recognition of Com­
pensation Cost, Effective Date and Transition, and Disclosures.
Process and Necessity for the SOP
PPG is concerned with the utilization of a SOP to promulgate 
generally accepted accounting procedures (GAAP). Although 
activities from AcSEC are closely followed by the large accounting 
firms, the AcSEC pronouncements do not generally receive the wide­
spread distribution or publication as do releases from the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), nor do they receive 
the same extensive due process. PPG believes that if it is 
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necessary to make a change, the change should be considered in the 
existing FASB framework.
PPG is in agreement that the utilization and complexity of ESOPs 
have grown since their inception. This growth, as well as the Law 
Changes presented in Appendix B of the proposed SOP, do not in 
themselves offer any compelling reasons to prompt the current 
efforts of AcSEC to alter the accounting for ESOPs. PPG is not 
aware of any group, other than AcSEC, who has requested changes in 
the ESOP accounting or reporting.
If an accounting method meets the requirements of the users, there 
is no reason to alter the accounting framework. We believe that 
SOP 76-3, supplemented by interpretations from the FASB Emerging 
Issues Task Force (EITF), has provided fundamental guidance for the 
accounting and reporting on leveraged ESOPs which have stood the 
test of time. In our opinion, there is no need for further 
changes.
We concur with the objection of the three minority members of AcSEC 
to the issuance of this proposed SOP. Currently, the FASB is 
working on a project on accounting for employee stock compensation 
that might result in conclusions on stock that should be considered 
in determining the appropriate accounting for ESOPs.
Recognition of Compensation Cost
PPG does not agree with the proposed position that ESOP 
compensation cost should be measured based on the fair value of 
shares when they are released. The valuation of ESOP shares to 
participants must be distinguished based on which party bears the 
risks and rewards associated with changes in the value of ESOP 
shares to be allocated.
Although employers do have the ability to manage their employees' 
total compensation package, PPG takes exception to AcSEC's 
assumption in paragraph 69 that employers typically alter the 
employee's compensation package in reaction to changes in the value 
of shares being released.
PPG believes it is appropriate to measure ESOP compensation cost 
based on cost value. We also believe there is no need to change 
the accounting for dividends and earnings per share computations. 
Our conclusion is based on the input outlined under Process and 
Necessity for the SOP.
AcSEC
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Effective Date and Transition, and Disclosures
PPG opposes the effective date and transition as outlined in 
paragraphs 55 through 57 in the proposal. The issuance and 
adoption of the SOP would require a public company, with a calendar 
year, to restate the prior quarters in 1993. In recent 
pronouncements, such as FAS 106 and 109, companies have been given 
sufficient time to study the requirements of the pronouncements, 
input changes into the process, and make structural changes that 
would provide for an implementation that is both meaningful and 
efficient. If it is necessary to implement this proposal, we 
propose that as a minimum, the SOP be effective for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1993.
The proposal permits ESOPs with shares acquired prior to 
September 23, 1992, to elect application of the accounting proposed 
in the SOP, but does not require application. PPG believes that if 
an accounting pronouncement is issued because it is clearly a 
preferable method, then the application must pertain to all users. 
A primary reason for issuing accounting guidance is to assure 
consistent application. Providing an arbitrary cutoff and 
permitting different accounting application for those meeting the 
cutoff, in our opinion, would cause further confusion in 
comparability of financial statements. If the accounting is 
consistently applied to all ESOPs, there would be no need for 
separate disclosures for comparability. Footnote disclosures 
should not be a substitute for proper accounting.
Other Comments
Should the SOP be issued, we suggest further clarification of 
paragraph 52. We interpret the paragraph to mean that the tax 
benefit of tax-deductible dividends on allocated and unallocated 
ESOP shares should be recorded as a reduction of income tax expense 
allocated to continuing operations. The last sentence of the 
paragraph states the SOP would supersede paragraph 36f of FASB 
Statement No. 109, but it does not specifically say how the tax 
benefit on unallocated shares would be treated.
Also, paragraph 57 is confusing. Not being able to arrive at a 
consensus as to the meaning of paragraph 57, we solicited 
clarification from a member of the task force. Our current 
interpretation for paragraph 57 is that no transition to the 
proposed SOP for old shares is permitted after December 31, 1994, 
and the bullet points on page 19 are applicable to any transition 
to the proposed SOP accounting. We are not aware of any other 
pronouncement that limits the adoption to a specific time period as 
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proposed in this SOP. An accounting change to a preferable method 
should always be encouraged and should not be limited to a "window” 
in transition.
PPG appreciates having the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
SOP. We are hopeful that AcSEC will find our comments useful. 
Should you have any questions regarding any of our comments, please 
contact Dennis M. Bailey, Manager, Financial Accounting, at 
(412) 434-2123.
Sincerely,
R. W. LeBouf
cc: Mr. William H. Hernandez, Controller
Mr. Dennis R. Beresford, Chairman 
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Mr. Chester Hobert, Partner 
Deloitte & Touche
Mr. John Hudson, Vice President
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Mr. J. Michael Keeling, President 
The ESOP Association
Mr. Walter P. Scats, Chief Accountant 
Securities and Exchange Commission
Mr. Norman N. Strauss, Chairman 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee
McDonalds
 
McDonald’s Corporation 
McDonald's Plaza 
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521
Direct Dial Number
(708) 575-3250
April 1, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
McDonald's Corporation is pleased to comment on the proposed statement of 
position (SOP) entitled "Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs). Our comments are directed at responding to the specific issues of 
Recognition of Compensation Cost, Effective Date and Transition, and Disclosures.
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
McDonald's Corporation disagrees with the Committee recommendation to measure 
compensation cost based on "fair value" for ESOPs where shares are released to 
compensate employees directly (Type I ESOPs). Rather, we agree with the views 
expressed by the minority of ACSEC who believe the measurement date to 
recognize compensation expense should continue to be the date the shares are 
purchased by the ESOP. Their views are consistent with our opinion that employee 
participants bear the risks and rewards inherent in the value of the shares after 
purchase by the ESOP, and thereby the "cost" to the employer sponsor is fixed at 
the date the shares are irrevocably transferred to the ESOP trust. With respect to 
the perceived inconsistency with the measurement date criteria outlined in APB 25, 
our opinion is that the entire ESOP share allocation is committed to the group of 
eligible employees at inception, and the on-going allocation to specific individuals is 
irrelevant.
Given the distinction between "Type I ESOPs" and "Type II ESOPs", we would 
recommend that Type I ESOPs be excluded from the scope of this project. 
Otherwise, we believe it is appropriate for this SOP to specify circumstances, such 
as outlined above, where cost of shares should be used to measure compensation 
expense as well as other circumstances which may support a fair value approach.
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These circumstances should be distinguished by looking at which party bears the 
value risk inherent in the transaction.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
In our opinion, the SOP should apply to shares acquired by ESOPs after the issuance 
date of the final statement. This would allow for a purely prospective approach 
without the need for restatement which would be caused by the time lag between 
September 23, 1992 and the final issuance of this SOP. There doesn’t appear to 
be a compelling reason for requiring this earlier application date for shares acquired 
by ESOPs.
Issue 3: Disclosures
We disagree with the proforma disclosure requirement for public companies that 
elect not to adopt the accounting provisions in the proposed SOP. We do not 
believe that the users of financial statements will realize any benefits from these 
disclosures. Rather, these disclosures may serve to create more confusion among 
financial statement users. While we understand and applaud ACSEC's desire to 
improve comparability among companies, users of financial statements have 
effectively dealt with varying accounting methods for many years in areas such as 
depreciation, inventory methods and, more recently, post-retirement benefits.
McDonald’s Corporation appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
SOP. We would be happy to discuss any of the issues addressed herein with 
ACSEC and the ESOP Task Force.
Sincerely,
Michael L. Conley
Senior Vice President and Controller
GENERAL MILLS, INC. EXECUTIVE OFFICES
Number One General Mills Boulevard • Minneapolis, Minnesota 55426
March 19, 1993 THOMAS P. NELSON 
Senior Vice President 
Financial Operations
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500 AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee,
RE: Proposed Statement of Position, "Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans"
We believe this proposed SOP changes and adds complexity to ESOP accounting that 
is not necessary. We believe the current accounting guidelines (SOP 76-3 and various 
EITF consensus) are adequate and they appropriately report the underlying economic 
substance of a leveraged ESOP. The EITF has appropriately addressed recent ESOP 
issues related to expense recognition and earnings per share calculations. There does 
not appear to be any compelling reason to change the current guidelines.
There are several areas where we have concerns as noted below.
We strongly disagree with the proposed SOP that compensation cost should be 
measured using the fair value of shares when released. We believe the cost of the 
shares to the ESOP should determine the compensation cost. At the point in time that 
the ESOP purchased the shares, the cost is fixed. The allocation of shares to 
participants does not change the economic reality of the cost of the shares.
We strongly disagree with requiring companies that do not adopt the SOP to provide 
the proposed disclosures. This will create a significant amount of additional work and 
create confusion with users of the financial statements. A company would have to keep 
two sets of records which would include two weighted average shares outstanding and 
two different interest and compensation expense amounts. This duplication of effort is 
not practical and adds complexity that is not necessary.
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 1113, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440 
The SOP requires the issuance of new shares or the sale of treasury shares to the ESOP 
when the issuance or sale occurs, but these shares are not considered outstanding for 
EPS calculations unless committed to be released. This is very contradictory. On a 
company’s balance sheet the shares will be shown as outstanding but in calculating 
EPS for the income statement they will not be outstanding. We believe it should be 
consistent.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this issue.
Sincerely,
March 17, 1993
Dionne McNamee
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
The Employee Benefits Committee and the Accounting Principles 
Committee of the Illinois CPA Society ("Committee") are pleased 
to have the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft of the 
Proposed Statement of Position, Employers' Accounting for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("Proposed Statement"). The 
organization and operating procedures of the Committee are 
reflected in the Appendix of this letter. These recommendations 
and comments represent the position of the Illinois CPA Society 
rather than any of the members of the Committee and of the 
organizations with which they are associated.
The Committee supports the AICPA in its efforts to conform and 
update the reporting of transactions between employers and 
employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs").
The format of this response follows the issues in the AICPA's 
cover letter.
Issue 1
The Committee does not agree that compensation cost should be 
measured based on the fair value of shares when committed to be 
released in all circumstances. The Committee concurs with the 
minority view that where shares are released to compensate 
employees directly ("Type I ESOP"), compensation should be 
measured at the cost of the shares to the ESOP, not the fair 
value measured at a later date. The Committee believes the cost 
to the employer is determined when the shares are irrevocably 
transferred to the ESOP. Thus, future compensation expense to be 
recognized by the employer is fixed at that date because the 
employer ceases to bear economic risk for fluctuations in the
RIVER­
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fair value of shares; this risk has been transferred to
employee participants of the ESOP.
The Committee concurs with the proposed accounting for shares 
released to settle or fund liabilities for other specified or 
determinable employee benefits.
Consistent with ©ur view above, we believe that unallocated 
shares held by Type I ESOPs should be considered to be 
outstanding for EPS calculations. The Proposed Statement should 
be reviewed to determine what other changes may be necessary to 
conform to this view.
Issue 2
The Committee believes the proposed effective date and transition 
rules should be revised. The effective date proposed would 
require employers with calendar fiscal years to adopt the new 
rules in 1993. This requirement does not allow sufficient time 
to implement the new rules. The effective date should be revised 
to apply to employers with fiscal years beginning after December 
15, 1993. The requirement to apply the Proposed Statement to 
shares acquired prior to the effective date of the Proposed 
Statement would require an employer, in essence, to restate 
previously reported results. Therefore, the Committee believes 
the Proposed Statement should apply to shares acquired by ESOPs 
after the issuance date of the Proposed Statement.
Issue 3
The Committee concurs with the proposed disclosures. A small 
minority of the Committee believes the proposal to require public 
companies to disclose pro forma income data is onerous and not 
consistent with other areas of generally accepted accounting 
principles.
Other matters
The Committee is concerned about the proposed differences in 
accounting for dividends on allocated shares versus dividends on 
unallocated shares. The Committee suggests the Proposed 
Statement include an example of how the earnings per share 
calculations would differ depending on whether dividends were 
used for compensation versus dividends charged directly to 
retained earnings.
The Committee believes that Illustration 1 should be revised to 
show the share allocation in the same accounting period that 
shares are committed to be released. From the Committee's 
experience, this situation is the more likely scenario.
The Committee believes the usefulness of the final document would 
be enhanced by including copies of all relevant consensuses of 
the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments and recommendations 
with members of the AcSEC or staff of the Accounting Standards 
Division.
Very truly yours,
Bernard Revsine, Chairman 
Committee on Accounting 
Principles
APPENDIX
ILLINOIS CPA SOCIETY 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES COMMITTEE 
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
1992-1993
The Accounting Principles Committee of the Illinois CPA Society 
(the Committee) is composed of 25 technically qualified, 
experienced members appointed from industry, education and public 
accounting. These members have Committee service ranging- from 
newly appointed to 15 years. The Committee is a senior technical 
committee of the Society and has been delegated the authority to 
issue written positions, representing the Society, on matters 
regarding the setting of accounting principles.
The Committee usually operates by assigning a subcommittee of its 
members to study and discuss fully exposure documents proposing 
additions to or revisions of accounting principles. The 
subcommittee ordinarily develops a proposed response which is 
considered, discussed and voted on by the full Committee.
Support by the full Committee then results in the issuance of a 
formal response, which, at times, includes a minority viewpoint.
30 South Wacker Drive 
Suite 3400
Chicago, Illinois 60606 
312/750-5171
RONALD G. PIPPIN
Director, Financial Accounting 
Standards and Reporting
March 26, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: File 2500
Dear Ms. McNamee,
We have reviewed the Proposed Statement of Position (PSOP) on Employers’ 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) and respectfully submit 
the following comment.
Paragraph 54 of the PSOP provides, in part, that public enterprises electing to retain 
their current ESOP accounting must also disclose pro forma income before 
extraordinary items, net income and earnings per share computed as if the employer 
had adopted the provisions of the ESOP.
Apparently, the requirement for pro forma information is driven by a concern that a 
potentially long period of noncomparability will exist between financial statements of 
those adopting and those not adopting the PSOP requirements. Most ESOPs will run 
out of shares by the year 2000 or so, which we do not believe to be a particularly long 
time. More importantly however, we believe the concept of pro forma disclosure is 
wrong, because:
• Such pro forma disclosures will be potentially confusing to financial statement users 
and could undermine the credibility of the financial statements. The existence of 
two net income numbers (one in the income statement and one in the footnotes) 
begs the question of what exactly is the "right ’’ net income number.
AMERICAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards
AICPA
March 26, 1993
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• Such pro forma disclosures are not required for other larger instances of 
noncomparability between financial statements (e.g. LIFO vs. FIFO inventory 
accounting, SFAS 106 immediate expensing vs. amortization or straight line vs. an 
accelerated depreciation method.)
• The pro forma disclosures create an administrative burden whereby financial 
statement preparers are required to track the same ESOP using two different 
accounting methods.
• It has not been demonstrated by the ESOP Task Force that material differences will 
occur between PSOP and current accounting methods.
We understand and appreciate the accounting theory prescribed by the PSOP. 
However, the proposed pro forma disclosure is clearly unnecessary and unwarranted 
and should be eliminated from the final accounting rule.
# # # #
We appreciate this opportunity to present our views to AcSEC.
Sincerely,
Navalle Ventures Limited
NAPA VALLEY VENTURE CAPITOL ASSOCIATES
March 19, 1993
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Diane D. Manama, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
Reference: Exposure Draft, SOP, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans, dated December 21, 1992
TO EVERYONE CONCERNED:
1. This is not a SOP critique you will enjoy reading. I am angry. Whatever, your 
undersigned correspondent believes your proposed SOP represents a valiant effort to 
synthesize an immensely complex, confusing, difficult area of business endeavor into a 
coherent structure of logical, problem-solving, accounting procedures. However, at the same 
time, I see your proposed SOP as a devious instrument that will purposely result in 
prejudiced, discriminatory, unfair end consequence. I give your SOP authors and “A” for 
effort, a "C” for clarity, and an “F—” for content value.
2. More precisely, I am utterly appalled and sickened by your proposed SOP. It is by far the 
best written example of corrupt intention I have ever seen; truly, it is an epitome of lackey 
perversion, deception, and attempted fraud. To me, it represents a pretense of honor by the 
AICPA while devising a devious structure of belief and accounting process which results in 
financial consequence extremely favorable to their corporate employers and controlling 
shareholders, at the expense of innocent ESOP employee beneficiaries and US taxpayers. 
Absolutely, it exemplifies intentional prejudice, collusion, corruption, and self-serving 
hypocrisy! It discredits the CPA accounting profession.
3. In defense of my attack and my judgment, let me clearly establish that your proposed 
SOP from beginning to end does indeed present the semblance of a coherent believable 
picture of objective, impartial, even-handed treatment of the subject matter. Ostensibly, it 
takes no sides, has no bias, makes no judgments, sponsors no objectives. But all this is 
devious, and that’s what infuriates me. It is contrived. The created illusion of impartial 
objectivity begins in the letter of introduction of the SOP issues by asking a key question: 
“should the compensation cost be measured based on the fair value of shares when 
committed to be released, or the cost of the shares to employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs)?
4. The SOP then proceeds to propose, endorse, and repeatedly justify the “fair value” 
option, which choice substantially benefits your benefactor corporate employers; It fails to 
mention the discriminatory conflict-of-interest consequence, or the economic benefit of the 
“cost value” alternative to ESOP beneficiaries. To me, such one-sided action by a 
professional “rule-making” body is a despicable travesty of honest, honor, and justice. For 
sure, this particular SOP, because it must be exposed to public scrutiny, is the cleverest 
structure of organized deception I’ve ever come across. In the end, it inflicts both injustice 
1
intention, circumvents ERISA and IRS regulatory process, and absolutely discriminates in 
favor of ESOP corporate employers and their controlling shareholders.
5. Again and again, your proposed SOP sanitizes AICPA philosophical preference and 
dogmatic conclusions that the accounting for ESOP debt (financing element) should be 
separated from the accounting for ESOP employer shares (defined contribution element) 
....see Paragraph 59. To me, it appears your objective is to authorize accounting procedure 
which allows ESOP employers to abrogate time-honored tort law and provide them with 
means to unilaterally modify ESOP agreements to serve themselves and their capital 
shareholders at will. This, in essence, happens when an ESOP employer is allowed by SOP 
provisions to provide or guarantee ESOP debt to purchase employer stock at a cost basis, 
either original issue, treasury shares, or on the open market, then release those shares into 
ESOP beneficiary accounts at a future fair value as future compensation cost, and then 
repurchase those shares through “put redemption” obligation and account for the various 
gains generated as tax-exempt transactions in treasury stock.
6. For explicit examples of this skullduggery, see Paragraphs 19, 23, 35-39, 52, 88 and 92. 
Pay extra special attention to Paragraphs 35-39, on ESOP termination’s. Compare 35 and 
39 with 36-38, and realize there would be no net remaining value gain, or remaining shares, 
for distribution to the ESOP employee beneficiaries. All of the value gain would effectively 
revert back to the employer corporation for tax-free benefit of the capital shareholders.
7. Hence, as I see it, your proposed SOP is effectively a planned strategic tactic which 
functions to create, justify, and allow accounting actions which result precisely in AICPA 
approved accounting consequence of immense self-serving economic benefit to ESOP 
employers and their capital shareholders--an ultimate benefit of magnitude of billions of 
dollars of stock value per year! This prejudice, collusion, and alignment of the AICPA with 
corporate employers is nauseatingly apparent when one is suspicious and knows what to 
look for. The facts speak for themselves. I stand on printed evidence and deductive 
reasoning; I welcome adversarial independent confirming analysis.
8. Now, for specific criticism. In what follows, keep in mind the issue of who wins and who 
loses-the ESOP employee beneficiaries or the ESOP employer and its capital shareholders. 
In short, whose ox gets gored by your accounting rules update.
9. First, let me say I disagree categorically with your proposed SOP on the issue of 
separating the accounting for ESOP debt from the accounting for ESOP suspense account 
stock value, which issue is the central guiding thesis of your proposed SOP update. I also 
understand why you want to legitimate the separation of accounting for ESOP leverage debt 
from the accounting for ESOP suspense account stock value (as the basis for measuring 
compensation cost). Why? Because separating that integral relationship is the accounting 
act which allows and effects the economic injustice and prejudiced discrimination I bring to 
your attention.
10. More important, the act of separating (and nullifying) the contractual relationship 
between ESOP leverage debt and the acquisition cost of the ESOP’s suspense account 
stock shares effectively abrogates the jurisdiction of contract law. Implicitly, it defines an 
ESOP not as a contract but as a “convenient economic arrangement”, where the employer 
can arbitrarily change “cost value” to “fair value” to serve its own economic interest. In 
actuality, an ESOP is a binding, mutually beneficial, IRS-qualified, ERISA-regulated, 
enforceable, written agreement. Technically, the legitimacy of an ESOP is determined by IRS 
qualification according to written plan compliance with the letter of the law as well as de facto 
compliance in plan execution and operation. However, your proposed SOP sanitizes 
arbitrary unilateral employer control and proposes to “legalize” employer right, power, and 
authority to serve themselves by providing enabling accounting change. I object! I support 
the right of ESOP employee beneficiaries to be heard!
11. More specific, the key guiding premise of your SOP’s strategic tactic is set forth in 
Paragraph 14, under CONCLUSIONS: “...(all accounting for leveraged ESOPs)... should be 
based on fair values of committed to be released shares.” The qualifying condition 
“should” implies justification by a desirable future consequence which explains why 
something ought to be done. A “should” justification also implies an optional choice between 
alternatives. In this case, the choice is between “fair value” and “cost value” of the released 
shares. Who best makes that choice, the ESOP employee beneficiary? Or the ESOP 
employer corporation? Or the CPA profession through SOP rules, deception, and self­
serving collusion?
12. To properly analyze this question, we must look at the financial consequence (end 
results) of the two optional choices. In looking at end results, lets assume that the substantial 
cash inflow from a leveraged five-year stock acquisition loan, reduced interest cost, and 
highly motivated employees make the corporation successful and the stock triples in value, 
say from $10.00 to $30.00 per share, as often happens. Such gain is the dream of ESOP 
opportunity.
13. As the leveraged stock acquisition loan is paid down with annual ESOP contributions, a 
proportional value of stock is released from the ESOP suspense account into employee 
beneficiary accounts, at “cost value" under historical ESOP accounting, and at “fair value” 
under your proposed new SOP accounting requirements. Clearly, the result difference over 
the 5-year loan term is extreme. When the suspense shares are released at “cost value” the 
ESOP employee beneficiaries ultimately receive ail of the suspense stock acquired by the 
leveraged loan and 100% full benefit of its appreciation in value. Stock release at cost also 
results in full dilution of shareholder equity interest, reduced earnings per share calculation, 
and an increased stock repurchase obligation at the end appreciated “fair value”.
14. When the suspense shares are released at "fair value” the ESOP employee 
beneficiaries receive fewer and fewer shares each year as the stock appreciates in value, 
and zero benefit from the appreciation in value of the employer stock held in the ESOP 
suspense account. On the other hand, the ESOP employer (and its shareholder owners) 
receive 100% full benefit of the stock value appreciation, minimum dilution of shareholder 
equity interest, minimum impact on earnings per share computation, and minimum stock 
repurchase obligation.
15. Thus, the discriminatory financial end consequence of your proposed SOP accounting 
rules is revealed. So it’s time to ask: who determines the choice of outcome and whose ox 
gets gored the most? Is not the economic largesse bestowed on ESOP employers by your 
SOP accounting rules vividly visible? Is not the adverse economic impact on ESOP 
employee beneficiaries clearly obvious. Think about it. Which option would you choose if 
you were a ESOP employee beneficiary? Which option if you were the CEO of an ESOP 
employer? And which option if you were an ESOP trustee with legal fiduciary responsibility 
to your ESOP beneficiaries?
16. Perhaps the better question involves the legality of the “fair value” issue in leveraged 
ESOP stock purchases and suspense account releases. Is there really a choice? Would an 
IRS auditor allow an arbitrary switch from “cost value” to “fair value”? Will ERISA attorneys 
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acquiesce to the change? Would the US Supreme Court rule on the issue? And if it did, how 
will the justices vote?
17. I personally believe your SOP prescribed “fair value" mandate in accounting for 
leveraged ESOP stock acquisitions is contrary to the intent and purpose of Federal ESOP 
legislation, is punitive and de motivating, and is not legally defensible. On the other hand, I 
concur totally that accounting for non-leveraged ESOP stock transactions according to “fair 
value" determination is the right and proper accounting method. However, in non-leveraged 
ESOPs, the stock transfer account allocations at “fair value” is also the current “cost value”.
18. I uphold the foregoing dichotomy because I believe there is specific purpose and 
objective involved in ESOP legislation that authorizes leveraged acquisition of employer 
stock. Large blocks of stock are involved, often controlling ownership interest. Also, I believe 
the IRS provision of the several unique tax subsidy inducements to encourage the formation 
of leveraged ESOPs is designed and intended to provide broad opportunity for ESOP 
employee beneficiaries to enjoy the benefits and rewards of ownership of employer stock, 
including the economic reward of stock value appreciation from inception, precisely the same 
as ESOP investments in other outside corporate securities.
19. Absolutely, the opportunity to enhance and increase corporate wealth by providing 
means to raise tax subsidized equity investment capital and tax subsidized low interest debt 
investment capital was not intended in ESOP legislation for primary benefit of the ESOP 
employer corporation and its capital shareholders. Rather, the purpose and objective behind 
the unique tax concessions available to leveraged ESOPs, i.e., lender 50% exclusion of 
interest income from taxation, deductible dividends, stock sale tax-free roll-overs, deductible 
loan principal payments, etc., was and is to achieve expansion of employee ownership of 
employer stock, as a wealth generating equity investment asset. I do not believe those 
unique tax concessions were intended for primary benefit of the ESOP employer corporation 
and its capital shareholders.
20. However, the fact is, your proposed SOP accounting rules function to generate the 
foregoing results.. Your “fair value" measurement compensation cost knowingly denies the 
ESOP employee beneficiaries the right to receive, participate in, or enjoy the economic 
benefit of value appreciation of “leveraged” employer shares acquired by tax subsidized 
purchase acquisition. Your SOP fosters and permits this injustice by concluding the ESOP 
employee beneficiaries do not legally own the employer stock held in the ESOP suspense 
account. And, in fact, It treats ESOP suspense account stock as a prepaid reserve of 
deductible future compensation expense, and assumes the rightful legal owner of that 
reserve is the employer corporation. I challenge the legality of this devious interpretation.
21. Yes, ESOP beneficiaries do not technically own the suspense-held employer stock, but 
neither does the employer corporation. The fact is, by law, the ESOP trust owns the 
suspense-held stock. And the stock is owned by the ESOP trust as a bonafide “shareholder 
of record” of issued outstanding capital stock. Further, the employer stock held in the 
suspense account is and must be, by law, issued only in exchange for a contribution of 
capital value acceptable to the corporation’s board of directors. And the acceptance of 
ESOP “leveraged debt” funds, however arranged, by the employer corporation, in exchange 
for the issued capital stock shares, constitutes the execution, perfection, and consummation 
of a legal, binding stock purchase. Thus, absolutely, the ESOP trust legally owns the 
employer stock held in its suspense account. It bought that stock with debt funds!
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22. What’s more, the ESOP Trustee, under imposed fiduciary responsibility, must operate 
the trust and “hold" and deploy its capital assets for the exclusive sole benefit of the trust’s 
qualified employee beneficiaries. And the trust’s assets include the employer stock held in its 
suspense account. This fact is crucially important. It means both the employer corporation 
and the ESOP trustee could be held criminally liable for gross negligence, collusion, fraud, 
and breach of fiduciary responsibility, should your proposed SOP accounting rules be 
implemented and followed by the ESOP trustee.
23. I repeat, your proposed SOP is based on erroneous assumptions and functions to 
discriminate against “leveraged” ESOP employee beneficiaries. As noted in Paragraph 15 
above, your SOP “fair value” accounting rule for measuring compensation cost serves to 
provide leveraged ESOP employer corporations and their capital shareholders with full 
economic benefit of the value appreciation of the tax-subsidized purchase of employer stock 
shares held unallocated in an ESOP suspense account. In addition, as noted, your “fair 
value” measurement rule functions to benefit the ESOP employer corporation with minimum 
shareholder equity dilution, minimum impact on EPS computations, and minimum stock 
repurchase obligation. These accounting end results, in my view, reflect planned, prejudiced, 
economic discrimination! As always, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. This 
deplorable end is achieved by the kind of moral rationalization epitomized in your proposed 
SOP accounting rules update.
24 In final sum, I charge the AICPA with making a willful attempt to perpetrate accounting 
fraud on “leveraged” ESOP employee beneficiaries and on the American taxpayer. Your 
SOP authors propose accounting rules which knowingly function to circumvent the intention 
and objectives of ERISA law and ESOP tax subsidy regulations. Indeed, your SOP 
authorizes, justifies, and sanctions accounting rules which knowingly effect prejudiced 
discrimination against ESOP employee beneficiaries. I therefore charge the AICPA with 
conscious hypocritical perversion of their professional fiduciary responsibility to the American 
People.
25 I am fully aware of the enormous nature of the above charges. I do so deliberately 
because I feel there is no other way to persuade ACIPA to rescind and redraft your proposed 
SOP so it will function to achieve economic justice for employee beneficiaries of “leveraged” 
ESOPs. Admittedly, I overemphasize to get your attention. I strongly recommend you trash 
your proposed SOP, and redraft it under legal imperative you must mandate release of stock 
from a “leveraged" ESOP’s suspense account at its original cost basis, not at its appreciated 
fair market value. As explained, this difference may ultimately be worth billions of dollars of 
stock value appreciation to ESOP beneficiaries in the years ahead.
26. Before formally implementing your proposed new SOP update, I recommend you 
circulate my SOP rebuttal argument among the tens of thousands of ESOP employee 
beneficiaries of the several thousand “leveraged” ESOPs now in existence-for their review, 
critique, and endorsement comments. I am confident you will find virtual 100% agreement 
with my position.
27. However, knowing you are unlikely to act on this recommendation, I advise you I intend 
to ask President Clinton to intercede in this matter on behalf of the ESOP employee 
beneficiaries you discriminate against, unless you inform me of the withdrawal of your 
proposed SOP from further consideration as drafted.
28 And if this threat is unsuccessful, I want you to know I intend to send a copy of my 
rebuttal argument, along with a copy of your proposed SOP, to all members of the US 
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Senate, the House of Representatives, the US Department of Labor (with ERISA 
responsibility), the Internal Revenue Service (with ESOP qualification responsibility), and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission - with request for administrative action to force you to 
rescind your proposed SOP.
29. And if this isn’t effective, I intend to send a copy of my SOP rebuttal argument, along with 
copy of your proposed SOP, to the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Fortune, Times, Newsweek, 
Business Week, etc., with request for analysis and publication by a qualified investigative 
reporter. Possibly, this whistle-blowing public exposure should be my first action..
30. Whatever, lets get on with it. I’m convinced that America and the World needs the ESOP 
concept. It heralds a union of trust between management and labor, as ownership partners 
in the productive process. It constitutes a sharing, cooperative, productive, distributive 
economic endeavor, not an adversarial, competitive, exploitive, collective, capitalistic system. 
You don’t seem to really understand the ESOP principle. Sadly, your proposed SOP 
demonstrates a narrow, hide-bound, antiquated, status quo, against-change, negative, 
immoral, capital-owner, perspective. Reality is strange. Lets talk.
Disrespectfully,
6
Frank W. Atchley, Ph. D., Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University 
Pounder, CH.B., and CEO (now, semi-retired)
Navalle Ventures Limited
  NAPA VALLEY VENTURE CAPITOL ASSOCIATES
March 26, 1993
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Diane D. Manama, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
Reference: Exposure Draft, SOP, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans, dated December 21, 1992
GENTLEMEN:
Since submitting my strong critique of your referenced SOP, via FAX on 3/19/93 and 
confirming letter of 3/24/03, I am advised by colleagues that I may have misjudged your 
motives and the functional effect of unfair discrimination I object to may be an unintended 
consequence. That’s difficult for me to envision, but I accept the verdict and apologize for my 
excessively violent reaction to your proposed SOP
However, I am still convinced of the error of several assumptions which support your position. 
You are dead wrong if you think the purpose of an ESOP is to provide benefits for the 
employer corporation and its capital shareholders, as I think your proposed SOP attempts to 
do. Let me begin with two specific questions.
1. Is not an ESOP trust a sanctioned independent legal entity in itself, the same as 
corporation, with individual status as a tax payer with a required tax payer number? Does not 
the ESOP trustee or record have legal fiduciary obligation to serve the trust’s employee 
beneficiaries? I say, absolutely, an ESOP trust is a responsible legal entity and the ESOP 
trustee of record, under penalty of recourse liability, is obligated by law to hold and deploy the 
trust’s assets for economic gain for the sole exclusive benefit of the ESOP employee 
beneficiaries.
2. What is the ownership status of unallocated employer shares held in an ESOP suspense 
account? I say, unequivocally, the employer stock shares held in an ESOP suspense 
account are bonafide ESOP trust assets which were acquired by a leveraged debt purchase 
and are set aside (held) under lien law as loan collateral. Further, I say the employer stock 
shares held in the ESOPs suspense account were issued to the ESOP trust in its name as a 
bonafide legal shareholder of record. I also say the shares were issued to the ESOP trust in 
exchange for cash or equivalent capital value which was accepted by the corporation’s board 
of directors as an equitable fair market value for the number of shares issued or transferred.
3. Further, I say this exchange transaction was a consummated sales/purchase transaction 
between two sanctioned tax payer entities which was executed according to a binding written 
contractual agreement. I also say the employer stock shares were purchased with debt funds 
and the source of the funds has no import on the reality or status of the ESOP stock 
purchase as a perfected investment with a specific cost basis. To me, absolutely, the 
employer stock shares held unallocated in a suspense account, and any dividends paid and 
received on those stock shares, are trust-owned property.
4. Significantly, the employer shares held in the ESOP suspense account
were acquired by leveraged debt purchase under fiduciary obligation to pursue economic 
gain from stock value increase for the exclusive benefit of the ESOP employee beneficiaries. 
There is no other justification for the existence of a leveraged ESOP, other than direct and 
indirect tax subsidy benefits to the employer corporation.
5. Thus, I am outraged when your proposed SOP creates, justifies, and sanctions 
accounting rules which function to discriminate against ESOP employee beneficiaries and to 
allocate the economic benefit of stock value increase on unallocated employer stock shares 
held in the ESOP’s suspense account, and other related benefits listed in my first SOP 
response, into employer and capital shareholder accounts. Your SOP literally “bends over 
backward" to justify this accounting result.
6. Specifically, in Paragraph 69, third subsection, Your SOP states: “The risks and rewards 
of ownership of the shares...(held unallocated in the suspense account)...rests with the 
employer..." This statement is ludicrous and unreal. It lets the employer have his cake and 
eat it at the same time. In essence, it sanctions the leveraged stock purchase, benefits the 
employer with cash loan proceeds, gives him enormous tax concessions, and lets him retain 
control and ownership rights to the stock he sells.
7. Further, your SOP Paragraph 60 is equally ludicrous and even more unreal. It states: 
"The consideration to be received by the employer for placing the...(employer stock)...shares 
in the ESOP trust is future employee services." Ridiculous! The real world truth is greed and 
self interest The employer puts the shares in the leveraged ESOP trust: 1) to benefit 
directly from tax concession; 2) to obtain low interest debt financing; 3) to be able to repay 
loan principle with deductible ESOP contributions and tax deductible dividends; 4) to be able 
to buy outside shareholder stock with the equivalent of pre-tax corporate earnings; and 5) to 
get shareholder tax deferral with tax-free stock sale roll-over. Absolutely, your ludicrous 
explanation of leveraged ESOPs is straight-away justification for release of stock shares from 
ESOP suspense accounts at "fair value" rather than “cost value.
8. I could go on and on and list dozens of examples of your SOP rationalizations, but it's not 
worth my time. I’m virtually certain your proposed SOP is a pre decided “done deal" and my 
criticism a wasted effort The odds are high that the deck is stacked, and the dice loaded. So 
why try? Why did I, anyway? Just don’t know. Stupidity, I guess.
Still the same, disrespectfully, I remain
Frank W. Atchley, Ph.D. 
Chief Executive Officer  
Navalle Ventures Limited
NAPA VALLEY VENTURE CAPITOL ASSOCIATES
March 28, 1993
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Diane D. Manama, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
Reference: Exposure Draft, SOP, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans, dated December 21, 1992
GENTLEMEN:
Another apology. I’m sorry to bother you again, but I failed to rebut several significant 
intellectual insults in your proposed SOP. For example:
1. On page 24, under Paragraph 79, you state: “AcSEC believes that ESOP shares that 
have not been committed to be released are analogous to unpaid stock subscriptions, for 
which the consideration the employer will receive is future employee services rather than cash 
proceeds.” To me, this dodo argument is but another rationalized justification of your position 
on employer ownership of ESOP suspense account stock and your “fair value" accounting 
rule? Who benefits from tax subsidized reduced financing cost, deductible debt service 
payments, and tax free roll-over when controlling shareholder stock is purchased?
2. Further, I understand a stock subscription is simply an agreement to purchase corporate 
securities at an agreed-on fixed price prior to certificate issue and before any consideration is 
accepted by the corporation. There’s been no exchange transaction and the authorized 
unissued stock is still corporation property. This situation is not the same as a leveraged 
ESOP stock acquisition, where the corporation has received and accepted the ESOP loan 
funds (and all related tax subsidy benefits) and has finalized the exchange transaction with 
stock transfer recordation and physical issuance of the purchased stock. The issued, or 
acquired, stock shares are then owned by the ESOP trust as a registered shareholder of 
record on the corporation’s books of account. If done otherwise, the transaction could be 
defined as an illegal scam. And the ESOP trustee, under penalty of punitive economic 
recourse, has legal fiduciary control of the acquired or newly issued stock, not the corporation. 
Also, the corporation guarantee of the ESOP stock acquisition loan has no bearing whatsoever 
on the stock ownership issue. Further, the ESOP trustee, under legal obligation, can and must 
hold, release, and sell the employer stock held in the suspense account only for the exclusive 
benefit of the ESOP employee beneficiaries, not for the benefit of the ESOP employer 
corporation and its capital shareholders.
3. Hence, I believe your SOP presents numerous deceptive arguments that support an 
erroneous conclusion the ESOP employer corporation continues to have legal ownership rights 
to the unallocated ESOP suspense account stock. I also think your core underlying 
assumption that compensation cost should be measured by the “fair value” of committed to be 
released stock shares is patently wrong. In lieu thereof, I propose compensation cost be
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determined precisely by resolution of the corporation’s board of directors, according to IRS 
limitation guidelines. I also conclude your espoused “fair value” accounting rule effectively 
gives the employer corporation a unilateral right to ignore the tax subsidized ESOP stock 
acquisition price (cost value) and the authority to sell and/or reissue the stock at a subsequent 
higher price and pocket the difference. Essentially, it makes employer creation of a leveraged 
ESOP a controlled profit-making venture that can be implemented and operated primarily for 
the benefit of the sponsoring corporation, not for the ESOP employee beneficiaries. I loudly 
object!
4. In full support of this devious economic end, as noted previously, your proposed SOP 
makes the following categorical statement, Paragraph 69, third subsection: “The risk and 
rewards of ownership of the (suspense account) shares rests with the employer until the 
shares are committed to be released.” I see this statement as a perfect example of biased 
ulcerous justification of the discriminatory end accounting consequence your SOP advances.
5. Seriously, do you not comprehend the import of the foregoing support for employer 
ownership of ESOP suspense account stock and the economic consequence of your proposed 
SOP “fair value” release rule? Or do you promote the deception because you feel you are so 
favored with intelligence that no one else can understand what’s going on, or is capable of 
seeing through the smoke screen, or can perceive the fraudulent impact of the accounting 
procedure you endorse?
6. Whatever, I admit I’m embittered by your proposed SOP rule changes. For certain, I 
believe your proposed “fair value” accounting rule for releasing employer shares from a 
leveraged ESOP suspense accounts knowingly delivers major economic benefit to ESOP 
employer corporations and knowingly results in adverse economic discrimination against 
ESOP employee beneficiaries. This result of economic discrimination is clearly demonstrated 
when a leveraged ESOP purchases employer stock from existing shareholders on the open 
market, either by tender offer or negotiated purchase of controlling shareholder stock. Such 
stock purchases can only be defined as leveraged, tax subsidized, market purchases of 
employer stock according to ESOP trust investment purpose. As such, the capital gain benefit 
of subsequent stock value appreciation, which derives from the ESOP investment in and 
holding of unallocated employer stock, is legal property of the ESOP trust which rightfully 
belongs to the ESOP employee beneficiaries, not the ESOP employer corporation! This is the 
same ownership recognition as universally accorded to all other ESOP trust investments. 
.Notwithstanding, this recognition of ESOP ownership right is expressly denied by the AICPA in 
its proposed SOP accounting rules update. Why? Is it possible the AICPA is unaware of the 
accounting end results I describe?
7. As noted in my antagonistic FAX response to your proposed SOP of March 19, 1993, I 
make great effort to explain that a leveraged ESOP, to qualify for tax subsidy, must be qualified 
by the Internal Revenue Service for written plan compliance to the letter of the law, as well as 
plan interpretation and operational compliance according to the fetter of the law. And the 
governing law, both ERISA legislation and IRS code regulation, is explicit: there must be no 
unfair effect of discrimination, overtly or covertly, against ESOP employee beneficiaries. Yet, 
the truth is, the SOP “fair value" accounting rule proposed by the AICPA specifically promotes, 
fosters, and accomplishes the act and fact of economic discrimination against ESOP employee 
beneficiaries. Hence, I’m absolutely mystified. I guess I just don’t understand accounting 
legitimacy. To me, the proposed AICPA SOP accounting treatment of employer stock value 
gain in leveraged ESOPs is premeditated, despicable, scurrilous, prejudiced accounting tactic. 
It absolutely denies the purpose and economic benefit of leveraged ESOP acquisitions of 
employer stock to the ESOP employee beneficiaries.
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8. So, in closing, I admit intellectual defeat. I don’t fully comprehend what is happening, what 
is objective accounting, or what distinguishes accounting truth from myth. To me, your 
proposed SOP epitomizes moral perversion and contemptible hypocrisy. To me, it is an 
absolute discredit and an utter disgrace to the CPA profession. But perhaps I am totally 
wrong. Maybe I’m all mixed up in my values, beliefs, and thinking. For sure, I’m perplexed. 
So, how about some help? How about an equally sincere response to my critique of your 
proposed SOP. Is my logic and understanding of accounting process and economic reality 
truly confused? If so, where am I off base? Where do I go astray? For sure, your response, if 
you have the courage to respond, would be beneficial and self-illuminating. Hence, for 
permanent record, and for posterity sake, please tell me where my accounting reasoning is in 
error, OK? And when you reply, lets imagine you are in fact explaining why the AICPA 
endorses the proposed SOP “fair value” accounting change to an investigative committee of 
ERISA and IRS attorneys...after they have reviewed your proposed SOP document with 
benefit of the insight and criticism reflected in my three letters of SOP criticism, OK?
With more than disrespect, I remain
Frank W. Atchley, Ph.D. 
Chief Executive Officer
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Navalle Ventures Limited
NAPA VALLEY VENTURE CAPITOL ASSOCIATES
April 6.1993
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Diane D. Manama, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
Reference: Exposure Draft, SOP, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans, dated December 
21, 1992
Gentlemen:
Herewith is my final summary analysis of your referenced SOP. I realize it is past your deadline date for submittal 
of reply comments, but feel my criticism and proposed SOP alternatives are worth your consideration.
I also realize that a "lone voice” from an unknown carries little weight. And I understand that my conclusions may 
merely substantiate the minority position your SOP has already considered and rejected. However, I am so 
convinced of the validity and legitimacy of my particular position that I am compelled to seek reinforcement and 
political support.
Accordingly, It is only fair you are advised I am sending copies of my four response critiques of your proposed 
SOP, with a highlighted copy of your SOP, to J. Michael Keeling, President of The ESOP Association, 
Washington, D.C. and to the National Center for Employee Ownership in Oakland, California, with request to 
circulate a condensed version of my critique argument among reputable ESOP authorities and organize a 
massive “write in" campaign to force you into reconsidering you SOP position.
I also intend to follow through on my prior admonition and send copies of my four SOP protests, with a highlighted 
copy of your SOP, to responsible authority in the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor, and Securities 
and Exchange Commission, with request for a thorough investigation and public hearing. I’ve been through this 
action before. I know what to do, how to get results, and what will happen. Fortunately, I have the time, the 
motivation, and the funds needed to follow through.
Believe me, as a professional person, I have no joy in taking this public approach to getting your attention. But 
how else can I be sure you have heard my protest and understand the importance of the SOP issues I challenge?
I would appreciate receiving a reply acknowledgment of your receipt of my four SOP critiques, your rebuttal of my 
harsh criticism and blunt challenges, and a comparable critical response to the proposed alternative SOP thesis 
expressed herewithin, in paragraph 11.
Thank you for your time and patience.
Sincerely,
P.O. BOX 2730 • 210 ORNDUFF STREET • NAPA. CA 94558 • OFFICE: 707-252 1625 • FAX: 707-252-1627
Frank W. Atchley, Ph D.
Chief Executive Officer
Navalle Ventures Limited
NAPA VALLEY VENTURE CAPITOL ASSOCIATES
April 3, 1993
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Diane D. Manama, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
Reference: Exposure Draft, SOP, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans, dated December 21, 1992
EMERGENCY IMPORTANCE!
This fourth and final SOP critique is being submitted well beyond the closing 
date for submittal of review comments. I do so because I believe my latest 
“overview” comments are critically Important and warrant serious 
consideration in your final SOP release. I feel they illuminate a biased, 
subjective, arbitrary, interpretation (a core organizing belief) which controls 
reader opinion and dictates SOP policy actions of extreme detrimental 
significance to the ESOP movement. Overall, I question the legality of your 
asserted (assumed) legitimacy of discretionary corporate ownership control 
of unallocated employer stock held in a leveraged ESOP suspense account.
1. Your proposed SOP, as drafted, does an admirable job of defining the ESOP issues and 
presenting logical coherent support for the accounting rules it proposes, which rules ostensibly 
carry AICPA endorsement. However, in opposition, I submit your proposed SOP accounting 
rules, in operation, serve to sponsor and effect biased economic discrimination favoring the 
ESOP employer corporation over the ESOP employee beneficiaries. In actual fact, I find your 
SOP to be deceptively deficient in disclosure of the end economic consequence of the 
accounting rules it proposes, so much so I cannot but wonder whether or not the omission is 
deliberate. To me, the end economic consequence of your proposed accounting rules is the 
single most important issue involved. I say this because your SOP mandated accounting rules 
will determine who receives the economic benefit of tens of millions, and ultimately billions of 
dollars in dividends and capital gain-either the ESOP employer corporation or the ESOP 
employee beneficiaries!
2. More specifically, I submit your proposed accounting of dividends and capital gain on 
unallocated, leverage-purchased employer stock effectively frustrates ERISA and IRS purpose 
in sponsoring ESOP formation, and strikes at the heart of ESOP employee beneficiary 
motivation and achievement of cost-cutting production efficiency. Hence, two questions: (a) Is 
not the sanctioned purpose of ESOP formation the creation of means and opportunity for 
employees to acquire ownership of wealth creating assets? (b) Is not the general goal of 
ESOP tax subsidy, including the extraordinary tax incentives offered to form leveraged ESOPs, 
the creation of a motivating independent source of tax-deferred future income (employer 
contributions, dividends, and capital gain) for the exclusive non-discriminatory benefit of ESOP 
employee beneficiaries?
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4. Accordingly, I conclude the primary purpose of ESOP formation is denied when capital gain 
and dividends on unallocated, ESOP leverage-purchased employer stock effectively revert 
back to the employer corporation, as is mandated by your proposed SOP accounting rules. 
Indeed, as I see process reality, your proposed SOP accounting rules effectively preclude 
investment gain on unallocated, leverage-purchased employer stock from accruing for the 
benefit of the ESOP employee beneficiaries. To me, this contrived result is contrary to ERISA 
purpose and IRS tax subsidy objectives.
5. Further, I conclude the foregoing result is accomplished with invalid, arbitrary accounting 
interpretation and assumption. In essence, your SOP refutes the reality that a leveraged 
ESOP transaction constitutes a bonafide investment in employer stock, even when the stock is 
acquired in a negotiated fair value market exchange. For specific illustration: in paragraph 60, 
you argue: “...the substance of (a leveraged ESOP) transaction is that the cash (received) is 
not consideration to the employer for the shares (issued) but rather proceeds from a 
borrowing.” And in paragraph 61, you argue: “...even if a leveraged ESOP buys shares on the 
market rather than from the employer and, therefore, has no direct capital stock transaction 
and no direct cash inflow (from the leveraged ESOP loan), the employer should treat it as a 
leveraged ESOP." Again, in paragraph 62, you argue: “...with internally leveraged 
ESOPs...the employer’s note receivable does not represent a claim by the employer on 
resources of an unrelated party...(and) should not be reported by the employer as a liability 
and as an asset, respectively.
6. To me, these interpretative SOP arguments represent an arbitrary accounting assessment, 
biased justification, and willful omission of relevant disclosure of material discriminatory 
accounting consequence. To me, overall, your SOP arguments clearly demonstrate AICPA 
sponsorship and support of the notion that an ESOP employer corporation should and does 
retain legal ownership control over unallocated employer stock held in a leveraged ESOP 
suspense account. As noted, your SOP accounting rules are predicated on the assumption 
that leveraged ESOP acquisition of employer stock does not constitute an investment stock 
purchase, wherever obtained or however financed. Moreover, your SOP accounting position is 
presumed to be valid and legal despite the reality of IRS sanction and qualification of the 
ESOP trust as an independent tax payer entity; despite the existence of ESOP trustee 
fiduciary obligation to the ESOP employee beneficiaries; despite the fact ESOP trustees must 
be bonded and serve under risk of punitive legal economic recourse; despite the substantial 
investment capital benefit the employer corporation commonly receives when the ESOP stock
is issued; and despite the various substantial tax subsidy benefits that inhere from ESOP 
formation, including tax free roll-over on purchase of controlling shareholder stock, reduced 
debt financing cost, and deductible loan principle payments. Hence, I openly challenge the 
validity of your ownership assumption and the legitimacy of your SOP accounting position!
7. Your SOP accounting treatment of dividends is exemplary of the foregoing confusion. For 
example, in paragraph 73, your SOP makes this candid admission: “Although legally the 
dividends on unallocated ESOP shares belong to the ESOP, employers control the use of such 
dividends,..” And, “...the employer controls, and benefits from, the use of the dividends on 
unallocated shares.” Further along, in paragraph 75, you say: “If the employer decides to use 
the dividends to pay debt service, there is no requirement that the employer replace those 
dividends or allocate additional shares to participants.” I don’t understand. This appears to be 
irreconcilable contradiction, like having your cake and eating it too. If the ESOP trust legally 
owns the dividends paid on its unallocated employer stock, how can the employer legally use 
those dividends for debt service payment without reimbursing to the ESOP or the ESOP 
beneficiaries, especially if those dividends are tax deductible. Such a diversion of ESOP fund  
(dividend earnings) just doesn’t seem right.
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8. More, in paragraphs 21 and 22, you say: (a) “Dividends on unallocated shares used to pay 
debt service should be reported as a reduction of debt or of accrued interest payable." (b) 
“Dividends on unallocated shares paid to participants or added to participant accounts should 
be reported as compensation cost." (c) “Dividends on allocated shares should be charged to 
retained earnings." Seems to me that reporting dividends on unallocated shares as a 
reduction in debt or accrued interest provides illegal exclusive benefit to the employer 
corporation. Similarly, it seems that reporting ESOP dividends as employee compensation 
cost, rather than ESOP trust earnings, defeats the ESOP purpose as defined above. Also, 
reporting ESOP dividends as compensation cost adversely impacts the ESOP employee 
beneficiaries by reducing the maximum ESOP annual contribution otherwise available to them. 
Further, it seems that charging ESOP dividends to retained earnings, rather than current 
earnings, serves to benefit the employer corporation with inflated EPS calculation. I would 
think tax deductible dividends paid to an ESOP should be charged off as an extraordinary 
expense against current earnings, or as an equivalent credit against current tax liability, as a 
reduction of income tax expense allocated to continuing operations--as prescribed in 
paragraph 52.
9. In final overview, let me say I view the ESOP movement as being critically important to this 
nation. And I think the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and the 
related IRS tax subsidy inducements to form ESOPs are extremely prescient political actions, 
on par with the “Mining Act” and the “Homestead Act” of last century. Like these two 
predecessor concepts, an ESOP functions to create and provide genuine economic 
opportunity for the common man. It does this by providing economic reward for human 
contribution to production results, over and above competitive “trickle down" wage earnings. In 
doing so, an ESOP offers tangible opportunity and hope and promise of a better future life. 
More, an ESOP promotes group loyalty, responsibility, cooperation, diligence, perseverance, 
and hard work. It does this by recognizing human worth and promising economic equity, non­
discrimination, proportional reward, and compensation according to contribution. Best of all, 
the ESOP concept is now historically proven beyond rational doubt. It works! And the proven 
result is enhanced productivity, economic growth, more wealth creation, and a better more 
secure life for everyone involved-provided, of course, the ESOP is managed and operated 
properly.
10. Yes, I believe in the ESOP concept. That’s why I’ve been so antagonistic toward your 
proposed SOP. My intelligence tells me your SOP is willfully slanted and purposely designed 
to benefit the ESOP employer corporation (and its capital shareholders) over the ESOP 
employee beneficiaries. To me, that’s wrong! With an ESOP, particularly in a majority-owned 
ESOP, the employee beneficiaries include the officers, managers, and inside directors. They 
all work as a team toward a common goal of creating wealth for their own individual personal 
benefit-not for the benefit of disinterested outside capital shareholders. This is the secret of 
ESOP success-concerted group effort to generate wealth for the ESOP employee 
beneficiaries! .The core idea is simple: wealth produced by labor belongs to labor! Your SOP 
should recognize this truth and function to achieve ESOP objectives, per ERISA and IRS 
sanction. More specifically, your SOP should mandate and cause dividend value and capital 
gain on unallocated employer stock in leveraged ESOP suspense accounts to flow into the 
employee beneficiary accounts, not be funneled back to the employer corporation for capital 
shareholder benefit!
11. How? By revising your proposed SOP to integrate the following Ideas: (a) Concede 
that an ESOP is a sanctioned independent entity and legal owns its portfolio of employer stock 
as a listed shareholder of record, (b) Recognize the economic reality that employer stock 
shares held as loan collateral in a leveraged ESOP suspense account are physically issued 
and legally outstanding, (c) Do not give ESOP employer corporations unilateral legal right to 
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determine stock value for ESOP contribution purpose, suspense account release, or 
shareholder stock redemption, (d) Do not give ESOP employer corporations discretionary 
control over the allocation of tax deductible dividends paid on unallocated ESOP-owned 
employer stock acquired by leverage purchase, (e) Respect the legitimacy of contract law with 
regard to leveraged ESOP acquisition of blocks of employer stock at a fixed cost. Treat such 
acquisitions of employer stock as a bonafide trust investment made for employee beneficiary 
benefit. (1) Provide for release of employer stock held in an ESOP suspense account into 
participant accounts at the original purchase cost value, as the leverage loan principal is paid 
down. (g) Dividends on ESOP-owned employer shares should be treated as trust earnings 
and should not be charged off as compensation cost. (h) Annual ESOP contributions (current 
compensation cost) should be determined by resolution of the employer board of directors, 
according to IRS limitations. Excess and deficient contributions should accrue and carry 
forward into succeeding years
Thank you for your patience and consideration.
I still have my doubts,
Frank W. Atchley, Ph.D.
Chief Executive Officer  
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THE UPJOHN COMPANY
7000 PORTAGE ROAD
KALAMAZOO. MICHIGAN 49001-0199. USA.
April 2, 1993
ROBERT C SALISBURY
Senior Vice President for Finance 
and Chief Financial Officer
TELEPHONE (616)323-5485
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division 
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Subject: Proposed Statement of Position: Employers’
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
In many respects we feel the draft represents a cohesive and understandable model for accounting 
for employee stock ownership plans. The existing rules are a patchwork attempt to revise, 
interpret, and update a model that has become obsolete. The proposal does a good job of 
integrating the many facets of the overall program and attempting to represent the substance of the 
transactions rather than attend to their form.
While we recognize the strengths of the draft and the fresh start it brings to this complex topic, 
we feel very strongly that its adoption for pre-existing plans must be voluntary. For ESOPs such 
as ours, which is a leveraged plan utilizing preferred stock, the accounting pervades our earnings 
statements, balance sheets, and disclosures. We are also beginning the fourth year of a 15 year 
program. To attempt to modify our accounting at this date would be unduly disruptive and 
confusing. We commend the Accounting Standards Executive Committee for its recognition of 
this critical matter by "grandfathering" plans whose shares were acquired prior to September 23, 
1992.
Despite our overall favorable response to the Exposure Draft, we are concerned about a number 
of specific provisions.
We do not believe that the use of fair value of shares released is an appropriate measure of 
compensation in all plans - particularly in cases where the terms of the ESOP call for different 
treatment. The terms of the plan may override the more philosophical goal of market value 
accounting and mandate that the accounting for the ESOP follow its legal terms.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
April 2, 1993
Page 2
We disagree that the convertible preferred stock held by an ESOP is, by definition, a common 
stock equivalent. Moreover, we submit that the present disclosures of primary and fully diluted 
earnings per share provide more meaningful information to the reader than would result from this 
change.
We dispute the need for pro forma disclosure of the effects of adoption of the proposed rules by 
firms electing not to so adopt. This would be a burdensome requirement, one which may confuse 
rather than illuminate, and one which is without precedent. Greater degrees of nonconformity 
have been accepted in other areas of accounting, such as inventories, and we fail to see the need 
for these disclosures in this instance.
Elaboration upon these major points and some less significant observations are contained in the 
attachment to this letter.
We appreciate the time you have taken to discuss the Exposure Draft and our views on it with 
Fred Hirt and Mark Ogden of our organization.
We would be pleased to continue this dialogue once you have had an opportunity to review our 
written comments.
Sincerely.
clg
Enc.
Robert C. Salisbury
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
The proposed SOP must not categorically require that employers measure compensation cost based on 
the fair value of the shares committed to be released. Either the SOP should indicate that the 
accounting follow the terms of the plan, or it should further define the term "fair value".
There are plans which release and allocate shares to participants’ accounts based upon cost of the 
shares (or stated value). While we understand this may be the exception rather than the rule, plans 
structured in this manner operate to the benefit of plan participants. When the fair value of the shares 
falls below cost, the employer guarantees redemption at the cost floor. When the shares appreciate in 
value, the employees continue to receive them at cost. The benefit of the appreciation falls to the 
employees, not the firm.
To attempt to superimpose an accounting rule which would mandate the use of a fair value, as that 
term is commonly used, would result in artificial results of limited benefit to anyone. We really do 
not believe it was the intent of AcSEC to suggest that fair value be used if the plan terms call for 
another measure. The draft, however, does lead to such a conclusion.
The draft states that, "compensation cost associated with providing such benefits [i.e., 401(k)] to 
employees would be recognized the way it would if an ESOP had not been used to fund the benefit." 
We support this intent. As Exhibit I illustrates, however, mandatory use of fair value fails to achieve 
that objective.
The compensation cost in the absence of an ESOP would be $15,000, not $19,380. Similarly, the 
operation of the ESOP using stated value of shares for release and allocation yields a compensation 
cost of $15,000. The draft SOP, as we understand it to operate, would result in compensation cost of 
$19,380 in this example.
As an alternative to requiring that the accounting follow the terms of the plan, perhaps paragraph 20 
could be elaborated upon to indicate that under circumstances such as those described above, "fair 
value" can be interpreted to mean the stated value at which the plan is committed to effecting 
transactions.
As subparts to our response to Issue I, we offer the following additional observations:
1. The determination of fair value of a preferred stock issue which has no market price adds 
unnecessary costs.
2. In Illustration 4, there is reference to the preferred stock having a guaranteed minimum 
redemption value. It appears from the table at the bottom of page 44 that this guaranteed 
minimum establishes fair value (by virtue of the constancy of the values of four years). This 
point is not made anywhere in the example, however, leaving the reader to make such 
inferences. If this was correctly the intent of the authors, the concept should be spoken to.
3. Also, in Illustration 4, the table at the bottom of page 44 refers to "market" values rather than 
fair values. Was this a deliberate choice of terms? If so, what is the significance?
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
The effective date should be extended to fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993 rather than 
ending after that date. This would avoid the possible necessity of restatements of previously reported 
interim periods.
More generally, we strongly support the option afforded firms with pre-September 23, 1992 plans to 
either adopt the new rules or not. Employers, such as The Upjohn Company, adopted ESOPs with a 
certain understanding as to what the applicable accounting rules were. We have already endured one 
fundamental change (i.e., EITF 89-8) and various other related modifications. Given the disruption 
which another change in accounting would create, the confusion to management and the readers of 
financial statements, and the associated costs, it would be counter-productive to mandate adoption of 
this rule change on pre-existing plans.
We commend AcSEC for recognizing the need to "grandfather" pre-existing plans.
There is one aspect of the transition provisions contained in paragraph 57 that we do not agree with. 
That is the transition from the provisions of EITF 89-8.
It appears that the authors are equating their term "shares committed to be released" with the EITF’s 
"shares allocated method". We do not believe these two terms are comparable. Again, referring to 
the Upjohn plan, since there are no scheduled principal payments in the early years of the plan, the 
EITF consensus requires that we artificially allocate a pro rata portion of debt principal to expense in 
those early years based upon the percentage of shares allocated. This is not the same as the formula:
(Total shares committed to be released x share cost) less cumulative dividends
Applying the steps in paragraph 57 (second bullet point) to Upjohn cumulative data yields a very 
large credit amount.
If the intended result of that portion of paragraph 57 is to catch up for the 20 percent transition factor 
allowed in EITF 89-8, the formula provided does not accomplish the task. If this is indeed the 
objective, though, we oppose it in principle. The EITF model, as we have indicated previously, 
artificially attempts to convert all plans into level plans. This is inappropriate in the Upjohn case and 
is not an expressed objective of the draft SOP. The catch-up adjustment would only force recognition 
of a flawed model as a stepping stone towards adoption of a more reasonable model.
The draft SOP does not expressly deal with non-level plans. Perhaps it should. Once again, relating 
this to a 401(k) funding vehicle, compensation expense under the draft should be the same as though 
an ESOP were not used. EITF 89-8 does not yield such a result.
There may indeed be the need for cumulative adjustments upon transition to the SOP rules, but such 
adjustments would more than likely be credits to decrease expense recognition to more appropriate 
levels. The adjustments would occur for both employers who applied the shares-allocated method in 
EITf 89-8 and those who did not.
Issue 3: Disclosures
Regarding the requirements that non-adopting employers provide pro forma income and earnings per 
share information as if the employer had adopted the provisions of the SOP, we are strongly opposed.
While we recognize and appreciate the concern for comparability across firms, we fail to understand 
why the issue is so critical in the area of ESOP accounting as to warrant the unprecedented move of 
requiring pro forma disclosures. This requirement would be tantamount to adoption. All the same 
accounting systems and analyses would be required, but they would be additive to procedures already 
in place. This would bring into question whether there is a favorable cost-benefit tradeoff.
Moreover, we submit that there are numerous other areas of accounting where disparate principles are 
permitted although they result in far greater degrees of non-comparability of operating results. We do 
not, for example, require pro forma disclosure of net earnings and earnings per share on a LIFO 
versus a FIFO inventory costing method. As in the case of inventory footnotes which offer the reader 
sufficient information with which to make his or her own analysis, ample data are currently being 
provided in the notes regarding ESOPs.
If pro forma disclosures should be required in final rule making, it would be advisable to expressly 
indicate that such disclosures are to be included in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to 
the face of the financials.
Other Issues
Common stock equivalency - We do not agree that convertible preferred stock held by an ESOP 
should be treated as a common stock equivalent. We believe the effective yield test in APB Opinion 
15 should continue to apply.
While it is true that the shares will ultimately be converted or redeemed, the time span over which 
this will occur is a very long one. It would be possible for relatively young employees to acquire 
shares in their 401(k) accounts near the end of the 15 year term of the ESOP and not withdraw those 
shares for another 30 to 40 years.
Number of shares outstanding - While we understand the logic behind looking only at shares 
committed to be released as outstanding, we are concerned that the ultimate dilutive effect of 
conversion of all preferred shares would not be properly reflected. There appears to be an 
incongruity in logic between the positions taken on common share equivalency and number of shares 
outstanding.
In the former instance, AcSEC takes the position that all shares will ultimately be converted; 
therefore, they are common stock equivalents. In the case of shares outstanding, the fact that all 
shares will ultimately be converted is disregarded.
Earnings per share - We firmly believe that APB No. 15 provides the most relevant information to 
the reader of the financial statements. It does not deem the preferred shares to be common stock 
equivalents if certain yield tests are met. Thus, the primary earnings per share calculation reflects 
common shares actually outstanding. The fully diluted computation assumes all convertible issues are 
converted and represents the maximum measure of dilution. This is preferable to the "half way" 
approach suggested by the draft which has essentially the same degree of dilution - but not all that 
will ultimately occur - in both earnings per share measures.
Illustrations - The illustrations provided in the draft are critical to a clear understanding of these 
fairly complex rules. It would be helpful to have one other example. We would like to see a 
comprehensive illustration which combines the use of preferred stock with the funding of a 401(k) 
plan.
EXHIBIT I
OPERATION OF ESOP USED TO FUND A 401(k) PLAN
As Designed
Compensation expense (employer’s cash cost to match
employees’ savings plan contributions). $15,000
Dividends on previously allocated shares $7,000
Number of shares required to satisfy above obligations
at stated value (cost) of $50 per share 440
Note that the manner in which debt service schedules were structured, 440 shares are committed to be
released.
Per Draft SOP
Assume fair value of shares to be $60
Employer’s matching contribution $15,000
Dividends on previously allocated shares $7,000
Number of shares required to satisfy above obligations
at fair value 367
Excess shares committed to be released 73
Times fair value of $60 $4,380
Total compensation expense $19,380
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March 26, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20004-1007
ROHM 
 HAAS 
COMPANY
Dear Ms. McNamee:
This letter is written in response to the December 21, 1992 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee’s (AcSEC) request for comments 
on the proposed statement of position (SOP) entitled "Employers’ 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans" (ESOPs).
Rohm and Haas Company is a $3 billion multinational producer of 
specialty chemicals and plastics. Over the years, we have been supportive 
of accounting standards that provide meaningful information to 
stockholders, creditors and other interested parties. However, in recent 
years there has been a proliferation of new accounting rules and 
disclosures which are costly to implement and maintain, but do not 
provide readers with better information. The following are our comments 
regarding specific provisions of the SOP:
Recognition of Compensation Cost
The ESOP sponsored by Rohm and Haas Company is used to fund the 
employer matching for a 401(k) plan. We oppose the proposed position 
that compensation cost for leveraged ESOPs be measured based on the fair 
value of the shares when they are released for the following reasons:
• Compensation expense should reflect the economic reality of 
providing the benefit to employees. In the case of our leveraged 
ESOP, the original cost of the shares plus the cost of any "top-up" 
shares is the true cost to the company of providing the benefit.
• The fair value of the stock is a reflection of various factors and 
forces in the public markets and is not correlated with the value of 
services provided by employees. The number of shares which are 
released each year are based on the debt service schedule and must 
be allocated regardless of changes in market value.
• While it is true that as an employer we have a large degree of 
control over employees’ total compensation package, it is not true 
that we can or would alter this package in response to changes in the 
value of shares being released. Our compensation package is a 
reflection of competitive forces in the employment markets in which 
we are located. Compensation packages are designed to attract and 
retain highly qualified personnel and are based on a long-term 
commitment to employees.
Transition
We support the transition rules that do not require sponsors of ESOPs 
whose shares were acquired prior to the transition date to use the 
proposed accounting rules. Sponsoring a leveraged ESOP is a significant 
economic decision and is based on the facts and circumstances that existed 
at the time the decision was made. If the proposed accounting rules had 
been in existence at the time we were considering sponsoring the ESOP, a 
different decision may have been made.
Disclosures
We do not support the proposed requirement for publicly-held ESOP 
sponsors that do not adopt the proposed accounting rules to disclose pro 
forma net income and earnings per share data as though the new 
accounting rules had been adopted. Providing accounting disclosures 
requires a significant effort to gather, compile and verify data. Requiring 
companies to provide pro forma disclosures would be burdensome because 
those companies would have to establish a separate method of tracking the 
data since it would not be part of their normal accounting systems. These 
disclosures are of no value to existing or future shareholders and are 
confusing and misleading to the reader. Most importantly, in a global 
world, the cost of non-value added disclosures is a competitive cost that no 
company can afford.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this important subject 
and hope that AcSEC will find our comments helpful in reaching a final 
decision.
Sincerely,
Fred W. Shaffer 
Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES 
INSTITUTE
Joseph A. Sciarrino
Vice President and Technical Director
March 26, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial 
Executives Institute (FEI) is pleased to comment on the AICPA's 
December 21, 1992 Proposed Statement of Position (SOP) entitled 
"Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans” 
(ESOPs). CCR individual member reactions to the proposed SOP 
reflect the same range of mixed opinions that you and Gerald 
Searfoss reported in your February 1993, Journal of Accountancy 
article. Nevertheless, a majority position was reached on the 
major issues and a strong consensus exists on one central 
issue; namely:
Any SOP changing current practice must provide 
grandfathering. Grandfathering is absolutely necessary for 
companies who made decisions in the past to create ESOPs 
based on the current accounting rules. The exposure draft 
contains sound logic for this conclusion in paragraph 94 
and we fully agree. ESOPs are typically long-term 
commitments and the accounting treatment is generally an 
important consideration in their establishment. Companies 
which relied on existing ESOP accounting rules when 
establishing plans should not be penalized by being 
required to change their accounting for those plans.
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We also offer the following comments on the specific issues 
noted in the covering letter accompanying the proposal:
Recognition of Compensation Cost
A majority of CCR believes that, for straight compensation 
plans, the point of focus is the irrevocable transfer of the 
shares to the ESOP. The number of shares to be given employees 
and the total periods over which they will be allocated 
("vested") are known. Any subsequent increase or decline in 
value affects only the employee group, not the company. We 
are, after all, accounting from the perspective of — and for 
— the shareholders. The above would conform to current 
literature and the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 
(FASB) latest thinking for stock compensation — fair value at 
the establishment or grant date would be used to measure all 
future allocations.
For plans in which the fair value of shares released is used to 
determine how many shares are needed to satisfy an obligation 
that arose outside the ESOP, fair value of committed to be 
released shares may be an appropriate measurement of the 
charges. We say "may" because the legal terms of a specific 
plan may not require the release of shares at fair value. At 
least one CCR member notes that there are plans which release 
and allocate shares to participants' accounts based only on a 
stated value (cost) of the preferred stock used to fund the 
plan. The SOP should be revised to address such plans.
Effective Date and Transition
We believe the effective date should be for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15th of the year in which the SOP is 
issued. The proposed effective date of "...fiscal years ending 
after December 15, 1993, as of the beginning of the fiscal year 
in which the SOP is adopted", appears to potentially require 
restatement of periods prior to the issuance of the final SOP. 
If we assume the final SOP is issued in the third quarter of 
1993 with the effective date as proposed, a calendar year 
company that established a plan in the fourth quarter of 1992 
or the first half of 1993 and applied existing rules would have 
to restate 1993 quarters in which the old rules were followed. 
If this is not the intent, the final SOP should be amended to 
clearly describe the implementation requirements. However, if 
our understanding is correct, the proposed effective date will 
prove cumbersome and will undoubtedly not be cost effective. 
Both those drawbacks could be easily avoided by adopting an 
effective date as we suggest above.
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, AICPA 
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As we stated earlier, grandfathering is an essential component 
of a smooth transition to the modifications in the proposed 
SOP. The proposed mandatory application to shares acquired by 
ESOPs after September 23, 1992, however, seems inappropriate. 
That is the date on which the FASB cleared the proposal for 
exposure but publicity was limited and due process is confined 
to the period that is the most demanding for many preparers and 
auditors. We feel strongly that the grandfathering date should 
be either the issue date or the effective date of the final 
SOP.
Disclosures
The proposed disclosures, by companies electing to grandfather 
existing plans, of pro forma income before extraordinary items, 
net income and earnings per share as if they had adopted, would 
be costly and would outweigh any benefits. The exposure draft 
enumerates valid reasons for grandfathering existing ESOPs. 
However, to then require pro forma information on the new 
accounting basis is without logic and unnecessarily expensive. 
We believe such a precedent-setting move is not warranted.
CCR's comments were consolidated by Ed Milan and Stan Rash of 
Tenneco. Should you have questions they may be reached at 
(713) 757-8255 and 4147 respectively.
Sincerely,
Joseph A. Sciarrino
231 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60697 
3128282345
Continental Bank
April 1, 1993
Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
Continental appreciates this opportunity to comment on the AICPA Exposure Draft 
(ED), Proposed Statement of Position, "Employers* Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans."
Continental will respond below to the three issues raised by the ED, which 
include recognition of compensation cost, effective date and transition, and 
disclosures.
Recognition of Compensation Cost
Continental generally agrees that compensation cost should be measured using the 
fair value of shares when committed to be released. However, we agree with the 
dissenting view that Type 1 ESOPs, in which shares are released to compensate 
employees directly, should continue to use purchase cost to measure compensation 
cost.
Specifically, in the case of leveraged ESOPs, whether internal or external, the 
risks and rewards associated with the ESOP shares are transferred from the 
employer to employees on the date of purchase. All shares are "committed to be 
released" at the purchase date over the life of the leveraged period. The ED 
definition of "committed to be released" appears to limit the shares "committed 
to be released" to those that will be allocated to employees for services 
rendered in the current accounting period. Accordingly, the employers will 
recognize the effect of fair value changes for subsequent accounting periods in 
its financial statements despite the fact that the employers* obligation to its 
employees for such fair value changes ended at the purchase date.
60 cont'd
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We do not believe such accounting faithfully represents the substance of the 
transaction. This is evidenced by the fact that total capital of an entity is 
unchanged by the accounting associated with such fair value changes. Instead, we 
believe the transaction represents the prepayment of the employer's expense which 
should be amortized as earned over the leveraged period.
Effective Date and Transition
Continental strongly disagrees with the September 23, 1992 cutoff date for 
application of the ED provisions. Since the ED was not issued until December 21, 
1992, employers are not given any lead time to adjust to the change in account­
ing. As a result, an employer's financial statement may be negatively effected 
for actions taken that may not have been taken had the employer been aware of the 
potential accounting change.
For this reason we strongly recommend that the ED provisions apply to shares 
purchased on or subsequent to January 1, 1993.
It should be noted that several precedents exist in accounting literature for 
providing employers lead time to react to a change in accounting. SFAS No. 106, 
"Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits", is a primary example.
Disclosures
Continental believes that disclosure of the pro forma effect of the final 
statement of position on shares purchased on or before September 23, 1992 should 
not be required. Our rationale is the same as provided above for the effective 
date and transition section. Specifically, such a disclosure would imply a 
positive or negative employer decision had been made to transactions that may not 
have been consummated if the ED provisions had been applicable in that time 
period.
Continental appreciates this opportunity to comment on the ED. Please contact me 
if you have any questions concerning our comments.
Sincerely
Claude J. Edelson
Vice President
Accounting Policy 
Telephone: (312) 923-5727
Coopers 
& Lybrand
certified public accountants 1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York New York 10020
telephone (212) 536-2000 
fax (212) 536-3500
(212) 536-3035
in principal areas of the world
April 13, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, 
File 2500
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Comments on the Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of 
Position, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are pleased to submit our comments on the December 21, 1992 
Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of Position, Employers' 
Accounting for Employee stock Ownership Plans (the "ED").
We concur with the minority view presented in the ED that the 
current accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs”) 
which are used to compensate employees directly ("type I ESOPs”) 
continues to be relevant and, therefore, should not be changed. We 
believe that the significant fundamental differences between type 
I and type II ESOPs described in the minority view provide a 
reasonable basis for different accounting treatment.
Accounting standards should only be altered when there is clear 
evidence that a proposed change would improve financial reporting. 
There is an absence of convincing proof that financial statement 
users would benefit from the accounting changes proposed for type 
I ESOPs, including those relating to dividends and earnings per 
share. Additionally, the issue of stock compensation is being 
actively reconsidered by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
and we believe it would be premature to issue guidance relating to 
ESOPs which may ultimately be inconsistent with stock compensation 
accounting guidance issued by the Board.
If AcSEC decides to proceed with the ED, we believe it should be 
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. The 
one-year extension is appropriate given that the final Statement 
would not be issued before the fourth quarter of 1993.
We disagree with the requirement for public companies to provide 
pro forma ("as if") earnings disclosures when they elect not to 
iapply the ED’s guidance to shares acquired by ESOPs on or before 
September 23, 1992. We believe that such disclosures would confuse 
financial statement users and do not provide meaningful 
information.
******
We appreciate this opportunity to express our views. If you have 
any questions concerning our comments, please call Dennis E. Peavey 
at (212) 536-3286 in our National office.
Very truly yours,
Eli Lilly and Company
Lilly Corporate Center 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46285
Keith E. Brauer 
Executive Director of Finance 
and Chief Accounting Officer
April 7, 1993
Ms Dionne D. McNamee
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms McNamee:
We appreciate the opportunity to express our opinion regarding the 
AICPA’s proposal on accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOP). We feel the proposal follows sound theoretical accounting and 
we fully support the grandfathering of the existing ESOPs. However, we 
strongly oppose the pro forma disclosure requirement of this proposal.
The proposal permits companies with established ESOPs to retain their 
current method of accounting. However, it requires such companies to 
make pro forma disclosures as if the company had adopted the proposal. 
Frankly, we feel that the cost of complying with this requirement far 
exceeds any potential benefit that this requirement could provide. Also, 
such pro forma disclosure will more than likely create confusion among 
the financial statement readers. We believe this is a major concern given 
the complex nature of the ESOP subject matter, in general. In addition to 
the pro forma requirement being cumbersome and potentially confusing, 
we are not aware of any similar "dual disclosure" in the accounting 
literature, making the pro forma disclosure an unprecedented requirement.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to express our opinion on the 
AICPA’s proposal on accounting for ESOPs and we will be happy to 
discuss the matter further. Should you desire, please feel free to contact 
me at 317/276-5303.
Sincerely,
Keith E. Brauer
KEB/me
Certified Public Accountants & Business Consultants
612-376-4500
Fax 376-4850
 LARSON 
  ALLEN 
 WEISHAIR  & CO.
Suite 1000
220 South Sixth Street 
Minneapolis, MN 55402-4505
April 14, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division
File 2500
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Re: Proposed Statement of Position, "Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans" 
(File Reference No. 2500)
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are pleased to provide our comments on the exposure draft [ED] referred to above and support the 
committee’s effort to address many complex issues associated with employers’ accounting for employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
Minority View
Included in the ED are the minority views of certain AcSec members related to the measurement of 
compensation costs for certain ESOPs. We wish to express our support of that minority view; however, 
we believe type I ESOPs should not be excluded from the scope of the SOP. Instead, the guidance 
should be applied using the original cost basis of the shares rather than the fair market value of the 
shares on the date released. We concur with the minority view that type I ESOPs should be measured 
based on the date the shares are purchased by the ESOPs since the risks and rewards associated with 
the value of the ESOPs’ shares have been transferred from the employer to its employees.
We believe the use of fair value based on the time of release will create an artificial paid-in capital. 
In addition, it appears as though this standard will inappropriately mix the use of historical cost 
accounting with fair value accounting. A practical consideration that is addressed lightly by the ED, 
and which we believe will create a significant problem, is the determination of fair value. Generally, 
fair value of an ESOP’s shares is determined at least five months into the following year. These same 
companies have financial statement timing requirements, including those brought on by the ESOP debt, 
of three months. As a result, the companies will be required to determine their fair value based on the 
previous year’s independent stock valuation which more likely than not will differ from the current 
independent stock valuation. This will be true for most privately held companies with ESOPs.
Member of Summit International Associates, Inc.
April 14, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
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Leveraged ESOPs
We concur with the committee’s approach to accounting for the loan in leveraged ESOPs. In practice, 
we have found an inconsistent application of both indirect and employer loans. We believe the proposed 
SOP appropriately addressed those issues.
Nonleveraged ESOPS
We agree that companies with nonleveraged ESOPs should report compensation costs equal to the fair 
value at the time a cash contribution or shares are contributed or committed to be contributed to the 
ESOP.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our views on the ED and would be pleased to discuss any 
aspect of our letter with the committee or its staff at its convenience.
LARSON, ALLEN, WEISHAIR & CO.
 TANDEM Tandem Computers Incorporated 
10600 Ridgeview Court 
Cupertino, CA 95014
May 13, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Dionne:
As I mentioned in our phone conversation last week, I apologize for our late response to 
the ESOP accounting proposal. Because I am new to Tandem, the delay in our response 
was principally to allow me to understand the Company’s plan and our position.
If you have any questions you can contact me directly at 408-285-0327.
Sincerely,
Mark P. Dentinger
Manager, Financial Reporting and Controls
TANDEMCOMPUTERS
May 13, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We are responding to your request for comment on the Exposure Draft of a Proposed 
Statement of Position, Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 
dated December 21, 1992 (the ’’Proposed SOP”).
Tandem Computers Incorporated (Tandem) is a publicly-held Fortune 500 manufacturer 
of on-line transaction processing computer systems. We have established several 
vehicles for distributing stock to employees and virtually all full-time employees own our 
stock.
In fiscal 1989, we established an internally leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
("ESOP" or "the Plan") and funded the ESOP Trust ("the Trust") with $50 million of our 
common stock. The primary purpose of forming the ESOP was to allow our employees 
to obtain stock for retirement without paying for the shares. Our ESOP is designed to 
allocate shares representing 1.5% to 5% of employee compensation each quarter and the 
shares vest no later than one year from date of allocation.
In responding to the Proposed SOP, we agree with the Task Forces’ observations that the 
structure and purpose of ESOPs have become increasingly complex. However, we also 
feel that guidance for some Type I ESOPs (as defined on page 95 of the Proposed SOP), 
which is principally contained in AICPA Statement of Position No. 76-3, Accounting 
Practices For Certain Employee Stock Ownership Plans (SOP 76-3), is still relevant and 
that certain Type I ESOPs should be excluded from the Proposed SOP.
Since SOP 76-3 was released, many new uses for ESOPs have developed, including the 
use of appreciated ESOP shares to fund liabilities of other employee benefit plans. For 
these newer uses of ESOPs, the guidance in SOP 76-3 may not be appropriate. However, 
for Type I ESOPs like Tandem’s, where there is an independent relationship between the 
sponsor and the ESOP, the guidance in SOP 76-3 remains sufficient. In our opinion the 
key issues that should affect accounting for ESOPs are how the shares are used and the 
nature of the relationship between an ESOP and the employer/sponsor.
Tandem Computers Incorporated
10435 North Tantau Avenue
Cupertino, CA 95014-0709
(408) 865-4500
May 13, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee
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We have the following specific concerns about conclusions drawn in paragraph 69 of the 
Proposed SOP:
1) The Task Force is focused on the fact that uncommitted employer shares in an 
ESOP are not individually allocated to employees per the requirements of paragraph 
10.b. of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to 
Employees (APBO 25), and therefore a measurement date has not been established at 
the time the shares are issued to the Trust However, the guidance in APBO 25 was 
applicable at the time SOP 76-3 was drafted. We do not believe SOP 76-3 conflicted 
with APBO 25, but merely addressed a new type of stock ownership mechanism 
following passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
which did not exist when APBO 25 became effective. Tandem's ESOP also meets the 
provisions of paragraph 10.e. of APBO 25 which provides a measurement date at the 
time shares are issued to the Trust. The substance of Type I ESOPs has not changed 
since issuance of SOP 76-3 and we believe the guidance contained therein is still 
applicable.
2) The Task Force notes the risks and rewards of ESOP shares reside with the 
employer until shares are committed to be released because of the large degree of 
control employers have over an employee's compensation package. We feel these 
observations do not apply in our case (and in other cases) for two reasons:
First, in order to qualify for certain tax advantages and to comply with ERISA, 
substantial structural and administrative requirements exist surrounding the formation 
and operation of an ESOP. These requirements effectively transfer many of the 
rewards of stock ownership to the employee group as a whole upon formation of the 
ESOP. Specifically, most qualifying ESOPs utilizing a Trust are chartered to vote 
the unallocated shares in the Trust in the interest of the employees. In our case, the 
unallocated shares must be voted in the same proportion as the allocated shares. 
Further, in our ESOP, the unallocated shares in the Trust can not revert to Tandem. 
Finally, as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, there is a 
substantial excise tax levied on Plans which dispose of securities within a three year 
period after formation. For these reasons, we believe issuance of shares to the Trust 
represents a substantive transfer of the rewards of owning the shares, even though 
the shares have not been individually allocated.
Second, although Plan contributions are part of an employee's compensation, because 
of the broad base of participants, and because of numerous other components of a 
compensation package, including other stock ownership vehicles, it is impracticable 
to use the ESOP to tailor compensation packages for individual employees. This is 
true in part because the ESOP shares must be distributed systematically to all 
employees, making it impossible to use the ESOP as a vehicle for non-uniform 
employee compensation. Our plan was designed principally as a retirement vehicle, 
not to facilitate current compensation.
May 13, 1993
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3) We do not understand the Task Force’s goal of trying to make practices for each and 
every leveraged and non-leveraged ESOP consistent. The accounting for shares issued 
to an ESOP should reflect the substance of the transaction, including the degree to 
which the sponsor has transferred the rewards of stock ownership to the employees and 
the relationship between a sponsor and the ESOP. In fact, the substance of leveraged 
and non-leveraged ESOPs (and, for that matter, the substance of different leveraged 
ESOPs) may differ considerably, depending upon legal structure and purpose. We feel 
the accounting guidance should reflect these differences.
As a final point, we note the Proposed SOP, if adopted, will likely result in greater net 
income to Tandem because the cost of the stock issued to our ESOP was $17.81 per 
share and our current trading price is about $11.50. Despite the positive impact on our 
earnings, we oppose the Proposal in principle because we do not believe it fundamentally 
improves financial reporting. In fact, adoption of the proposal would likely adversely 
affect the volatility of reported earnings and the comparability of income between 
periods.
We ask the Task Force to consider amending or modifying the Proposed SOP to retain 
the current guidance for Type I plans with an independent relationship between the 
sponsor and the trustee. In other cases, where the trustee is not substantively independent 
from the sponsor or where the Plan is used to fund the liabilities of other benefit plans, 
we agree in principle with the Task Force's conclusions.
We would be happy to discuss this matter with you or any of the Task Force members at 
your convenience.
Sincerely.
David J. Rynne
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
May 17, 1993
California
Society
Certified
Public 
Accountants
100 W Broadway
Suite 500 
Glendale. GA 
91210-0001 
(818)246-6000
Accounting Standards Division
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Attention: Dionne D. McNamee, Technical Manager
Re: File 2500, Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the California Society 
of Certified Public Accountants ("AP&AS Committee") has discussed the Exposure Draft 
of the proposed Statement of Position, Employers’ Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans and has developed certain comments on that Exposure Draft.
The AP&AS Committee is a senior technical committee of the California Society of 
Certified Public Accountants. The 1992/93 Committee comprises 44 members, of which 
16% are from national CPA firms, 46% are from local or regional firms, 30% are sole 
practitioners in public practice, 4% are in industry, and 4% are in academia. In 
addition, 5 current or former members of the Accounting Standards Executive Committee 
serve on the AP&AS Committee.
The following comments represent the results of the AP&AS Committee’s deliberations 
on the AICPA Exposure Draft.
The AP&AS Committee agrees with the minority view of AcSEC that there are essential 
differences between ESOP shares that are released to compensate employees directly and 
ESOP shares that are released to settle or fund liabilities for other employee benefits, 
referred to as Type I and Type II ESOPs, respectively. SOP 76-3 has worked well for 
Type I plans and there is no apparent need to change. While there are arguably some 
inconsistencies between SOP 76-3 and APB Opinion No. 25 "Accounting for Stock 
Issued to Employees", those inconsistencies were known when SOP 76-3 was issued, 
which was several years after the issuance of APB 25. Further, these inconsistencies 
have not been a source of significant concern Type I plans.
The risks and rewards associated with the value of Type I ESOP shares are transferred 
to employees at the date the ESOP purchases the shares, and this should be the 
measurement date for compensation. The cost as of that date is the actual cost to the 
employer and is the best representation of the employer’s cost of compensating the 
employee. In addition, valuation of shares at release date would cause some additional 
Accounting Standards Division 
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
May 17, 1993
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need for appraisal of shares which is not matched by any apparent benefit. One must
consider that approximately 95% of ESOPs are non-public companies and there is no
demonstrated need by users of their financial statements for a different basis for
measurement of Type I ESOP plans on a basis different than current practice under
SOP 76-3.
Further, the AP&AS Committee believe that AcSEC should not undertake any change 
for Type I plans at the time that the FASB is working on a comprehensive project on 
accounting for employee stock compensation that might affect the conclusions that would 
be reached on accounting for Type I plans.
On the other hand, the AP&AS committee does believe that new guidance is needed for 
Type II plans. These are new since SOP 76-3 and are substantively different from Type 
I ESOPs. It essentially agrees with the guidance in the proposed SOP and recommends 
that a SOP limited to Type II plans be issued.
The AP&AS Committee has several comments on transition provisions. First, the 
effective date should be delayed until years ending after December 15, 1994. Making 
it effective for years ending after December 15, 1993, as proposed, would be 
unreasonable since there would not be an sufficient time between issuance and effective 
date for adequate implementation. Second, the "grandfather date" of September 23, 1992 
should be extended to a more current date that is consistent with the effective date. 
Third, the proforma income data that would be required by the last sentence of paragraph 
54 should not be required; it does not seem to be worthwhile, its preparation would be 
burdensome, it is inconsistent with requirements of recent FASB pronouncements such 
as FAS 106, and the cost does not seem to be matched by any discernable benefits.
The AP&AS Committee has two other suggestions. First, it would seem worthwhile to 
include the conclusions of EITFs 88-27 and 89-11 in a final document so as to put all 
ESOP guidance in one place. Second, the AP&AS Committee believes that the "contra­
equity account" described in paragraph 13 should periodically be adjusted to reflect the 
value of suspense shares for Type II ESOP plans since their cost seems irrelevant if such 
shares will ultimately be recorded at fair value at release date.
100 W. Broadway
Suite 500
Glendale. CA
91210-0001
(818) 246-6000
FAX: (818) 246-4017
Accounting Standards Division 
American Institute of Certified 
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We appreciate the opportunity to express our comments related to this Exposure Draft
and are available to discuss our letter further, if you desire.
Certified
Public 
Accountants
Very truly yours,
Richard A. Clark, Chairman
Accounting Principles & Auditing Standards Committee 
California Society of Certified Public Accountants
100 W. Broadway
Suite 500
Glendale, CA
91210-0001
(818) 246-6000
EAX: (818) 246-4017
May 18, 1993
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, Inc.
105 Chauncy Street, Boston, MA 02111 (617) 556-4000 FAX (617) 556-4126 Toll Free 1-800-392-6145
Accounting Standards Executive Committee
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americans, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft of "Proposed Statement of Position (SOP) Employers’ 
Accounting for Employees Stock Ownership Plan"
Gentlemen:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Procedures Committee is the senior technical committee 
of the Massachusetts Society of CPAs’. The Committee consists of over thirty members who are 
affiliated with public accounting firms of various sizes, industry and academia. The Committee 
has reviewed and discussed the Exposure Draft of "Proposed Statement of Position (SOP) 
Employers’ Accounting for Employees Stock Ownership Plan" and offers the following 
comments.
The Committee is in basic agreement with all aspects of the Exposure Draft, except for the 
provision that expense would be based upon the current fair value of shares released, rather than 
the original cost to the ESOP.
Our concern is that this would be a departure from the prohibition of recognition of gain or loss 
when a corporation deals in its own stock. It would seem incongruous to recognize the gain or 
loss in relation to recording the compensation expense but have the corresponding adjustment go 
to additional paid-in-capital.
The fact that there has been a fluctuation in the fair market value of a corporation’s stock 
between the time when it was "purchased" and when it was "released" should not enter into the 
measurement of compensation expense.
The Committee has concerns regarding the use of "fair value accounting" in connection with this 
issue while the movement towards greater use of fair value accounting is still in process. In 
addition, because of the proposed grandfather provisions, the Committee believes that there will 
be a lack of comparability for many years subsequent to adoption of the provisions of this 
statement
The Committee appreciates the opportunity to participate in AcSec’s due process procedures and 
we hope that our responses are helpful to AcSec in its deliberations.
Very truly yours, 
Mary E. Barth, Chair
Accounting Principles & Auditing Procedures Committee 
of the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants
Date April 23, 1993
INTERNAL MEMORANDUM
Reply:
To:
Dionne McNamee
Tom Lemmo
From:
Comments on Proposed SOP on ESOPs
Subject:
The Professional Issues Subcommittee of the Members in Industry 
Executive Committee will not comment as a group on the Proposed 
Statement of Position, Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans.
I am enclosing, however, comment letters from two members of the 
Subcommittee for the consideration of the Task Force on Accounting 
for ESOPs. As indicated, these letters represent the personal 
views of the respondent individuals, and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of their respective employer organizations, the 
Professional Issues Subcommittee or the Members in Industry 
Executive Committee.
If you or the Task Force members have any questions, please contact 
me at extension 6122 in New York.
cc: Mike Bohan
Holly Nelson 
Larry Handler 
Hal Hyatt 
Chester Sadowski 
David Summers
BP AMERICA
Michael P. Bohan
Regional Center Controller
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BP America Inc.
200 Public Square 38-3801-N 
Cleveland, OH 44114-2375
Phone: 216-586-3984
Fax: 216-586-5420
March 10, 1993
Mr. Thomas J. Lemmon
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Proposed Statement of Position - Employers’ Accounting 
for Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Dear Tom:
For openers, Jerry Searfoss, the Chairman of the ESOP Task Force, told me that of 
the seven members on the Task Force, two were from industry -- Leonard A. 
Brams, from United Technologies and Frederick W. Deichmann, from General 
Reinsurance. He said that both of those enterprises have significant ESOPs and that 
was the main reason for these individuals being assigned to the ESOP Task Force. 
That gives me considerable comfort that appropriate industry representation was 
in place, however as I look at my comments I wonder if these folks were in the 
majority or not. The dissenting views seem to focus on what I would describe as a 
grandfathering situation, so it’s not clear to me as to the level of concurrence on the 
part of these individuals. I guess I’d like to contact them to see if they are happy 
with the document, on the other hand, it may be inappropriate to make such 
contact. I’d appreciate any counsel you may have in this regard.
I have one overriding concern, and that’s shared in the minority position. The 
FASB appears to be about ready to expose their document on stock compensation 
— I’m concerned that AcSEC may be providing guidance that could only be a short­
term fix and may even ultimately be undone if the approach taken by the FASB 
differs from that in the proposed SOP. Accordingly, I would provide a general 
recommendation that AcSEC defer action. I realize that the FASB has had an 
opportunity to review the SOP in its pre-exposure stage and apparently has not 
objected to exposure, so that waters down my argument a bit. However, I am 
concerned that we’ve got too many folks addressing aspects of compensation 
which I believe should be encompassed in the FASB project.
Mr. Thomas Lemmon
AICPA
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Having said that, I am basically in agreement with the guidance provided in the 
proposed SOP. There are some provisions which I believe need some fine tuning 
or reconsideration, as follows:
Paragraph 2 -- I believe that the references to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) should be more specific by 
reference to section numbers or the related sections should 
be included as exhibits to this document.
Paragraph 12 —
Paragraph 14 —
Paragraph 16 --
The sentence regarding “released shares” indicates they 
“must be allocated.” Who says? I presume it is a 
requirement of either ERISA or of the IRC, but it’s not clear 
here. There are similar comments throughout the document 
that “something” must be done without providing any 
reference as to why it is mandatory. Without such a 
reference it appears that the SOP itself will require such 
treatment.
I see where they’re going, but the initial sentence is difficult 
to read. I’m not sure I can provide any better guidance, 
having not participated in their deliberations, but I 
recommend they look at the wording one more time.
As I read the requirements here, I have no basic problem 
but I wonder if any of these plans have any vesting features 
which need to be considered in determining the 
measurement of compensation. Under pension and other 
postretirement benefit plans the accrual accounting that is 
used during an individual’s active service period includes a 
factor for turnover in case the individual does not fully vest in 
the benefits under the plan — is it possible that under an 
ESOP a similar situation could occur? If so, should there not 
be a provision with respect to this? It’s quite possible that 
the law requires everything to be vested, but I didn’t pick 
that up in my reading (I could have missed it).
Mr. Thomas Lemmon
AICPA
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Paragraph 21 -
Paragraph 23 -
Paragraph 24 --
Paragraph 30 --
Paragraph 45 &
Paragraph 46 --
The treatment of dividends on unallocated shares leaves me 
cold. If the shares are unallocated, then why aren’t the 
dividends paid thereon afforded the same accounting as the 
related unearned compensation cost attributed to 
unallocated shares? In other words, shouldn’t the dividends 
on unallocated shares go into the deferred compensation 
account and only be recognized as a compensation cost as 
the related shares are ultimately allocated? I have a great deal 
of difficulty understanding how the last sentence of this 
paragraph operates, how can dividends on unallocated shares 
be paid to participants or added to participant accounts if in 
fact they haven’t as yet been allocated to specific 
participants? It just doesn’t flow.
The first sentence mentions a requirement, similar to my 
earlier comment (Paragraph 12) — where is this requirement? 
(Please note that I have not identified all sections where this 
wording is contained in the document, but I’m pointing this 
out as another example.)
This paragraph is another example of an issue being 
addressed by the FASB -- how to treat repurchase of shares 
both under employee stock plans and in general when put 
options are outstanding.
The first bullet indicates that a direct loan "... often include[s] 
some formal guarantee or commitment by the employer.” 
What if there is no guarantee or commitment — does that 
imply a different type of accounting is to be employed? I 
believe the document should address all situations.
Subparagraph a. states that “convertible preferred shares 
held by ESOPs generally cannot remain outstanding 
indefinitely” — why not?
I think I’m missing something here. Shouldn’t there first be 
a discussion of the employer’s accounting for the asset 
reversion and then accounting guidance provided for the 
transfer to the ESOP. As I read this paragraph, I feel there is 
a step missing that may need some clarification.
Mr. Thomas Lemmon
AICPA
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Paragraph 52 -- Is this paragraph really needed? Cannot the guidance be 
appropriately determined by reference to FASB Statement 
No. 109? I believe as written Paragraph 52 is confusing. Isn’t 
all they’re saying is that if expense is recognized in the P&L, 
then the associated tax benefit should be recognized in the 
P&L; if expense is not recognized in the P&L, because the 
associated charge is to retain earnings, then any related tax 
benefit should similarly be credited to retained earnings.
Paragraph 59 -- I’m not convinced that the statement in the last sentence is 
correct, "... each element is reported in accordance with its 
substance as it would be reported if it occurred as a separate 
transaction.” If an enterprise guaranteed the debt of another 
enterprise and it was likely that the guarantor would be called 
upon to make good on its guarantee, the guarantor would 
record the liability at the time this determination is made 
(similar to the recognition of the employer’s substantive 
obligation on ESOP debt) but the guarantor would also 
immediately recognize expense, not defer it over some 
future period as is the case with respect to the deferred 
compensation aspect under this proposed SOP. To me, the 
ability to defer the compensation aspect is the result of 
linking the features of the guarantee and the intention with 
respect to future allocation of shares to the employees. 
Accordingly, I believe the SOP really looks at the substance 
of the entire transaction, not the individual pieces. I believe 
one must look to the substance of an entire transaction, not 
fragment it and try to account for the pieces as entirely 
separable. So, while I agree with the treatment of the 
obligation and the deferred compensation expense under 
the proposed SOP, I believe the statement in the final 
sentence of Paragraph 59 is not in fact representative of the 
concept upon which the proposed SOP is based.
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Paragraph 61 -  I believe we used to refer to the treatment described in this 
paragraph as a “constructive retirement” of shares followed 
by a “constructive reissuance.” It might be helpful to use this 
traditional terminology to assist the reader in relating the 
accounting prescribed in the proposed SOP to situations 
they have encountered in the past.
Please note that the foregoing comments are my personal views and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of BP America or its parent.
I hope the above is sufficiently clear for your to proceed. Please give me a call if 
you have any questions.
Very truly yours,
MPB:cnb
cc: Lawrence Handler
Harold A. Hyatt 
Mary Molloy 
Holly Nelson 
Chester Sadowski, Jr.
M1021
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Mr. Thomas J. Lemmon
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Tom:
Attached are my comments on the proposed Statement of Position, Employers' 
Accounting for Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Sorry my response is not more 
comprehensive, but I have not had any practical experience in this area, and have 
had to spend most of my time on our yearend close.
If you have questions, please contact me at 612-726-7295. I have also included 
my registration form for the spring Members in Industry Conference as we 
discussed.
Sincerely,
Professional Issues Subcommittee
Enclosures
cc: Michael Bohan
Holly L. Nelson, Member
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SPECIFIC ISSUES REQUESTED TO BE ADDRESSED
Issue 1: Recognition of Compensation Cost
This is a difficult question. To be consistent with APB Opinion No. 25, it would 
appear that the utilization of fair market value would be preferred. However, 
a contradiction arises in that the form of the plans is Ignored (e.g. the ESOP 
debt is considered the company's debt). This would support valuation utilizing 
the cost to the ESOP as any profit is eliminated in related party transactions, 
which you could possibly apply to an F.SOP from a theoretical standpoint. I see 
this argument especially applicable as related to paragraph 70 when treasury 
shares are utilized to fund liabilities. It would seem more appropriate in those 
circumstances to use cost to measure compensation expense, versus fair market 
value. So a potential alternative would be to utilize fair market value for 
newly issued shares and cost for treasury shares. Whether this makes sense from 
all facets of the issue would need to be re-evaluated by AcSEC.
Issue 2: Effective Date and Transition
The 1993 effective date is aggressive, especially considering the requirement to 
restate interim periods. One of the topics wo discussed at our first meeting was 
standards overload. With the required adoption of SFAS 106 and 109 in 1993, this 
is just one more issue to address with shrinking personnel resources. The 
complexities and costs to private companies to determine market value are in 
addition to the actuarial costs of SFAS 106. I would recommend a 1994 effective 
date. Earlier adoption could be encouraged, but not required.
Not working with ESOPs in practice, what is the significance of September 23, 
1992? I don't understand and it would be my recommendation to utilize something 
geared to the end of the calendar or fiscal year timeframe. If there is a reason 
for that date, it should be explained. The proposed transition rules appear 
appropriate.
Issue 3: Disclosures
I would concur that the proposed pro forma disclosures be required only of public 
companies.
OTHER COMMENTS
Definition of Committed to be Released
Not familiar with this area, it was not clear to me how probable this requirement 
was. Did it have to be probable or guaranteed to be recognized? My assumption 
is that it had to be guaranteed versus probable as nothing addressed what the 
accounting would be if the shares were never released due to unexpected 
circumstances. I would recommend that this be clarified. It would also be my 
recommendation that the definition be guaranteed and not probable.
Paragraph 37--Sale of Suspense Shares
The entire SOP requires any share valuations to be at fair market value. In this 
paragraph specifies at the cost of the shares to the ESOP. That appears to be 
contradictory, other than these shares arc in suspense which is a different stage 
than committed to be released. However, the next paragraph indicates the 
treasury stock purchase to be done at fair market value. This accounting 
recommended here seems to be inconsistent and 1 would question why the different 
approach is recommended.
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Paragraph 54--Disclosures
I would conclude on item f that the disclosure of the number of shares would be 
adequate unless repurchase is imminent. The price for repurchase could be 
totally unrelated to the fair market value. Also, are the pro forma requirements 
for the most recent year or all years presented after adoption? This should be 
clarified.
Paragraph 66--Timing of Recognition
AeSEC's conclusion that the allocation date or the date that employees become 
vested is not significant for accounting purposes makes sense and I would concur 
with those conclusions.
Minority View
I would concur with the minority view that if there is a chance that this 
accounting could be superseded by another project that it may be best to not to 
issue at this time until AcSoc is comfortable the proposed accounting will stand. 
As it appears an exposure draft is to be issued this year, this assessment should 
be able to be made.
Other than the items noted above, I concur with the proposed accounting and 
disclosures.
BORDEN, INC.
180 EAST BROAD STREET • COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215
JAMES M. HESS
VICE PRESIDENT 
AND 
GENERAL CONTROLLERJune 8, 1993
Ms. Dionne D. McNamee 
Technical Manager 
Accounting Standards Division, File 2500 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1007
Dear Ms. McNamee:
We offer the following comments regarding the Exposure Draft on the 
proposed Statement of Position - Employers' Accounting for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans.
Background re: the Borden ESOP
There are two elements of our integrated ESOP/401-K plan design which are 
somewhat unique and which cause questions as to the application of this 
proposed SOP. First, the Borden ESOP has no external or internal debt, 
however, shares are placed in the ESOP before the exact allocation to 
participants is known. Thus, under the proposed SOP our plan has 
attributes of both leveraged and nonleveraged plans. Second, shares for 
the 401-K match are allocated to participants based on the historical cost 
to the ESOP of those shares. For example, assume shares are purchased or 
issued from treasury stock when the fair market value is $20 and they are 
allocated to participants six months later when the FMV is $25. If a 
participant has a match contribution of $100, the participant would 
receive five shares (not four). If the FMV assumptions were reversed, the 
participant would receive only four shares.
Typically, Borden purchases shares on the open market or issues treasury 
stock for a year's requirements of the 401-K Company match. The charge is 
recorded to a deferred charge. The ESOP has never had more than one 
year's worth of shares for the 401-K match and the calculation of the 
future requirement is relatively easy since the shares are allocated at 
the ESOP's cost. Compensation expense is recorded as the shares are 
allocated to the participants based on the historical cost of the shares 
(which would also represent the cost of the match if it were paid in 
cash). The acquisition of the shares by the ESOP, the earning of the 
shares by the participants, the allocation of shares to participants and 
the recording of the expense all occur within twelve months, sometimes 
within the same fiscal year. On some occasions the shares were purchased 
in December just prior to year-end.
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The only difference between our plan and the typical nonleveraged ESOP is 
that there is up to a twelve month delay between the acquisition of shares 
by the ESOP and the allocation of the shares. As mentioned earlier, this 
delay does not affect the basis for share allocation since they are 
allocated based on the cost of the shares to the ESOP.
Comments on the Proposed SOP
Since the proposed SOP specifies different accounting practices for 
leveraged and nonleveraged plans, these terms should be formally defined 
in the SOP. Conceptually, it would appear that the most important 
difference between leveraged and nonleveraged ESOPs is that the former 
will require future sacrifices by the ESOP (in the form of forfeited 
dividends, employer contributions, etc.) in order to fund the interest and 
debt. Nonleveraged ESOPs obtain their shares without any future 
obligations or sacrifices on the part of the ESOP and shares are allocated 
to the participants within a single accounting period. At a minimum the 
following change (shown in italics) should be made to paragraph 40 of the 
SOP. "The shares contributed or acquired with the cash contributed, which 
may be outstanding shares, treasury shares, or newly issued shares, are 
allocated to participant accounts "within a single accounting period" and 
held ...".
The definition of "committed to be released shares" could also be 
clarified with the following addition. Shares are considered committed to 
be released when substantially all of the risks and rewards associated 
with the shares have been transferred to the participants.
If you should have any questions regarding our comments please call 
Michael Stoner at (614) 225-3497.
urs,
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